Jeff Marshman

The Crown appealed an application judge's order staying drug trafficking proceedings against the respondents due to a breach of their right to trial within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling, and the Crown argued the delay was justified by the complexity of the multi-accused project investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the Crown failed to meet its burden to show the case was sufficiently complex to justify the delay, particularly since the respondents were not participating in a lengthy pre-trial application that complicated other related prosecutions.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a fatal stabbing during an altercation.

At trial, he relied on self-defence and the partial defence of provocation.

During deliberations, the jury asked several questions seeking clarification on the elements of provocation, specifically the meaning of 'sudden' and 'sufficient'.

The trial judge's answers failed to adequately clarify the issues and amounted to misdirection regarding what conduct had to be sudden.

The Court of Appeal found the answers deficient, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his domestic partner and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody credit, based on a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued for a further sentence reduction due to harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the sentence was based on a joint submission by experienced counsel and was entirely fit.

The appellant appealed his conviction on two counts of sexual assault relating to two complainants at a house party.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and provided insufficient reasons for her factual conclusions regarding his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility assessments were sound, available on the record, and supported by clear reasons.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's refusal to order a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) assessment and the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit for an offender convicted of possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace.

The offender, a homeless man with schizophrenia, was involved in an altercation with a taxi driver and a homeless couple.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decision to refuse the assessment based on the evidence, including video surveillance.

The court also upheld the trial judge's allocation of pre-sentence custody credit across multiple charges, applying the principles from Barnett.

The accused, charged with making, circulating, or publishing a false prospectus contrary to s. 400 of the Criminal Code, brought a motion for a directed verdict after the Crown closed its case.

The accused argued there was insufficient evidence that she knew the prospectus contained a material misrepresentation regarding a $20 million private placement, or that she actively circulated it.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the circumstantial evidence—including her role as a founding member, her signing of the prospectus, and her failure to act when informed of severe financial discrepancies—was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt by a properly instructed jury.

The court held that the limited weighing of circumstantial evidence on a directed verdict motion does not permit the judge to resolve competing inferences, which remains the province of the jury.

The self-represented applicant, facing serious fraud-related charges in a lengthy jury trial, suffered a severe cardiac event during the trial.

Medical evidence from his cardiologists indicated a 100% blockage of a main artery and recommended two to three months of rest to avoid a potentially fatal heart attack.

The court granted the motion for a mistrial, finding that continuing the trial posed a serious risk to the applicant's health and his ability to make full answer and defence.

The applicant agreed to waive any s. 11(b) Charter arguments arising from the delay.

Les requérants, accusés de fraude et de parjure, ont présenté une motion en vertu de l'alinéa 11(b) de la Charte pour obtenir un arrêt des procédures en raison de délais déraisonnables.

Le délai total anticipé entre le dépôt des accusations et la fin du procès était de plus de 50 mois.

Après avoir déduit les délais imputables à la défense, le délai net dépassait le plafond de 30 mois établi par l'arrêt Jordan.

La Cour a conclu que le dossier était d'une complexité particulière justifiant les délais excédentaires, compte tenu du volume de la preuve, du nombre de témoins, de la tenue d'un procès conjoint et bilingue devant jury, et de la nature des accusations.

La motion a été rejetée.