Joseph J. Arvay

The appellant was injured when his motorcycle tire became trapped in a flangeway gap alongside railway tracks running down the centre of a street.

The trial judge found the railways liable in negligence and nuisance, but the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the railways' compliance with statutory and regulatory standards precluded liability.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, abolishing the long-standing 'special rule' that limited a railway's duty of care to statutory compliance.

The Court held that statutory compliance does not necessarily exhaust the common law standard of care, and the railways were negligent in failing to minimize the risk posed by the flangeways.

The Court also restored the trial judge's findings on public nuisance and the absence of contributory negligence.

Appeal in a major Aboriginal title claim involving hereditary chiefs asserting rights over a large area of British Columbia.

The Court held that Aboriginal title is a sui generis right in land protected by s. 35(1), conferring exclusive use and occupation for a variety of purposes subject to an inherent limit against uses irreconcilable with the group’s attachment to the land.

The Court also held that oral histories must be given due weight in Aboriginal litigation and that the trial judge erred in his treatment of such evidence, requiring a new trial.

On the cross-appeal, the Court held that the province lacked constitutional authority after 1871 to extinguish Aboriginal rights, either directly or through s. 88 of the Indian Act.

A same-sex couple challenged the definition of 'spouse' in the Old Age Security Act after the younger partner was denied a spousal allowance available to opposite-sex common law spouses.

The appeal raised whether exclusion of same-sex couples from the statutory definition violated s. 15(1) of the Charter and, if so, whether it could be justified under s. 1.

A majority dismissed the appeal, with four judges concluding there was no discrimination and one judge concluding there was a s. 15 breach but that it was justified as part of an incremental extension of social benefits.

The decision recognized sexual orientation as an analogous ground under s. 15 and became a foundational equality-rights case in Canadian constitutional law.

The appellant airlines challenged the application of British Columbia's Social Service Tax Act to their aircraft and parts, as well as to in-flight sales of alcoholic beverages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Act, properly construed, did not apply to aircraft and parts brought into the province temporarily for interprovincial flights.

The Court also held that in-flight liquor sales lacked sufficient presence in the province to attract the tax.

Furthermore, the Court ruled that Air Canada could recover the taxes unlawfully collected on its aircraft and parts, despite being paid under a mistake of law, but could not recover the taxes collected from passengers for liquor sales, as it acted merely as a tax collector.

The airlines sought to recover gasoline taxes paid to British Columbia between 1974 and 1976 under a statute that was ultra vires because it imposed an indirect tax.

The province amended the statute in 1976 to make it a valid direct tax, and in 1981 enacted retroactive legislation to impose the valid tax for the 1974-1976 period and confiscate the invalidly collected taxes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 1976 and 1981 amendments were constitutionally valid.

The Court also held that, as a general rule, taxes paid under an unconstitutional statute are not recoverable, rejecting the application of restitutionary principles in this context due to public policy concerns about fiscal chaos.

The respondent, a British subject permanently resident in Canada, met all requirements for admission to the British Columbia bar except Canadian citizenship.

He challenged the citizenship requirement under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the citizenship requirement infringed s. 15(1) because it discriminated against non-citizens, an analogous group, and was not justified under s. 1.

The Court established the foundational approach to s. 15(1), rejecting the 'similarly situated' test in favour of an approach focusing on enumerated and analogous grounds.