Jon Fuller

The accused was charged with 23 counts of prohibited contact with his former spouse.

He pleaded guilty to 3 counts of failing to comply with probation and 1 count of criminal harassment.

The accused had a lengthy criminal record spanning 28 years, including 16 convictions involving violence and 17 breaches of court orders.

He violated probation orders prohibiting contact within hours of release from jail, engaging in repeated unwanted contact with the victim at multiple locations.

The court imposed a global sentence of 2 years less 1 day, with 414 days remaining to be served after crediting 315 days of pre-trial custody.

Post-release probation conditions included a 3-year term with strict no-contact provisions and geographic restrictions.

The accused was convicted at trial of extortion contrary to s. 346(1.1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused attended the victim's home, left a phone number, and threatened the victim's wife, stating that if her husband did not call back they should "watch out." This initiated an escalating series of intimidation and threats designed to extort $54,000 from the victim.

The Crown sought a one-year custodial sentence.

The court appointed an amicus to assist the unrepresented accused in identifying mitigating factors and reviewing relevant sentencing precedents.

The court imposed a sentence of 12 months in custody less credit for 79 days time served, followed by three years of probation with conditions including a prohibition on contact with the victim and a lifetime firearms prohibition order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the Crown failed to prove that breath samples were taken “as soon as practicable” under s. 258(1)(c)(ii), and that police breached his Charter right to counsel under s. 10(b), including by failing to provide a Prosper warning.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court held the trial judge reasonably concluded that an 18‑minute transport to the police station satisfied the “as soon as practicable” requirement and that police acted reasonably and promptly.

The court further found the appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and did not act diligently in pursuing that right, and that his statement declining to speak with counsel constituted an unequivocal waiver.

The conviction was upheld.

A licensed paralegal and her firm sought judicial review of directions issued by a justice of the peace requiring paralegals to remain behind the bar in the courtroom until their matters were called and suggesting that matters involving lawyers be called ahead of those involving paralegals.

The applicants argued that the justice of the peace exceeded jurisdiction, breached natural justice, and violated s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by disadvantaging paralegals economically and professionally.

The court held that courtroom seating arrangements and management of the calling of cases fall within a judicial officer’s authority to control court process and maintain order.

Economic interests are not protected by s. 7 of the Charter, and the impugned directions did not engage life, liberty, or security of the person.

The justice of the peace therefore acted within jurisdiction and did not breach principles of natural justice.

The accused was charged with six counts of assault upon his spouse and one count of assault upon his child, allegedly occurring between June 2005 and November 2010.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the complainant spouse, who alleged repeated assaults occurring approximately twice monthly throughout their marriage.

The defence denied all allegations.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to exaggerations, inconsistencies with police statements, and lack of corroboration from medical professionals despite claims of severe injuries.

The corroborating witnesses (the complainant's brother and mother) provided contradictory accounts and failed to mention key incidents in their initial police statements.

The accused testified credibly and consistently, denying all allegations.

The court acquitted the accused on all counts.

The applicant brought a Charter s. 11(b) application alleging his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The trial commenced on January 19, 2012, but was not completed until July 25-27, 2012, with further adjournment to February 28 and March 1, 2013.

The total delay from charge to projected trial completion was approximately 27 months.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Morin and R. v. Godin, analyzing the length of delay, reasons for delay (inherent, Crown actions, accused actions, and institutional factors), and prejudice to the accused.

The court found approximately 10 months of institutional delay, which fell within the Morin guideline of 8-10 months.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with two counts: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The trial proceeded as a blended Charter application and trial.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath readings on grounds of alleged violations of s. 8 and s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found no Charter violations.

On the substantive charges, the court accepted the defence evidence regarding the accused's alcohol consumption pattern and found that the defence had raised a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the breath readings on the over 80 count.

On the impaired operation count, the court found the evidence equivocal and that the Crown had not proven impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood and refusal to provide a breath sample.

Police found the defendant sleeping in his vehicle with the engine running in a parking lot.

The Crown called an arresting officer and a qualified technician.

The defendant testified that he consumed three beers, received a call from his wife advising against driving, and decided to sleep in his vehicle until he felt better.

The court found the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle but acquitted on both charges due to reasonable doubt regarding impairment and the refusal charge.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment, threatening to cause death, and breaches of probation arising from allegations made by his ex-wife during access visits to their daughter in January and February 2011.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the ex-wife, who alleged the accused damaged her vehicle, followed her, and made threatening statements.

The accused's daughter testified that the alleged threatening phone conversation did not occur as described.

The court granted a directed verdict on the harassment charge due to lack of evidence and acquitted the accused on all remaining counts, finding the complainant's credibility undermined by her emotional state regarding custody issues and her admission that she had not actually witnessed the alleged following.

The defendant pleaded guilty to five bank robberies committed by handing notes to bank tellers demanding money while falsely claiming to have a gun.

The Crown sought a concurrent sentence of six years in federal penitentiary with one-for-one pre-sentence credit for a net sentence of five years.

The defence sought a net sentence of three to four years.

The court imposed a concurrent sentence of six years less enhanced credit of 1.5 to one for approximately 1.5 years of pre-trial custody, resulting in a net sentence of four years and six months in federal penitentiary.

The court also imposed a lifetime firearms prohibition and ordered a DNA sample.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The accused faced multiple charges, including sexual assault and criminal harassment, spanning a 14-month period.

The total delay from arrest to trial was approximately 16.5 months.

Applying the Morin framework, the court found 10 months and 16 days of institutional delay, slightly above the 8-10 month guideline.

However, balancing the societal interest in trying serious charges on their merits against the minimal prejudice suffered by the accused, the court concluded the delay was not unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The union applied for certification to represent stage employees of the Canadian Opera Company (COC).

Following a representation vote in which all voting employees supported the union, the COC argued the application should be dismissed as an abuse of process, alleging the union's true motive was to secure bargaining rights for a future, unbuilt opera house.

Alternatively, the COC sought to restrict the bargaining unit to its current rehearsal facilities based on alleged industry practice.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board rejected the abuse of process argument, finding the union had legitimate interests in formalizing the existing relationship and expanding employment opportunities.

The Board also rejected the site-specific bargaining unit, granting a municipal-wide certificate to ensure stability of bargaining rights, noting the COC's ability to perform and build sets at various locations.

The applicant union applied for certification to represent stagehands employed by the responding party at a seasonal outdoor concert venue.

The application was filed in February, during the venue's off-season, when no employees were actually performing bargaining unit work.

The responding parties brought a preliminary motion to dismiss the application on the basis that there were no employees in the bargaining unit on the application date.

The Board applied the bright line test from the theatrical and construction industries, holding that because employment in this industry is seasonal and transitory, individuals must be actually at work on the application date to be considered employees in the bargaining unit.

Since no employees were working on the application date, the application for certification was dismissed.

The applicant union sought an order determining the effective date for the combination of several bargaining units at various retail stores of the responding party employer.

The Board had previously ordered the combination but reserved on the effective date.

The employer argued the combination should be effective only when every unit had entered into a collective agreement, while the union sought an immediate combination.

The Board found no reason to delay the combination, noting that deferring would not eliminate implementation complexities and that concluding terms for the units would be reached against the framework of an eventual combined unit.

The Board ordered the bargaining units combined effective immediately.

The applicant union sought to combine several bargaining units at various retail stores in Ontario under section 7 of the Labour Relations Act.

The responding employer argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction to combine units that had already given notice to bargain and invoked statutory negotiation processes, and alternatively, that doing so would cause serious labour relations problems.

The Board held that it had jurisdiction to combine the units regardless of the stage of collective bargaining.

The Board found that combining the units would facilitate viable and stable collective bargaining and reduce fragmentation, and directed the combination of the units, while reserving on the effective date to allow the parties to address transitional issues.

The union applied for certification to represent employees at a producer-owned cannery co-operative.

The employer argued the application should be dismissed because the employees were employed in agriculture, or alternatively, that seasonal workers should be excluded from the bargaining unit.

The Board held that although the co-operative processed agricultural products, the industrial nature of the canning work and the separate corporate entity meant the employees were not employed in agriculture.

The Board further held that an all-employee bargaining unit, including seasonal workers, was appropriate, as the seasonal workers shared a sufficient community of interest and their inclusion would not cause serious labour relations problems.

A certificate was issued for the all-employee unit.

The applicant union sought a declaration that the respondent was a successor employer under section 63 of the Labour Relations Act.

The respondent had acquired an assignment of a lease and purchased some equipment from a Dominion store that had been closed for a year and a half.

The Board found that due to the long hiatus between the closure of the predecessor and the opening of the respondent's business, any goodwill had dissipated.

The transaction was characterized as a mere transfer of surplus assets rather than the sale of a business.

The application was dismissed.