Ontario Labour Relations Board
[1995] OLRB Rep. April 568
3693-94-R; 3812-94-R; 3814-94-R United Food and Commercial Workers International Local 175, Applicant v. Zellers Inc., Responding Party
BEFORE: S. Liang, Vice-Chair.
APPEARANCES: Kelvin Kucey, John Fuller and Michael Duden for the applicant; Wallace M. Kenny, Dolores M. Barbini, Neil Shalapata, Linda Adam and Rick Hibbard for the responding party.
DECISION OF THE BOARD; April 28, 1995
- These are applications for combination of bargaining rights, made pursuant to the provisions of section 7 of the Labour Relations Act. The first of these applications (Board File No. 3693-94-R) was made on January 23, 1995. The subsequent two applications were made on January 30, 1995. All were heard before the Board on March 30, 1995. The parties were able to agree on most of the facts which form the basis of the applications, and the Board heard brief oral evidence from one witness.
General Background and Outline of Issues
In Board File No. 3693-94-R, the applicant (also referred to herein as "the union" or "Local 175"), seeks to combine eight bargaining units for which it currently holds bargaining rights, at each of eight Zellers stores in various locations in Ontario. On January 30th, Local 175 filed applications for certification with respect to two additional stores. Board File Nos. 3182-94-R and 3184-94-R are applications for combination of the two new bargaining units with the eight preexisting bargaining units. At the time of this hearing, the certificates for the two additional bargaining units were still pending, although the parties understood that they were imminent (by the time of this decision, a certificate has been issued in respect of one of these). Although the normal practice of the Board is to determine a union's right to certification before considering an application to combine bargaining rights, in the circumstances the parties agreed to deal with these combination applications together, on the assumption of certificates being issued for the two new bargaining units.
Of the eight bargaining units for which Local 175 held bargaining rights at the time of this hearing, seven are currently engaged in collective bargaining. Six of these units are bargaining for a first collective agreement, and one for a renewal agreement. The last of these eight units is covered by a collective agreement which is to expire on January 31, 1996. Part of the order sought by the union is the early termination of this collective agreement, effective January 31, 1995. These eight units represent all the Zellers stores in Ontario for which the union has bargaining rights at the time of this application.
The focus of the hearing before me was the position of Zellers that the Board ought not to combine these bargaining units. Zellers submits firstly, that the Board has no jurisdiction to combine bargaining units which have invoked the processes under the Act for the negotiation of collective agreements (commencing with the giving of notice to bargain under sections 14 and 54); in the alternative, even if the Board has jurisdiction, given these same circumstances it would not enhance viable and stable bargaining (but rather the opposite) and cause serious labour relations problems to grant the orders requested here.
The Facts
In this decision, the Board will refer to the Zellers stores by the names given to them by the parties, usually based on location. The eight stores for which the union has bargaining rights are Niagara Falls, Oshawa, Galleria Mall, Golden Mile, Woodside Square (Scarborough)~ Dixie/Dundas (Mississauga), Cornwall and Tecumseh (Windsor) - The two stores for which the union is awaiting certification are Bloor Street (High Park) and Lawrence Square.
Zellers operates a 113 store chain of discount department stores in Ontario as part of the Hudson Bay Retail Group. The first of the Zellers stores to be organized by Local 175 was Niagara Falls, certified on December 6,1992. The parties entered into a first collective agreement which expired on January 31, 1995. Notice to bargain a renewal agreement was sent by the union on November 14, 1994. The union requested the appointment of a conciliation officer on January 10, 1995 and the parties met in conciliation on February 7, 1995. No bargaining occurred prior to conciliation, although the parties had exchanged proposals. The Minister issued a "no Board" report on February 19, 1995 and the parties have met in mediation subsequent to that.
The next store to be certified was Oshawa, on February 2, 1994. The parties agreed to apply the Niagara Falls agreement to this store, with modifications only to the scope and recognition clause and removal of a provision which was unique to Oshawa. This agreement expires on January 31, 1996 and the union requests that the expiry date be amended to January 31, 1995.
The other six stores were certified between May 9, 1994 and December 6,1994. Notices to bargain have been issued for all six stores, within a month of each certificate. Negotiations have been held for these stores, at some more intensively than others. For Cornwall, for instance, the parties held negotiation meetings on July 19th, August 23rd and 24th, and November 3rd and 4th. Conciliation was held on October 18th and November 24th. The Minister issued a no-Board on December 4th, and the parties met in mediation on January 18th. At Woodside Square, notice to bargain was given by the union on January 3, 1994, and although bargaining proposals were exchanged, no negotiations took place until the parties met in conciliation on March 30th and 31st.
At each step of the way, the union has taken the steps of issuing notices to bargain and requesting the appointment of conciliation officers. As of January 23rd, when the first of these combination applications was filed, conciliation had been requested in four of the seven units in negotiations and no-Boards had been issued in two of these, in December of 1994. The union applied for conciliation in the remaining three units on January 26th. By the time this matter came before me for hearing, no-Boards had been issued in all but one of the units in collective bargaining. The union commenced a strike in Tecumseh on March 29th, which was ongoing at the time of the hearing.
For the stores for which negotiations had commenced before the filing of these applications, the union has been using the Niagara Falls' collective agreement as a benchmark to begin negotiations, with modifications to address local issues with each particular store. The parties are agreed that, in general, most proposals from both sides have been common across the stores, although they contain local variations.
As indicated above, Zellers operates 113 retail stores in Ontario. Ontario contains two of the company's five regions across the country, Region 3 and Region 4. The stores which are affected by this application fall within both of these Regions. Each Region has a single Vice- President and Human Resources Manager. The Regions' Human Resources Managers have been representing Zellers at the various sets of negotiations. In addition, at three stores, a Human Resources Manager employed by the Hudson Bay Company has been spokesperson for the Zellers' negotiating team.
Zellers provides standard benefits to employees at its stores, including a shopping discount, savings bond purchases, medical and dental plans, employee share ownership plans and registered retirement savings plans, all of which are outlined in the Zellers benefits package brochure. In addition to these standard benefits there are common rules and regulations which govern employee conduct. For new employees, Zellers provides standardized orientation which includes, among other things, scripted conversations with customers and identification of "buzz words" that are used in the Zellers system. These are described in the Zellers Orientation Guide.
The employees at Zellers stores fall within four general categories. The first group are the cashiers and customer service staff who deal with customers at the point of sale. The second group are customer service staff who work in various areas within the stores. The third group of employees are responsible for restocking. Where there is an in-store restaurant, a fourth group of employees work in traditional restaurant duties such as serving and kitchen duties.
The applicant maintains province-wide collective agreements in retail food with the Great Atlantic & Pacific Company which operates under the banners of A & P, Miracle Food Mart, Ultra Mart, Basics and Superfresh. The union also has provincial bargaining rights for Valdi's, Pharma Plus and Fortinos, which is a division of National Grocers in which sister locals of the union have province-wide bargaining recognition for Loblaws, No Frills and Zehr's. The union also represents fourteen Food City locations operated by Oshawa Foods which are covered by a single collective agreement. The parties agree that the comparison of department store operations to retail food and pharmacy is appropriate.
Section 7 of the Act provides:
7.-(l) On application by the employer or trade union, the Board may combine two or more bargaining units consisting of employees of an employer into a single bargaining unit if the employees in each of the bargaining units are represented by the same trade union.
(2) On an application under subsection (1) that is considered together with an application for certification, the Board may do the following:
Combine the bargaining unit to which the certification application relates with one or more existing bargaining units if the certification application is made by the trade union that represents the employees in those existing bargaining units.
Combine the bargaining unit to which the certification application relates with other proposed bargaining units if the certification application is made by the trade union applying for certification for the other proposed bargaining units.
Combine the bargaining unit to which the certification application relates with both existing and proposed bargaining units if the certification application is made by the trade union that represents the employees in those existing bargaining units and that has applied for certification for the other proposed bargaining units.
(3) The Board may take into account such factors as it considers appropriate and shall consider the extent to which combining the bargaining units,
(a) would facilitate viable and stable collective bargaining;
(b) would reduce fragmentation of bargaining units; or
(c) would cause serious labour relations problems.
(4) In the case of manufacturing operations, the Board shall not combine bargaining units of employees at two or more geographically separate places of operations if the Board considers that a combined bargaining unit is inappropriate because the employer has established that combining the units will interfere unduly with,
(a) the employer's ability to continue significantly different methods of operation or production at each of those places; or
(b) the employer's ability to continue to operate those places as viable and independent businesses.
(5) In combining bargaining units, the Board may amend any certificate or any provision of a collective agreement and may make such other orders as it considers appropriate in the circumstances.
(6) This section does not apply with respect to bargaining units in the construction industry.
Section 7 is a relatively new provision, being part of the amendments to the Labour Relations Act which came into effect on January 1,1993. Since the introduction of section 7, the Board has granted a large number of orders combining bargaining units, many on consent. In some cases, the Board has combined bargaining units which are located in different regions of the province. In others, the Board has combined units of "inside" workers with units of "outside" workers, a "parts" unit with a "manufacturing" unit, and full-time with part-time units. In the case which is perhaps the most similar on its facts to the one before me, The Hudson's Bay Company, [1993] OLRB Rep. Oct. 1042, the Board combined seven department store units located across Southern Ontario.
In all of the cases in which the Board has discussed the factors which led to its decision, the Board has drawn the connection between broader based bargaining units and viable and stable collective bargaining. In Mississauga Hydro-Electric Commission, [1993] OLRB Rep. June 523, the Board, citing decisions both from Ontario and other jurisdictions, canvassed the various labour relations difficulties that may arise where there is a multiplicity of bargaining units and the reasons why broader units are desirable. The Board noted such factors as administrative efficiency and convenience in bargaining, the enhancement of lateral mobility for employees across an employer's operations, the efficiencies of having a common framework of employment conditions, enhancement of industrial stability (by decreasing the number of rounds of negotiations and the likelihood of competitive bargaining between units), and the reduction of jurisdictional disputes over the assignment of work between two units. In The Hydro-Electric Commission of the City of Ottawa, [1994] OLRB Rep. Apr. 516, the Board stated:
The reality is that at least since the most recent amendments to the Labour Relations Act, the statute and the Board favour broader based bargaining units whether at the initial certification stage or, subsequently, on a combination application. Exceptions are made where a more comprehensive unit would frustrate another important statutory objective - the ability to organize -and no serious labour relations problems would be caused by granting a smaller unit; where the broader unit would itself cause serious labour relations problems; and in the case of certain craft units. The reasons for this legislative and Board preference have been articulated in such cases as The Governing Council of the Salvation Army in Canada and Bermuda, [1994] OLRB Rep. Jan. 85 and Mississauga Hydro, supra.
This employer recognizes (in the Board's view, wisely) that, apart from its arguments based on the recent bargaining history of these various units, the case before me cannot be meaningfully distinguished from those other cases where the Board has fashioned a broader bargaining unit out of two or more separate units. Having regard to all of those factors which favour the establishment of broader based bargaining units, this is a unit which makes eminent sense. Apart from the intricacies of the current situation (about which I will say more later), combining these bargaining units will facilitate viable and stable collective bargaining and reduce fragmentation. Also apart from the intricacies of the current situation, I see no serious labour relations problems which would arise from the combination of these units.
The primary position of this employer is that the Board does not have the jurisdiction to combine bargaining units for which notice to bargain has been given, with other units. Upon the giving of notice to bargain, it is argued, certain rights and obligations crystallize under the Act. These include the obligation to bargain in good faith, the right to conciliation, the right of the Minister to appoint a conciliation board, a mediator or to issue a "no-Board" report, the duties of a conciliation officer to meet with the parties, the right to request first contract arbitration, and the right to request final offer votes. Once an order combining bargaining units is made, it is submitted, the entire bargaining unit must be placed within a common legal framework. The Act does not contemplate that one part of a bargaining unit, for instance, is on strike while another part is covered by a collective agreement. Where different units are at different stages of collective bargaining (or where some are in negotiations and others are covered by a current collective agreement), the Board may have to decide what legal regime governs the parties from the moment the bargaining units are combined. Depending on the Board's choice of legal regime, the effect may be, depending on the circumstances, the extinguishment of a legal strike or lockout, the extinguishment of conciliation or mediation, or even the extinguishment of a first contract arbitration process. Further, if the Board grants an order for the early termination of the current collective agreement for the Oshawa store, this will have the effect of changing the "open period" for the employees in that bargaining unit.
The employer's argument is that once any of these statutory mechanisms have been invoked or have crystallized, the Board has no power to issue an order which may result in "undoing" or "cancelling" them. The employer's argument is based on the giving of notice to bargain which has the effect, it is said, of entrenching the parties' right to avail themselves of the panoply of statutory mechanisms found in the Act for the resolution of collective bargaining disputes.
I am satisfied that the Board is within its powers to apply section 7 of the Act to a situation where one of the bargaining units sought to be combined has been the subject of notice to bargain. Section 7 grants to the Board broad powers and discretion, while at the same time establishing some very specific preconditions to the exercise of these powers. The application must be made by an employer or a trade union. The application must be made in respect of the employees of the same employer, who are represented by the same trade union. Once these conditions are met, the Board is at liberty to take into account "such factors as it considers appropriate" but shall in any case consider those factors listed in section 7(3). The section provides nothing in the way of specific times within which these applications must be brought, unlike the sections of the Act governing, for instance, applications for displacement of bargaining rights or termination of bargaining rights. On the other hand, the section is explicit with respect to certain limitations. Manufacturing operations are treated specially: section 7(4). Further, the section does not apply to the construction industry: section 7(6).
From a review of the provisions of section 7, I am not convinced that there is any statutory or other legal impediment to the Board applying the provisions of this section to a bargaining unit for which notice to bargain has been given. To find otherwise would be to impose a very significant limitation on access to this section, for which there is no statutory basis, in contrast to the specific limitations which are already found in the language of section 7. The significance of such a limitation is without question, particularly in a situation such as the one before me, where a union is engaged in an ongoing organizing drive over many different workplaces, which come to fruition at various times. More likely than not, at any given point during the course of this organizing effort, at least one bargaining unit will be in negotiations. Practically, the effect of the restriction urged on us would be to make the "window" for the application of section 7 so narrow as to be almost meaningless. This cannot be consistent with either the letter or intent of section 7.
The employer points out, quite rightly, that the union could have applied to combine each newly certified bargaining unit with the first one which it organized, Niagara Falls, at the time that each new certificate was obtained. Indeed, many if not most of the combination applications brought under section 7 are made in conjunction with a certification application. Even so, the fact is that the employer's theory, premised on the giving of notice to bargain, would still preclude combination applications where a newly certified unit is sought to be combined with a pre-existing unit which is in negotiations, either for a first collective agreement or for a renewal agreement. Likewise would it preclude an application where an applicant seeks to combine established units which are at a common stage of negotiations. I see no basis for such a limitation, and indeed, it is not consistent with the Board's interpretation of section 7 to date. In Hudson's Bay Company, supra, for instance, it appears that at the time of the application under section 7, notices to bargain had been given for all the bargaining units concerned.
As for the notion that the Board would be "extinguishing" other statutory rights and obligations by granting the order sought, the notion of reconciling conflicting rights is not novel. The Board is called upon from time to time to determine which of several competing rights, whether granted by statute or not, prevails. Sometimes, there is explicit statutory guidance on how the Board should proceed, for instance, in section 64(6) of the Act where the Board may have to reconcile the rights of two or more bargaining agents or the rights of unionized and non- unionized employees. Other times, the Board is left to fashion its own principles, in a manner which is most consistent with the Act as a whole and its purposes. Recently, in Suedon Foods Ltd. c.o.b. as Elizabeth Street I. G.A., Board File Nos. 0167-94-R and 0442-94-R, decision dated February 14, 1995 (as yet unreported), the Board had to determine whether to proceed first to consider an application for termination of bargaining rights, or an application made under section 7, where the outcome of each would affect the outcome of the other. The Board stated:
Having carefully considered the matter, we are of the view that both statutory and broader labour relations considerations militate strongly in favour of granting the termination application procedural priority in the present circumstances. Underlying the detailed statutory provisions relating to the representation provisions of the Act is the clear legislative policy in favour of preserving the two month "open period" for the purpose of bringing representation applications. While it is not particularly helpful to ascribe, in the abstract, a "more fundamental" quality to termination rights than to other rights under the Act when a conflict between such rights is at issue (see Venture Industries Canada Ltd., [1990] OLRB Rep. May 625), it is nonetheless clear that employees' ability periodically to choose whether or not to be represented by a trade union is an interest that has otherwise been scrupulously safeguarded by the provisions of the Act. In light of this, in order to give employees' representation rights practical effect, the Board has in other contexts been careful to structure its discretion in such a manner as to prevent their derogation. (In particular, see The National Cash Register Co. of Canada, Ltd., [1967] OLRB Rep. Apr. 90; Ridgewood Industries, [1990] OLRB Rep. Mar. 331.)
I am therefore satisfied that there is no jurisdictional obstacle to the exercise of my authority under section 7 to combine the bargaining units which are the subject of this application. I now turn to the employer's alternative argument, which is that because of the diversity of the parties' legal rights with respect to each bargaining unit at this moment, the combination of these units would detract from and not enhance viable and stable collective bargaining, and would cause serious labour relations problems.
As I have indicated above, there is no question that, but for the present collective bargaining circumstances across the units sought to be combined, the combination of these units would enhance viable and stable collective bargaining and reduce fragmentation. Further, other than the present collective bargaining circumstances, no party has identified any serious labour relations harm that would result from a combination of these units. The arguments of the employer here are based on the timing of this application, and follow two related themes. Firstly, assuming that the Board has jurisdiction, the employer submits that it does not encourage rational and focused collective bargaining to allow the parties to engage in a collective bargaining process where the ground rules may be changed at the instance of one of the parties sometime late in the process. In the case before us, the parties had been involved in store-by-store negotiations for up to seven months by the time this application was made, and nine months by the time the parties appeared before the Board. At every step of the way, the union has pursued its statutory rights to invoke conciliation, engage in mediation and in one instance, call a strike. Early in the process, the union had proposed joint bargaining which was refused by Zellers. After that, negotiations were conducted separately. In essence, Zellers submits that the collective bargaining process would not be well served if the Board permits one of the parties to use the Board's powers to combine bargaining units as a strategic lever to be used at an opportune time during negotiations. Rather, the process would be better served by encouraging parties to make their positions known early in the process, and to hold to them.
The second theme advanced by the employer, also based on the timing of this application, is that the combination of bargaining units which are at dramatically different stages in the collective bargaining process will lead to serious labour relations consequences. At the time this application was heard, one unit was bound by a collective agreement, several were engaged in mediation, and one was on strike. Relying on the same issues it raises in its "jurisdictional" argument, the employer submits that if the various units are placed in one common legal regime, the parties may find that in any given unit, an otherwise lawful strike is extinguished, rights to conciliation or medtation are extinguished, or the right to apply for first contract arbitration is extinguished. Surely, it is submitted, this is not a rational labour relations result.
The force of this argument would be much diminished if this application had been brought at another time, where the situations of the units varied less, or were equivalent. To the extent, therefore, that this argument is essentially one of timing, I do not find that it affects the substantive merits of a combination of these bargaining units. In other words, at its highest, the submission that the Board should not combine these units is a submission that the Board should not combine these units now. It does not detract from the logic of a combination of these units, having regard to all of the reasons which have been expressed by the Board in favour of broader-based collective bargaining units.
This employer proposes that the least disruptive time within which to combine bargaining units is after each unit has concluded collective bargaining and reached agreement. Although it is true that the issues which the parties may have to address in order to implement the combination at that point may be narrower in focus than those addressed in collective bargaining, it is difficult to subscribe to the notion that it is better to have parties who have spent some energy reaching a collective agreement, start yet another form of negotiations over the implementation of a combination direction, than to have all of these issues addressed at a time when the parties are at a bargaining table in any event. This suggests that virtually any time two bargaining units are combined, there will be some transitional issues, and that there is no "perfect" time to make the transition.
I might also observe that the relationship between these various units is an issue which has already influenced these separate sets of negotiations. The union has signified its intention to seek a combined bargaining structure; the employer indicates it would be more sensible to deal with this issue once collective agreements have been reached. To the extent that the present dispute is mostly about timing, the potential combination and harmonization of these bargaining units is an issue which is present in the parties' minds, even during these negotiations. Indeed, even wholly apart from the provisions of section 7, the relationship between the various bargaining units and the terms of conditions for these units is an issue to which the parties have clearly addressed themselves. The parties' agreed facts, and a review of the documents, reveal the extent to which these units present common problems and concerns.
A further observation that can be made is that to a large extent the labour relations problems which the employer has identified as standing in the way of the combination of these units are problems that relate to the implementation and harmonization of these combined units, rather than to the substantial merits of a combination. This does not detract from the realities and complexities of these problems, and I do not intend to minimize these. In order to implement a combination of these units at this time the parties and, if they fail to agree, the Board, may have to make difficult decisions about the balancing of important statutory policies such as free collective bargaining and the right to invoke economic sanctions, third-party assisted dispute resolution, and the ability within proscribed "open periods" to exercise a choice about trade union representation. In the context of the facts before me, such questions arise as: would the otherwise lawful strike in Windsor become unlawful? Would the parties have access to conciliation and mediation for the most recently certified units? Would the parties have access to first contract arbitration? Should the Board grant the union's request for early termination of the Oshawa agreement if it affects the open period?
But these are thorny issues which have, perhaps to a lesser degree, been present in many of the decisions which the Board has made under section 7. One of the "simplest" scenarios in which the Board has granted a combination of units involves the joining of a newly certified unit with a pre-existing unit which, at the time of the order, is often bound by a collective agreement. Even in this scenario, the parties have had to resolve the issue of whether the newly certified unit may have access to the statutory mechanisms for the resolution of collective bargaining disputes, or should be treated as bound by the pre-existing collective agreement until the combined unit can proceed into bargaining together. In one of these decisions, Metroland Printing, [1994] OLRB Rep. Feb. 160, the Board observed that "uncertainty as to the parties' respective legal and practical positions is a fact of life under any newly amended legislation. It is not a serious labour relations problem within the meaning of section 7(3) -.." (para. 16).
All of this suggests that while implementation problems may be complex and require hard choices, it would be inconsistent with the thrust of section 7, to allow them to overwhelm the essential question of whether a combined bargaining structure fits better with statutory and Board policies than a continuing fragmented structure.
It is also worth noting that the employer's arguments are premised on a "worst case scenario", where the parties are unable to arrive at their own way to implement the Board's combination orders. The Board has now had the benefit of two years of experience with the application of section 7. Although many of the orders which the Board has granted under section 7 combined bargaining units which are at different stages of the collective bargaining process, in all of these cases, the parties have been able to reach a resolution on the transitional issues facing the combined units. Indeed, only a very few cases have required further direction from the Board, relating to the contents of the combined collective agreement rather than the structure or mechanisms of bargaining.
Finally, I turn to the employer's argument regarding the use of section 7 as a strategic lever at a late point in negotiations. Without a doubt, the Board is always conscious that its decisions ought not to impinge on open and rational collective bargaining. Further, the Board encourages litigants to pursue their disputes in an expeditious manner. But nothing as specific as estoppel, for instance, is argued here. And to the extent that this may be a factor affecting the exercise of my discretion, I consider it relevant to the issue of the effective date of this order (see below) in contrast to the merits of directing a combination of these units.
In sum, I am satisfied that but for the essentially timing-related problems which have been raised by the employer, the combination of the units sought would be consistent with the facilitation of viable and stable collective bargaining for these parties and would certainly reduce the fragmentation of bargaining units. I am also satisfied that it would cause no serious labour relations problems. The issues which are identified by the employer are labour relations problems in the sense that they may require some difficult choices between competing statutory policies, but they are not labour relations problems which outweigh the merits of placing these various bargaining units represented by the same union, with respect to the same employer and involving essentially the same set of employees, in one combined unit. I therefore direct that the bargaining units which are the subject of Board File Nos. 3693-94-R and 3812-94-R be combined. Board File No. 3814-94-R is adjourned pending the outcome of the certification application to which it relates, and I remain seized of the matter.
However, I also find that the transitional issues posed by the current situation (as they were at the time of the hearing) militate against combining these units effective immediately.
In particular, although it is true that other cases under section 7 have raised similar issues respecting the imposition of a common legal framework on disparate units, none have presented them so starkly, and none have involved the prospect, for instance, that an order under section 7 may bring an end to an otherwise lawful strike. I find it unlikely that the union would be so sanguine about this result if it were the employer seeking to combine these units at this point. I find, therefore, that although transitional complexities are ever-present in cases brought under section 7, they are of a nature in this case that I should seek to minimize them by the timing of my order. I therefore reserve on the issue of the effective date of this order. The will enable the parties to put their minds to this outstanding issue, and hopefully arrive at their own resolution. In any event, the Registrar is directed to schedule a further hearing as soon as practically possible in this matter so that I may receive the parties' submissions on the appropriate date on which this order should come into force.
Before concluding, I wish to note that the possibility of combining fewer than the ten bargaining units which are the subject of these applications was raised by me at the hearing. The union did not indicate any interest in pursuing this as an option, and I am therefore not inclined to consider this at this time.

