Allan M. Kaufman

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for constructive dismissal after being temporarily laid off due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the plaintiff was an employee from the start of his tenure, despite initially being paid through a personal corporation.

The court also held that the employment contract signed mid-employment was void for lack of consideration.

The employer had no contractual right to lay off the plaintiff, resulting in a constructive dismissal.

The court awarded 15 months' reasonable notice and $25,000 in punitive damages due to the employer's failure to pay statutory minimums.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment because of disability following her termination.

The respondent requested that the Tribunal defer the application pending the resolution of a parallel civil court action regarding a motorcycle accident in the respondent's parking lot.

The Tribunal denied the request for deferral, finding that the legal issues were distinct and there was no significant risk of inconsistent decisions, as the civil proceeding did not raise issues of discrimination or termination.

The respondent employer brought a request for an order during proceedings to remove a personal respondent and to strike background allegations from the human rights application.

The Tribunal removed the personal respondent on consent.

The Tribunal declined to strike the background allegations regarding the cause of the applicant's disability, finding they were not alleged Code infringements subject to dismissal for delay under s. 34(1), and held that their relevance and admissibility should be determined by the hearing adjudicator.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, claiming she was laid off after taking a medical leave.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal addressed several preliminary requests.

On consent, a personally named respondent was removed from the application.

The applicant's union was granted intervenor status.

The respondent's request for a summary hearing was denied because there was a central factual dispute regarding the timing of the decision to lay off the applicant.

The respondent's request to dismiss the application under section 45.1 of the Code or as an abuse of process was deferred until after the parties attempt mediation.

The applicants, children with disabilities attending a private school, alleged discrimination on the basis of disability because they did not receive certain educational supports funded by the respondents.

The respondents requested dismissal of the application, arguing it had no reasonable prospect of success given the Divisional Court's decision in Cooper v. Ontario, which held that O. Reg. 386/99 is not discriminatory.

The Tribunal agreed, finding it was bound by the Divisional Court's determination that the regulation does not discriminate on the basis of disability.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant alleged that the respondents refused to hire him as a truck driver because of his age and disability, contrary to the Human Rights Code.

The respondents maintained that the decision was based on his driving infraction record, his AZ licence status, and his current employment elsewhere.

The Tribunal found the respondents' evidence credible and concluded that the decision not to hire the applicant was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, children attending private faith-based schools, challenged Ontario's failure to provide them with special education benefits available in public schools.

They argued this exclusion violated their freedom of religion and equality rights under the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Supreme Court's decision in Adler v. Ontario foreclosed the freedom of religion claim.

The court also held that the challenged regulation, O. Reg. 386/99, which provides some health services to private school students, is an ameliorative program under s. 15(2) of the Charter and does not discriminate on the basis of disability.

A secondary claim seeking language therapy under the regulation was also dismissed, with the court finding a rational basis for the province's distinction between speech and language disorders.