G. Dow

The plaintiff, a minor who suffered a skull fracture when struck by a reversing vehicle, sought court approval of a $620,000 settlement under Rule 7.08.

The court approved the settlement amount but found the proposed 25% contingency fee of $124,576.15 unreasonable given the low risk of non-recovery and the docketed time.

The court reduced the legal fee to $100,000 and ordered the balance of the proceeds to be paid into court for the minor's benefit.

The defendant brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action arising from a tweet about the plaintiff media outlet.

The court found the tweet related to a matter of public interest.

While the plaintiff established a real prospect of success on the merits and that the defences of fair comment and justification might not succeed, it failed to demonstrate the existence of harm resulting from the tweet.

The court concluded the public interest in continuing the action did not outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendant's freedom of expression.

The action was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendant.

The applicant landlord sought to terminate a commercial lease and obtain vacant possession due to the respondent tenant's non-payment of rent, failure to maintain insurance, and unauthorized residential use of the premises.

The tenant, who operated a martial arts studio, had been forced to close due to COVID-19 provincial orders and paid only 25% of the rent.

The court declined to grant the landlord's application, finding that the default was clearly related to the global pandemic and government-mandated shutdown.

The court exercised its equitable jurisdiction to grant the tenant relief from forfeiture, conditional upon the tenant providing proof of insurance and ceasing residential use within ten days.

The applicants, a chiropractic business, sought urgent relief after receiving a Notice to Terminate their commercial lease from the respondent landlord.

The core issue was whether the applicants had validly exercised their second five-year option to renew the lease.

The court found that despite the lack of a formal lease document and some irregularities, the applicants had provided timely notice of their intent to renew, and the landlord's subsequent conduct, including rent negotiations, indicated acceptance.

The court concluded the lease was in effect and properly extended.

The plaintiff franchisor brought a motion for summary judgment for unpaid royalties and advertising expenses incurred after the franchise agreement expired.

The defendants argued the claims were statute-barred and raised credibility issues.

The court found that the terms of the expired agreement continued to govern the parties' relationship as they had operated under it for 19 months post-expiry.

However, the court held that claims arising more than two years before the Statement of Claim was issued were statute-barred.

Judgment was granted for amounts billed within the limitation period, with interest.

The plaintiff sought partial summary judgment against the defendants for a loan of $1.25 million.

The defendants argued the loan included fees that exceeded the criminal interest rate under s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment for the undisputed advanced funds of $1,050,000.00, as the defendants failed to provide an actuary certificate to prove the criminal interest rate for the remaining disputed amount.

The court awarded interest at 30% up to the issuance of the claim, and 2% thereafter.

The plaintiffs, two numbered companies acting as financing vehicles for tax shelter schemes, sued the defendant investor for repayment of $6.29 million in loans.

The defendant argued that the loans were satisfied by preferred shares held in trust and that claims for earlier loans were statute-barred.

The court found that the claims for the earlier loans were out of time as the limitation period commenced when the loans matured or were demanded by the tax shelter's operating company acting as the plaintiffs' agent.

Furthermore, the court held that the preferred shares were intended to repay the loans.

The action and the defendant's counterclaim were dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion for wrongful dismissal damages after being terminated by the defendant due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court applied the Bardal factors, noting the plaintiff's 9.8 years of service, age of 39, and specialized training, to award an 11-month notice period.

The court included pension contributions and a 10% benefits value in the award, but declined to reimburse post-termination training expenses.

The court also found that a 25% salary reduction prior to termination constituted constructive dismissal, meaning the plaintiff's subsequent resignation did not reduce her entitlement.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the jury notice in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision, citing delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court considered the factors for striking a jury notice before trial, including local court resources, the age of the case, and prejudice to the parties.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a just cause or compelling reason to strike the jury notice at this time.

The motion was dismissed, with costs awarded to the defendant.

The plaintiff, injured while a passenger on a bus, brought a motion to strike the jury notice due to COVID-19 delays and to permit witnesses to testify virtually.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to amend their Statement of Defence to allege contributory negligence and failure to mitigate.

The court granted the defendants' motion to amend, finding the proposed amendments legally tenable.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to strike the jury notice at this time, noting the availability of jury trial facilities in Toronto and the substantive right to a jury, but adjourned the trial.

The court granted the request to allow witnesses to testify by video conference, subject to notice requirements.

The applicant, a person under disability following a catastrophic motor vehicle accident, sought court approval of a $675,000 all-inclusive settlement for statutory accident benefits.

The court approved the settlement amount as being in the applicant's best interests.

However, the court found the proposed contingency fee of $164,714.87 to be unreasonable given the moderate-to-low risk and the limited time docketed.

The court reduced the approved legal fees to $70,000.

The plaintiff, a 62-year-old former Director of Product Design and Development with 11.65 years of service, sued for wrongful dismissal after his employment was terminated.

The court applied the Bardal factors and awarded a 16-month reasonable notice period, including base salary, unpaid bonus, benefits, and pension contributions.

The plaintiff's claim for bad faith damages, based on the employer's late disclosure of a superseding employment contract, was dismissed as the conduct did not meet the required threshold.

The plaintiff, a 59-year-old senior executive with 14 years of service, was terminated without cause.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court determined the reasonable notice period to be 18 months.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for his lost Sales Target Incentives (STI) during the notice period, as the policy did not unambiguously exclude it.

However, the court found that the Long Term Incentives (LTI) agreement unambiguously excluded recovery for unvested Restricted Stock Units.

The court ordered a trust and accounting mechanism for the remainder of the notice period to account for any mitigation earnings.

Allstate paid Michigan-level personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to an insured following a motor vehicle accident in Michigan.

TD Home accepted priority as the proper insurer but only reimbursed Allstate for Ontario-level benefits, arguing it was not obligated to pay Michigan-level benefits because it had not signed Michigan's Certification List.

An arbitrator ordered TD Home to reimburse the full amount.

TD Home appealed.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the arbitrator's decision was reasonable and within his authority under the Arbitration Act to decide the dispute in accordance with law and equity.

The applicant, a self-represented former client, brought an application seeking to have the court assess and reduce his former lawyer's account of $147,845.94, or alternatively, require it to be assessed by an Assessment Officer.

The respondent lawyer had already initiated a Solicitor/Client Preliminary Appointment for assessment.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reason to interfere with the usual assessment process under the Solicitors Act and noting that Rule 14.05 did not apply given the material facts in dispute.

Costs of the application were reserved to the Assessment Officer.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to access the defendants' adjacent property to complete brickwork on a new residential home before winter.

The parties were involved in a broader dispute over property lines and construction damage.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm if the structure was left exposed to winter weather, and that the balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff.

The motion was granted, permitting temporary access subject to proof of insurance.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment regarding a Lease and General Security Agreement for nutraceutical manufacturing equipment.

The defendants defaulted on payments, leading to the repossession of most of the equipment.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, rejecting the defendants' claim that a subsequent settlement agreement altered the lease terms, as no payments were made under the alleged settlement.

Summary judgment was granted against all defendants for the outstanding balance, less the amount recovered from the sale of the repossessed equipment, and an order was made for the delivery of the remaining unrecovered equipment.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer a Small Claims Court action to the Superior Court of Justice.

The plaintiffs, an osteopathic federation and its president, sued the defendant insurer for defamation after the insurer delisted their services.

The court applied the five-factor test from Farlow v. Hospital for Sick Children and found that the complexity of the issues, the need for expert evidence, the need for discovery, and the general importance of the matter favoured a transfer.

The court also noted the plaintiffs sought mandatory orders beyond the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction.

The motion to transfer was granted.

The plaintiff purchased a property at a Sheriff's auction and paid the deposit.

The following day, the Sheriff cancelled the sale because the purchase price was below the internal policy threshold of 60% of the debtor's equity.

The plaintiff sued for damages for breach of contract, relying on a notice in the Ontario Gazette that stated the sale was subject to cancellation 'up to the time of sale'.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the actual Notice of Sheriff's Sale of Land, which allowed cancellation 'up to the time of the satisfaction of the sale terms', governed the auction.

The court also held that the Sheriff, as an officer of the court, acted in good faith and was immune from liability under section 142 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The moving party, Ford, sought summary judgment on its appeal of a tax reassessment by the Minister of Finance.

The Minister had issued a Notice of Assessment in 2017 seeking repayment of an excess refund of over $6.2 million from the 1999 taxation year.

Ford argued the reassessment was statute-barred under subsection 82(11) of the Corporations Tax Act.

The court agreed, finding that unlike other provisions, subsection 82(11) did not include the phrase 'at any time,' meaning the normal assessment period applied.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of Ford, declaring the reassessment statute-barred.