L. Favreau

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences, including robbery with a firearm, arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant's DNA on a pry bar left at the scene and his subsequent arrest in a stolen vehicle containing items taken during the robbery.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended identification evidence, failed to consider alternative explanations for the DNA evidence, and erred in finding a real firearm was used.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial evidence was reasonable and the alternative explanations were speculative.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims against a mortgage brokerage and a lawyer under Rule 21.01.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the brokerage, finding no factual connection pleaded.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the lawyer, holding that the motion judge erred in finding the lawyer immune from liability for allegedly participating in a fraud while acting on client instructions, and erred in concluding the claim was barred by res judicata without sufficient evidence that the same cause of action was previously argued.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter for acting as the getaway driver in a premeditated murder-for-hire plot.

He was sentenced to nine and a half years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in finding he was aware the shooter had a gun and that the sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence and consistent with the jury's verdict.

The sentence was held to be fit given the appellant's significant moral culpability and the premeditated nature of the offence.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of assault and sexual assault against his former romantic partner and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by admitting a screenshot of a text message exchange without independent authentication and by failing to give adequate limiting instructions to the jury regarding its reliability.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to Gladue and Morris factors relating to his Black and Indigenous ancestry.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the complainant's testimony was sufficient to authenticate the screenshot and the jury instructions were adequate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in weighing the mitigating factors against the gravity of the offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction and three-year sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge found that the complainant was extremely intoxicated and incapable of consenting, relying on circumstantial evidence including the complainant's state when awoken and the presence of the appellant's DNA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and the trial judge's use of common sense inferences appropriate.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year sentence fell within the established range for sexual assault involving forced penetration, regardless of whether the victim was awake or sleeping.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and arson in the death of his intimate partner.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased about their relationship, failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, and permitting lay opinion evidence from firefighters about his demeanour at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statements were properly admitted under the state of mind exception, a bad character limiting instruction was unnecessary given the specific directions provided, and the demeanour evidence was admissible lay opinion.

The appellant municipality was charged with contraventions under the Endangered Species Act for road maintenance activities that allegedly harmed an endangered butterfly species.

The municipality sought declaratory relief stating that its road maintenance obligations under the Municipal Act superseded the Endangered Species Act, exempting it from compliance.

The application judge dismissed the application as premature and not ripe for adjudication, noting the municipality had not attempted to obtain a permit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding that the issues were not justiciable and should be addressed either through the permit process or in the ongoing quasi-criminal prosecution.

The appellant commenced an action against opposing counsel from a previous proceeding, seeking punitive damages and a direction for Law Society disciplinary proceedings.

The motion judge struck the claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellant appealed.

The respondent requested the appeal be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting the absence of a duty of care, absolute privilege, and the doctrine of collateral attack.

The appellants were convicted of procuring, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

At trial, the judge applied section 276 of the Criminal Code to restrict the appellants from cross-examining the complainant about her prior work in the sex trade.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that section 276 does not apply categorically to sexual services and human trafficking offences, and that the trial judge erred in applying it to restrict relevant cross-examination.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeals in respect of the sexual services offences, and ordered a new trial.

An appeal against a conviction for trafficking MDMA was dismissed.

The appellants sued their former lawyer and her firm for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract, alleging she failed to proceed promptly with motions, incurred unnecessary costs, and obtained inadequate costs awards.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the lawyer was successful in her conduct of the litigation and was not responsible for the delays or the quantum of costs awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions and agreeing that expert evidence was required to establish the standard of care regarding a settlement offer.