Joseph De Filippis

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and with two related offences under the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial proceeded by way of a blended hearing incorporating a Charter motion to exclude breath test evidence.

The accused claimed his right to counsel was violated because police refused to allow him to speak to his father.

The court found that the accused did not express a desire to contact his father to facilitate contact with counsel, but rather sought his father's general advice about the situation.

The court rejected the Charter challenge, finding the police properly discharged their duties and the accused was not diligent in exercising his right to counsel.

The accused was found guilty of all three charges.

Two young persons were jointly charged with the robbery of three victims at a plaza near a high school in Ajax on May 14, 2012.

The Crown's case against D.F. rested primarily on eyewitness identification evidence from all three victims, who identified him from a photo array and in court.

The Crown's case against R.L. was based on his similarity to one of the assailants, surveillance video showing him returning to school from the robbery location within minutes, and his possession of a stolen wallet belonging to one of the victims.

Both defendants were found guilty.

The court rejected D.F.'s counsel's arguments regarding the frailties of identification evidence and found the victims' identifications reliable and credible.

The court rejected R.L.'s explanation that he had found the wallet and innocently retained it, finding his testimony not credible and concluding he had concealed the wallet in his jacket lining.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and failure to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded the second charge and it was dismissed.

The court found the defendant guilty of the first charge.

The central issue was whether the defendant had care and control of the vehicle.

The court found that the defendant's actual operation of the vehicle—moving it from a gas pump to a parking spot—established care and control.

The defendant's intoxication was established through witness testimony and video evidence.

Following the defendant's conviction for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault, the Crown applied for a dangerous offender assessment under section 752.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court appointed a psychiatrist to prepare the assessment report.

The Crown sought the right to cross-examine the psychiatrist at the dangerous offender hearing, claiming the assessor was a court-appointed witness.

The defence objected, arguing that permitting Crown cross-examination would undermine the adversarial system and give the Crown an unfair advantage.

The court ruled that both Crown and defence had the right to cross-examine the assessor, distinguishing the nature of dangerous offender proceedings from traditional adversarial trials.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit (over 80) contrary to the Criminal Code.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the approved screening device (ASD) test result, arguing that the demand for the breath sample was not made "forthwith" as required by law, thereby violating his Charter rights.

The Crown established that the defendant was stopped at 11:11 PM, the ASD demand was made at 11:12 PM, and the device was presented at 11:18 PM—a six-minute delay.

The court found no realistic opportunity for the defendant to consult with counsel within this timeframe and determined that the police complied with the statutory requirements.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed and the defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with assaulting the complainant on three occasions in November 2011 and March 2012.

The third count was dismissed on consent.

The trial involved conflicting accounts of two incidents: one on November 22, 2011 involving an alleged slap, and another on November 23, 2011 involving alleged grabbing and striking.

The complainant testified the defendant used threats regarding her immigration sponsorship to control her.

The defendant denied the assaults and claimed the complainant initiated physical contact.

The court found the Crown had not discharged its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant on both remaining counts.

The defendant was convicted of multiple counts of assault with a weapon, assault, and threatening following a four-day trial.

The sentencing decision addresses a pattern of domestic violence spanning several years, including an incident on May 9, 2011, where the defendant threw boiling water on his spouse and infant child.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence followed by three years of probation, with ancillary orders including DNA sampling and weapons prohibition.

The decision emphasizes denunciation and specific deterrence in the context of domestic violence, while considering the defendant's prior brain injury and extensive criminal history of violence.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm against her step-mother following a domestic altercation on February 19, 2012.

The complainant suffered a significant injury to her eye requiring stitches.

The Crown alleged the defendant intentionally assaulted the complainant.

The defendant testified she reacted with a single blind punch after the complainant grabbed and bent back her fingers during a physical struggle.

The court found that while the defendant caused serious injury, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she intended to strike the complainant as she did.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit contrary to the Criminal Code, and with a provincial offence of having a blood alcohol level above zero as a novice driver.

The defence raised three objections to the admissibility of breath test evidence.

The court dismissed one objection orally during trial.

The remaining issues concerned whether the roadside demand was made "forthwith" and whether the breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 254 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the police complied with section 254(2) regarding the "forthwith" requirement and that the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The defendant was found guilty of the Criminal Code offence but the provincial offence was dismissed due to insufficient evidence that the defendant was a novice driver.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit following a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant sought to exclude her statements to police and breath test results on the grounds that her right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter was violated and that her statements were involuntary.

The court conducted a blended hearing on the Charter and voluntariness voir dire issues.

The court found that the defendant's section 10(b) rights were not violated, her statements were voluntary, and the Crown proved both charges beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was found guilty of both offences.

The defendant was charged with eight offences arising from domestic violence incidents: two counts of assault with a weapon (May 9, 2011), four counts of assault (December 30, 2010; February 10, 2011; April 2011), and two counts of threatening death (April 2011).

The Crown alleged a pattern of abuse against the defendant's wife.

The defendant denied all allegations, claiming the complainant fabricated the charges to prevent him from obtaining custody of the children after learning he intended to leave the marriage.

The court found the defendant guilty of six counts (assault with a weapon on May 9, 2011; assault on December 30, 2010; assault on February 10, 2011; assault on April 2011; and threatening death on April 2011) and not guilty of one count of assault (April 2011 choking incident) and one count of threatening death (shooting threat).

The court rejected the defendant's credibility based on his delay in surrendering to police and his manipulative conduct, and accepted the complainant's detailed and corroborated testimony.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and failure to comply with a demand to provide breath samples.

The trial commenced on December 14, 2012, but was not completed and was scheduled to continue on August 1, 2013.

The defendant brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been violated.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while 17 months had passed from arrest to the scheduled trial continuation, the delay was not unreasonable when accounting for inherent time requirements, defence unavailability, and the underestimation of trial length.

The court found no prejudice to the defendant's Charter rights beyond stress and strain.

The defendant was charged with failure to comply with probation by not paying restitution of $2,023.15 by the end of a three-year probation term.

The defendant had pleaded guilty to fraud, communicating for the purposes of prostitution, failure to comply with a recognizance, and possession of a controlled substance.

The sentencing judge imposed probation with a restitution condition, finding that the defendant would have the ability to pay over the three-year period.

The defendant made no payments, repeatedly lied to the probation officer about making partial payments, and spent between $2,400 and $4,800 per month on crack cocaine during the probation period.

The trial judge found the defendant guilty of the breach charge, holding that while abject poverty can constitute a reasonable excuse for non-compliance, such cases are rare and compliance must be virtually impossible.

The defendant's continued drug use, repeated false promises, and failure to apply for a variance of the order negated any reasonable excuse based on poverty.

The defendant, a long-term offender subject to a long-term supervision order (LTSO) requiring him to remain within the City of Toronto, was charged with breaching the conditions of his release by being found outside Toronto in Pickering.

The Crown alleged the defendant knowingly violated the territorial restriction.

The defendant testified that he was a passenger in a vehicle driven by his common-law spouse, who became lost while searching for a significant home and inadvertently crossed the Toronto boundary.

The court found the defendant not guilty, holding that being a passenger who took no action to place himself outside the city, and ending up in Pickering as an accident, constituted a reasonable excuse under section 753.3(1) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with two offences: having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol, and refusing to comply with a lawful demand to provide breath samples.

The Crown proved that the defendant was intoxicated and that police had reasonable and probable grounds to demand a breath sample following a single-vehicle collision.

The defendant claimed insufficient evidence of care and control and argued his injuries provided a reasonable excuse for refusing the breath demand.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the impaired charge but convicted on the refusal charge, finding the defendant's injuries did not provide a reasonable excuse and that his conduct in the breath room demonstrated his refusal was not medically motivated.

The defendant was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The defendant challenged the breath test results on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 9 (unreasonable search and seizure and arbitrary detention).

The court found that the officer reasonably relied on the defendant's statement that he had consumed alcohol 40 minutes earlier, despite the strong odour of alcohol on his breath.

The court also found that the officer was authorized under the Highway Traffic Act to stop and detain the defendant for a sobriety check, and that the detention was not arbitrary.

The motion to exclude evidence was dismissed and the defendant was found guilty.

A young person was charged with threatening bodily harm against a 16-year-old complainant following a Facebook conversation in which the defendant described violent sexual fantasies involving cutting, breaking bones, and rape.

The defendant, who had recently turned 18, was a member of the same high school band as the complainant.

The Crown alleged the defendant uttered threats; the defence argued he merely expressed fantasies and desires, not intended actions.

The court found the defendant guilty, determining that despite the defendant's statements that he did not want to hurt the complainant, his clear declarations that he did not care about the complainant's consent and his assertion "I want to cut u....so why can't I" constituted threats meant to be taken seriously.

The court considered the context of the entire conversation, the brevity of the relationship, the document found in the defendant's possession containing similar violent sexual fantasies, and the complainant's eventual fear upon reflection.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and multiple firearms and ammunition offences following the execution of a search warrant at an apartment in Oshawa.

Cocaine, two loaded handguns, and ammunition were found hidden under a desk drawer in the bedroom normally occupied by the accused's mother.

The Crown argued the accused had knowledge and control of the contraband.

The defence contended there was no direct evidence linking the accused to the items and that other residents and visitors had access to the bedroom.

The court found that while the accused or his brother likely brought the contraband into the apartment, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt which brother was responsible.

The realistic possibility that the brother hid the items without the accused's knowledge was fatal to the prosecution's case.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

At trial, the defendant brought a Charter motion arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel of choice was violated.

The arresting officer's field notes indicated the defendant asked for a specific lawyer, but her typed report stated he had no preference and was fine with duty counsel.

Due to the material inconsistency and the officer's lack of independent recollection, the court found a s. 10(b) violation.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant brought a Garofoli motion to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to the execution of a search warrant at his mother's residence, alleging a violation of section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant challenged both his standing to bring the motion and the sufficiency of grounds in the Information to Obtain the warrant.

The court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence and therefore had standing.

The court also found that while the Information contained some deficiencies in disclosure, there was sufficient reliable evidence to support the issuance of the warrant.

Even if the warrant was issued without reasonable and probable grounds, the court would have admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, as the administration of justice would not be brought into disrepute.