J. Di Luca

The plaintiff hired the defendant to construct a pole barn.

The defendant abandoned the project before completion, citing delays and health issues, leaving the barn unfinished and exposed to the elements.

The defendant failed to appear at trial.

The court found the defendant liable for breach of contract and awarded the plaintiff $71,288.13 in damages, representing the overpayment for work performed and the estimated cost to complete the barn to the contract's specifications, plus $10,500 in costs.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking following an undercover police investigation.

The accused delivered cocaine and fentanyl to an undercover officer on four occasions after deals were brokered by a co-conspirator.

The court admitted the co-conspirator's text messages under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.

The court found the accused guilty on all trafficking counts, concluding he had knowledge of the illicit nature of the substances.

The court also found the accused guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking regarding drugs found in an apartment, finding constructive possession proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant Township brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for defamation, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The action arose after the Township posted unsolicited, unvetted, and allegedly defamatory public comments about the plaintiffs' proposed farm brewery on its website.

The court found the breach of fiduciary duty claim did not arise from an expression and could proceed.

The negligence claim was dismissed for lacking substantial merit.

The defamation claim was allowed to proceed, as the court found it had substantial merit, the Township's defences lacked a real prospect of success, and the public interest in allowing the claim to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the unvetted, vitriolic public comments.

The applicant insurer brought a motion to compel the respondent insured to attend an examination under oath and produce cell tower and banking records following a vehicle theft claim.

The insurer suspected the insured misrepresented her residential address.

During the hearing, the insured agreed to attend the examination, so the court adjourned that request sine die.

The court dismissed the request for documentary production, finding the insurer's demands for months of location and financial data to be abusive, a fishing expedition, and an unwarranted invasion of privacy.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to evict the defendant from her condominium unit and for damages for unpaid condominium fees and loss of opportunity.

The defendant, who had occupied the unit since 2011 under an oral agreement to pay condominium fees, refused to vacate and counterclaimed for reimbursement of fees paid.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the defendant was a trespasser and ordering his eviction.

The court awarded $38,765 in damages for unpaid condominium fees but declined to award damages for loss of opportunity.

The defendant's counterclaim was dismissed as lacking merit and being barred by issue estoppel from prior Landlord and Tenant Board proceedings.

The plaintiff brought an action against the police for negligence, trespass, conversion, and Charter violations arising from their response to her complaint of voyeurism against her domestic partner.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to strike portions of the claim, arguing they disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a fresh examination for discovery, alleging that the defendants' counsel thwarted the initial discoveries through improper refusals and uncivil conduct.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the pleadings properly supported the claims regarding the plaintiff's mistreatment.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for fresh discoveries, concluding that the defendants' counsel took an erroneous position on relevance and engaged in unwarranted personal attacks that undermined the discovery process.

The Public Guardian and Trustee brought an application seeking to declare the respondent incapable of personal care and property management, and to be appointed as his permanent guardian.

The court found insufficient evidence to declare the respondent incapable of personal care, despite concerns about his living conditions.

However, the court found the respondent incapable of managing his property and removed his mother as guardian due to her failure to pass accounts and abide by a management plan, appointing the PGT in her place.

The offender was convicted of the first-degree murder of one young woman and the manslaughter of another.

Both victims were vulnerable and their bodies were dismembered and disposed of in a callous manner.

The court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 25 years for the murder.

For the manslaughter, the court found extreme aggravating factors, including the complete desecration of the victim's body, and imposed a sentence of 18 years imprisonment to be served concurrently.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the trial judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by using inflammatory language in a supplementary ruling on a recusal motion, after defence counsel observed the judge with a draft judgment during submissions.

The appellant also alleged errors in the trial judge's Charter analysis under ss. 8, 9, 10(b), and 24(2) regarding the roadside screening device and the right to counsel of choice.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's comments about counsel were problematic, they did not meet the high threshold for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court also upheld the trial judge's Charter findings, concluding there was no misapprehension of evidence and the police waited a reasonable time for counsel of choice.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) and an interim injunction regarding a family cottage property.

The parties, who are siblings, disputed ownership and use of the property after the defendant changed the locks and excluded the plaintiffs.

The court found a triable issue regarding the plaintiffs' claim for a constructive or resulting trust based on their financial contributions and historical use.

The court granted the CPL and an interim injunction preserving the status quo, allowing both families exclusive use of separate cottages on the property pending the resolution of the action.

The accused, charged with two counts of first-degree murder, brought multiple Charter applications seeking the exclusion of evidence.

He alleged violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel regarding initial utterances to police, his s. 9 right against arbitrary detention regarding his arrest for one of the murders, and his s. 8 right against unreasonable search and seizure regarding the forensic re-testing of a seized knife and freezer, as well as the use of a general warrant to obtain Google data.

The court dismissed all applications, finding no Charter breaches.

The court held the accused was not detained prior to his arrest, the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, no residual privacy interest remained in the lawfully seized physical items, and the general warrant was appropriately issued.

The offender, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of assault for striking a young Black man in the face with a metal pipe while the victim was injured and seeking help.

The court emphasized the need for denunciation and general deterrence, noting the breach of public trust and the racialized context of the offence.

The offender was sentenced to 9 months in jail, followed by 12 months of probation, along with DNA, weapons prohibition, and non-communication orders.

Prior to the offender's sentencing, the Crown sought to file a community impact statement from the Black Action Defence Committee.

The defence objected to portions of the statement, arguing they exceeded the permissible scope under section 722.2 of the Criminal Code, and sought redactions.

The court held that while much of the statement provided necessary context regarding the impact of the offence on the Black community, two specific portions were irrelevant or inflammatory and required redaction.

The court otherwise declined to redact the statement, noting it would disregard any impermissible content.

The applicant, having been acquitted of aggravated assault but convicted of the lesser included offence of simple assault, applied to re-open the trial before sentencing.

The applicant argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to find him guilty of simple assault, asserting that aggravated assault under s. 268 of the Criminal Code does not contain a lesser included offence of assault.

The court declined to exercise its discretion to re-open the trial, emphasizing the principle of finality and noting the argument should have been raised during closing submissions.

The court also rejected the substantive argument, affirming that simple assault is a lesser included offence of aggravated assault.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges including second degree murder, arising from a stabbing during a drug deal turned robbery.

The preliminary inquiry justice had committed the applicant for murder based on the combined operation of s. 229(c) and s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

The reviewing court found this was a jurisdictional error, as there was no evidence the applicant had subjective foresight that an intentional murder was likely to be committed.

The committal for second degree murder was quashed and replaced with manslaughter, while committals on remaining drug and weapons charges were upheld.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of $581,787.01 obtained by the plaintiff in relation to a defaulted mortgage.

The court applied the test for setting aside a default judgment and found that while the defendants had no arguable defence regarding the $500,000 principal and accrued interest, they did have an arguable defence regarding the penalties, charges, and costs awarded.

The court partially granted the motion, upholding the judgment for the principal and interest but setting aside the portion relating to penalties, charges, and costs.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender and long-term offender application following the offender's convictions for a series of violent, random attacks on women, including robbery, attempted sexual assault, and break and enter.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that the offender's risk of violent re-offence was moderate and did not meet the high threshold of intractability required for such designations.

The court imposed a global sentence of 14 years imprisonment, reduced to 6 years and 6 months net after accounting for pre-sentence custody and enhanced credit for harsh lockdown conditions.

The offender, a medical doctor, was convicted by a jury of trafficking in fentanyl.

He participated in a scheme with a pharmacist and others, prescribing over 4,000 fentanyl patches for financial gain.

The court found his actions constituted a severe breach of trust motivated by greed.

Emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation, the court sentenced the offender to 12 years in prison, along with ancillary orders.

The Crown applied for an order permitting the complainant and her mother to testify by video link from Quebec in a trial for human trafficking and sexual assault.

The defence opposed the complainant testifying by video link but did not strenuously oppose the mother's request.

The court granted the application for the mother to testify from Quebec under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code.

For the complainant, the court found it appropriate for her to testify outside the courtroom but ordered that she must do so from the Oshawa courthouse, citing concerns about managing cross-examination with documents and transcripts if she were in Quebec.

The respondent was found guilty of civil contempt for violating an interim order prohibiting him from communicating with the Town of Aurora and its officials pending a vexatious litigant application.

The court rejected the respondent's proposals to purge his contempt, finding he lacked insight and remained committed to his cause.

The court ordered the respondent to pay a fine of $1,500 and costs of $10,000, emphasizing the need for general and specific deterrence.