Joseph J. Arvay

The respondent's long-term disability benefits were terminated by her insurer based on video surveillance, despite a lack of medical evidence indicating she could return to work.

After five years of denied benefits, the insurer reinstated them shortly before trial.

The trial judge awarded $20,000 in damages for mental distress but denied punitive damages, finding no bad faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the mental distress award and added $100,000 in punitive damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the insurer's appeal in part, setting aside the punitive damages but upholding the mental distress award.

The Court held that damages for mental distress for breach of contract are recoverable under the Hadley v. Baxendale principle if they were within the reasonable contemplation of the parties, which is the case for disability insurance contracts.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and awarded damages.

The trial judge reduced the management fee award by 50 percent to account for a predicted increased return from investment counselling, and deducted the respondent's legal fees and house purchase from the amount used to calculate management fees and tax gross-up.

The Court of Appeal reversed these deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory discount rate is mandatory and cannot be circumvented by reducing management fees.

Furthermore, damages are assessed as a lump sum, and how a plaintiff chooses to spend the award (e.g., on a house or legal fees) is irrelevant to the calculation of management fees and tax gross-up.

The Surrey School Board passed a resolution declining to approve three books depicting same-sex parented families as supplementary learning resources for Kindergarten and Grade One classrooms.

The appellants challenged the resolution.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board's decision was unreasonable because it failed to act in accordance with the secular mandate of the School Act.

The Board allowed the religious views of some parents to trump the need for equal respect and tolerance for all family models, and failed to apply the appropriate criteria for approving supplementary learning resources.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remanded to the Board.

The appellant, a gay and lesbian bookstore, challenged the constitutionality of Customs legislation that authorized the interception and prohibition of obscene materials.

Customs officials had repeatedly delayed, confiscated, or prohibited materials imported by the bookstore, often misclassifying non-obscene gay and lesbian erotica as obscene.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Customs legislation infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, it was largely justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to prevent the importation of harmful obscene materials.

However, the Court struck down the reverse onus provision in s. 152(3) of the Customs Act as it applied to obscenity determinations, ruling that the burden of proving obscenity must rest on the Crown.

The Court also found that while the legislation itself did not violate s. 15(1) equality rights, its systemic misapplication by Customs officials had discriminated against the gay and lesbian community.

The respondent, a former provincial cabinet minister, faced sexual harassment complaints before the British Columbia Human Rights Commission.

The proceedings were delayed for over 30 months.

The respondent sought a stay of proceedings, arguing the delay violated his section 7 Charter rights to liberty and security of the person due to the severe stigma and psychological stress he suffered.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Charter applies to the Commission, the respondent's section 7 rights were not engaged because the state did not interfere with his fundamental life choices or psychological integrity in a manner protected by section 7.

Furthermore, under administrative law principles, the delay did not compromise the fairness of the hearing and was not so inordinate as to amount to an abuse of process.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was lifted.

The respondent patient sued the appellant doctor for medical malpractice after he allegedly misdiagnosed her breast cancer.

The action was commenced outside the standard two-year limitation period.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the running of time was postponed under s. 6(4)(b) of the Limitation Act.

The Court held that the provision requires a subjective/objective approach, postponing the limitation period until a reasonable person would conclude that the plaintiff could reasonably bring an action in light of their own serious, significant, and compelling circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the action to proceed.

The appellant was injured when his motorcycle tire became trapped in a flangeway gap alongside railway tracks running down the centre of a street.

The trial judge found the railways liable in negligence and nuisance, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the railways' compliance with statutory and regulatory standards precluded liability.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, abolishing the long-standing 'special rule' that limited a railway's duty of care to statutory compliance.

The Court held that statutory compliance does not necessarily exhaust the common law standard of care, and the railways were negligent in failing to minimize the risk posed by the flangeways.

The Court also restored the trial judge's findings on public nuisance and the absence of contributory negligence.

Appeal in a major Aboriginal title claim involving hereditary chiefs asserting rights over a large area of British Columbia.

The Court held that Aboriginal title is a sui generis right in land protected by s. 35(1), conferring exclusive use and occupation for a variety of purposes subject to an inherent limit against uses irreconcilable with the group’s attachment to the land.

The Court also held that oral histories must be given due weight in Aboriginal litigation and that the trial judge erred in his treatment of such evidence, requiring a new trial.

On the cross-appeal, the Court held that the province lacked constitutional authority after 1871 to extinguish Aboriginal rights, either directly or through s. 88 of the Indian Act.

A same-sex couple challenged the definition of 'spouse' in the Old Age Security Act after the younger partner was denied a spousal allowance available to opposite-sex common law spouses.

The appeal raised whether exclusion of same-sex couples from the statutory definition violated s. 15(1) of the Charter and, if so, whether it could be justified under s. 1.

A majority dismissed the appeal, with four judges concluding there was no discrimination and one judge concluding there was a s. 15 breach but that it was justified as part of an incremental extension of social benefits.

The decision recognized sexual orientation as an analogous ground under s. 15 and became a foundational equality-rights case in Canadian constitutional law.

The airlines sought to recover gasoline taxes paid to British Columbia between 1974 and 1976 under a statute that was ultra vires because it imposed an indirect tax.

The province amended the statute in 1976 to make it a valid direct tax, and in 1981 enacted retroactive legislation to impose the valid tax for the 1974-1976 period and confiscate the invalidly collected taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 1976 and 1981 amendments were constitutionally valid.

The Court also held that, as a general rule, taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute are not recoverable, rejecting the application of restitutionary principles in this context due to public policy concerns about fiscal chaos.

The appellant airlines challenged the application of British Columbia's Social Service Tax Act to their aircraft and parts, as well as to in-flight sales of alcoholic beverages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act, properly construed, did not apply to aircraft and parts brought into the province temporarily for interprovincial flights.

The Court also held that in-flight liquor sales lacked sufficient presence in the province to attract the tax.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that Air Canada could recover the taxes unlawfully collected on its aircraft and parts, despite being paid under a mistake of law, but could not recover the taxes collected from passengers for liquor sales, as it acted merely as a tax collector.

The respondent, a British subject permanently resident in Canada, met all requirements for admission to the British Columbia bar except Canadian citizenship.

He challenged the citizenship requirement under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the citizenship requirement infringed s. 15(1) because it discriminated against non-citizens, an analogous group, and was not justified under s. 1.

The Court established the foundational approach to s. 15(1), rejecting the 'similarly situated' test in favour of an approach focusing on enumerated and analogous grounds.