G. Dow

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff contractor's defamation action.

The action arose from an email the defendant sent to his spouse expressing dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's renovation work.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the email was a private communication between spouses and did not constitute an expression on a matter of public interest.

No costs were awarded.

The plaintiff purchased three industrial units from the defendant, which were undergoing a delayed conversion into a condominium.

The plaintiff occupied the units under a one-year lease with zero base rent, which expired before the conversion was completed.

The defendant sought base rent for the overholding period from July 2017 to April 2022.

The court found no enforceable agreement for the $8,000 monthly base rent proposed by the defendant but awarded the defendant occupation rent based on unjust enrichment.

The court reduced the entitlement to 35 months due to the defendant's failure to issue invoices or notices, awarding $316,400 inclusive of HST.

The applicants and respondents entered into a business arrangement to open an optometry clinic, but failed to agree on final terms.

The applicant locked the respondent out of the business and ceased paying rent.

The court found the applicant's unilateral ouster of the respondent constituted oppression.

The applicant was ordered to repay the respondent's surplus capital contribution and the parties were directed to appoint an appraiser to determine fair market rent owed since the lockout.

The plaintiffs brought an in-writing motion for default judgment following the striking of the defendants' statement of defence due to repeated procedural non-compliance.

The court accepted the plaintiffs' method of service given the history of non-compliance and granted default judgment in the amount of $267,790.10 for breach of a development and construction services agreement and unjust enrichment.

The court also awarded pre-judgment interest, post-judgment interest, and partial indemnity costs.

The defendants, the Law Society of Ontario and two of its employees, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 21.01 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, sued the defendants over their handling of complaints made against him.

The court found that the defendants were protected by statutory immunity under section 9 of the Law Society Act, and the plaintiff failed to plead bad faith with the requisite precision and full particulars to overcome this immunity.

The court struck the statement of claim but granted the plaintiff leave to deliver a fresh as amended statement of claim.

The plaintiff, an investment advisor, brought an action against the defendant, a portfolio manager, for $90,000 based on an alleged agreement to buy out the plaintiff's participation rights in a book of business.

The court found that an email exchange between the parties constituted a binding contract, as the essential terms were agreed upon despite the lack of a formal signed document.

The court also found that the plaintiff's subsequent termination did not frustrate the contract.

Alternatively, the court held that the defendant was unjustly enriched by retaining the financial benefits of the book of business without compensating the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was awarded $90,000 plus pre-judgment interest.

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondent insurer had a duty to defend them in an underlying action alleging misappropriation of funds from syndicated mortgages.

The insurer had denied coverage, arguing the applicants made a material misrepresentation in their insurance application regarding their source of financing.

The court found that the email relied upon by the insurer lacked detail and precision, and the insurer failed to clarify the ambiguous answers.

The court concluded there was no misrepresentation and ordered the insurer to resume defending the applicants and pay their incurred defence costs on a full indemnity basis.

Following a 42-day medical negligence trial where damages were agreed at $12 million, the plaintiffs sought costs of over $4.5 million.

The court considered the complexity of the case, the high hourly rates of senior counsel, and the defendants' stout denial of liability.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $4,218,052.00 in partial indemnity costs and disbursements, payable two-thirds by the unsuccessful physicians and one-third by the hospital.

The court declined to make a Sanderson Order, instead ordering the plaintiffs to pay $250,000 in costs to the two successful defendant physicians.

The plaintiff, an Executive Director of a long-term care facility, was terminated for cause after 21 years of service following an investigation into an undisclosed romantic relationship with a subordinate manager.

The court found the employer failed to prove just cause, noting the relationship was condoned and the investigation was flawed and conducted in bad faith.

The plaintiff was awarded 22 months' notice, plus benefits and bonuses, less disability payments and mitigation income.

The court also awarded $50,000 in moral damages for the employer's bad faith conduct during the dismissal and litigation.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for breach of confidentiality and fiduciary duty.

The individual defendant, a former president of the plaintiff, was terminated without cause and signed a severance agreement with a one-year confidentiality clause.

During that year, he interviewed with and accepted a job from the corporate defendant, a competitor.

The plaintiff alleged he shared confidential information, including his resume and advice to another terminated employee.

The court found no actionable breach of confidentiality or fiduciary duty, concluding there was no genuine issue for trial.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The proposed intervenors, who are 40% shareholders of the respondent corporation, brought a motion for leave to intervene in applications concerning the management and interests of a residential property.

They alleged that a settlement reached by the respondent's representative was done without their required consent under a unanimous shareholders agreement.

The applicants objected based on the indoor management rule.

The court granted the motion to intervene, finding that the proposed intervenors had an interest in the proceeding and could be prejudiced by the outcome.

The applicants, unit owners in the respondent condominium corporation, brought an application for an oppression remedy, alleging that the corporation's representatives engaged in coercive and abusive behaviour regarding noise complaints, repair issues, balcony storage, and the rejection of a board nomination.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the conduct of both parties was less than ideal, the respondent's actions did not meet the legal test for oppression and were a valid exercise of balancing communal interests with private rights.

The applicant insurer sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify the respondent insured following a motor vehicle accident in California, arguing the insured misrepresented his address and vehicle use.

The court dismissed the application as premature and too broad, noting that under sections 233 and 258 of the Insurance Act, an injured third party maintains the right to collect a judgment against the insurer up to statutory minimums despite the insured's misrepresentation.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the insurer revisiting the issue if claims materialize.

The plaintiff's counsel sought court approval of a solicitor and client account based on a 30% contingency fee agreement following a $200,000 settlement with the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The court found the contingency fee agreement was not fair or reasonable, noting the lack of complexity, the limited time docketed compared to the proposed fee, and the absence of evidence that the plaintiff was advised of the limited recovery available from the Fund.

The court deemed the agreement unenforceable and reduced the approved fee to $30,000 plus HST and disbursements.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff's damages were reduced to zero due to statutory deductibles and failure to meet the verbal threshold, the defendant sought costs of $165,000.

The plaintiff argued for no costs based on impecuniosity and access to justice.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments, noting the claim's lack of success and the plaintiff's access to specialized counsel on a contingency fee.

Costs were awarded to the defendant in the requested amount of $165,000.

The plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest and anoxic brain injury during an urgent caesarean section.

The plaintiffs sued the treating obstetricians, anesthesiologist, and the hospital for medical negligence.

The court found the initial obstetrician negligent for failing to diagnose the pregnancy early, failing to discuss termination, and failing to document severe risk factors associated with the plaintiff's morbid obesity.

The anesthesiologist was found negligent for prematurely converting to a general anesthetic and failing to adequately manage the airway, directly causing the cardiac arrest.

The hospital was found vicariously liable for a triage nurse's failure to follow protocols during a telephone call.

Liability was apportioned equally among the three negligent defendants.

The plaintiff employee and defendant employer both brought motions for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The plaintiff was temporarily laid off in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the layoff was extended several times.

The plaintiff waited nine months before alleging constructive dismissal.

The court found that the plaintiff had acquiesced to the layoff by failing to object within a reasonable period of time.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the defendant's motion to dismiss the action was granted.

Costs were awarded to the defendant.

The parties entered into a talent acquisition agreement where the defendant agreed to hire a team of employees from the plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract, claiming the defendant failed to make two subsequent payments and incurred termination expenses after the defendant terminated several of the hired employees without cause.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the action, finding that the plain wording of the agreement conditioned the subsequent payments on the retention of the employees.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the defendant breached its duty of good faith, noting the terminations were a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiffs, residential tenants of a luxury property, sought an interim injunction to regain possession after the defendant landlords unilaterally terminated the tenancy, changed the locks, and moved back in.

The plaintiffs had been absent from the property since December 2020 due to the pandemic.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm as the corporate plaintiff could operate elsewhere and the individual plaintiff remained abroad.

The balance of convenience favoured the landlords, who could better maintain the property pending resolution of the disputes before the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for defamation over anonymous reviews posted by a former employee on Glassdoor's website.

Glassdoor brought a motion to dismiss the action under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, arguing the reviews were expressions on a matter of public interest.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the reviews regarding workplace conditions, salaries, and management style constituted a private grievance between a former employee and employer, rather than a matter of public interest.