John R. Sproat

This costs endorsement followed a six-day trial concerning custody and access, where the respondent, Jessica Mary Baran, was largely successful in maintaining the status quo of alternating weekend and mid-week access and securing sole custody.

The court found the applicant's position on shared week-about custody unreasonable, which prolonged the trial.

Despite offers made by both parties not being fully bettered in all aspects, the court determined that the applicant should pay costs somewhat greater than partial indemnity due to his unreasonable stance on custody and access.

The respondent was awarded costs totaling $28,251 plus applicable HST.

The Applicant sought costs after the Respondent accepted her Offer to Settle, which included an equalization payment and payment for line of credit debt.

The court considered the reasonableness of the parties' conduct, particularly the Respondent's failure to make reasonable offers and his reliance on unsubstantiated allegations in costs submissions.

The court awarded the Applicant costs fixed at $33,000, plus $1,627 for reply submissions, finding this to be slightly more than 75% of full recovery costs, justified by the Respondent's conduct and the late settlement.

The court determined custody and access for the parties' child, Bodhi.

The applicant sought joint custody with alternating weeks, while the respondent sought sole custody with the existing access schedule.

The court considered the applicant's history of domestic abuse and poor judgment regarding the child's health and exposure to an unregulated "Mars unit" treatment.

The respondent was found to be a caring, competent, and diligent parent.

The court granted sole custody and primary care to the respondent, with an adjusted access schedule for the applicant, and prohibited the applicant from using the "Mars unit" on the child.

Mr. Caron appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit.

The appeal raised four grounds: (1) "evidence to the contrary" regarding the expiry date of the alcohol standard solution, (2) delay in advising the right to counsel, (3) the fairness of a blended voir dire, and (4) whether Mr. Caron waived his right to counsel.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the alcohol standard's expiry, the reasonableness of the delay in advising counsel due to officer safety, the informed consent to the blended voir dire procedure, and the voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.

Derek Crespy appealed his conviction for assault and the imposed sentence of 45 days imprisonment.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's findings of fact, credibility assessments, and sentencing decision.

The court found no error in principle regarding the conviction, the rejection of self-defence, the credibility assessment of witnesses, or the reliance on photographic evidence.

The court also found no reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and no error in principle in the sentencing decision, noting the aggravating factor of an unprovoked assault involving kicking to the head.

Both the appeal against conviction and the appeal against sentence were dismissed.

The plaintiff claimed adverse possession of a disputed area of land.

The court analyzed the three requirements for adverse possession: actual possession, intention to exclude the owner (animus possidendi), and the true owner being out of possession.

The court found that the plaintiff's predecessor in title, Mr. Malfara, did not meet these requirements as he did not actually use the land and had no intention to exclude the true owner.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for adverse possession was dismissed.

The defendants' counterclaim for trespass was granted, awarding $500 in damages, and a permanent injunction was issued against the plaintiff.

Costs were awarded to the defendants.

This application concerned a dispute over the purchase of a "Farm Property" from an estate.

The applicant sought authorization to purchase the property, while one respondent claimed a first option to purchase under the deceased's will.

The court analyzed the will's provision for "express written notice" to trigger the 30-day option period and whether the respondent had effectively waived his entitlement.

The court concluded that the respondent had properly exercised his option, as the conditions for triggering the option period were not met until a later date, and no effective waiver occurred.

The applicants, charged with fraud over $5,000, sought a stay of proceedings based on an infringement of their s.11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 41.25 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay under both the Jordan framework and the pre-Jordan Morin framework, considering defence delay, Crown delay, institutional delay, and prejudice to the accused.

While acknowledging significant institutional delays in the Brampton courthouse, the court found that the case did not meet the "particularly complex" exceptional circumstance under Jordan.

However, applying the transitional exceptional circumstance, the court determined that the Crown's reliance on the previous Morin framework was reasonable, and under Morin, the delay was not unreasonable given the serious charges and minimal prejudice attributable to the delay itself.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

Robert Must, a party previously declared mentally incapable and represented by the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT), sought leave to bring a motion in a family law proceeding.

The PGT opposed, citing a prior order that required court leave for Mr. Must to bring motions and arguing the current motion was not in his interest.

The court, respecting previous findings of incapacity and noting Mr. Must's continued "bizarre" and "incomprehensible" conduct, dismissed the motion for leave, affirming that only the PGT could bring motions on his behalf.

The plaintiff, Claudine Benjamin, brought an action against Primerica Life Insurance Company of Canada, Masoud Movahedi, and Hooper-Holmes Canada Ltd. Primerica moved to strike the jury notice, arguing the plaintiff claimed declaratory relief or that a mixed jury/non-jury trial was impractical.

The plaintiff cross-moved to serve a jury notice in a previously consolidated action.

The court set aside the consolidation order, granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion to serve a jury notice in the second action, and dismissed Primerica's motion to strike the jury notice.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim, though framed as a "declaration," was in essence a claim for damages based on factual findings regarding insurance coverage, not purely declaratory relief under s. 108(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

A minority shareholder application was brought under the Business Corporations Act seeking an order for the majority to purchase the minority interest.

The court found that the applicant was a legitimate shareholder and that a breakdown in the relationship of trust and confidence among the small shareholder group, coupled with some oppression, warranted a remedy.

The court ordered a process for the termination of the business relationship, giving the respondents the option to either pursue a sale of the company's assets or a court-ordered share valuation process to purchase the applicant's shares.

The valuation date was set, and the issue of a holdback for a separate lawsuit was deferred.

The court addressed three motions: the defendants' motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims, the plaintiff's motion to strike portions of the statement of defence and counterclaim, and the plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction.

The court denied the plaintiff's request for an adjournment, finding a breach of diligence.

The defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing all of the plaintiff's claims, including those for defamation, domain name ownership, theft of trade secrets, corporate espionage, passing off, copyright, and trademark infringement.

The court found the plaintiff acted in bad faith regarding domain name registrations and meta-tag use.

The plaintiff's motions were dismissed.

The plaintiff, Valrose Taylor, brought an action for injuries sustained after falling on a City of Brampton bus due to sudden braking.

The parties agreed on damages, leaving only the question of liability.

The court examined the bus driver's standard of care, considering the sudden braking event caused by pedestrians running in front of the bus.

The court found the driver met the standard of care of a reasonable bus driver in the circumstances, as he had to brake immediately to avoid serious injury or death to the pedestrians.

The action was dismissed.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay in their criminal trial for production and possession of controlled substances.

The court found a total delay of 44.5 months, with 10 months attributable to egregious Crown delay and 9 months to institutional delay.

Despite minimal prejudice to fair trial rights, the significant impact on the applicants' liberty and security interests, exacerbated by the Crown's failure to manage the case responsibly, led the court to conclude that the right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

In a jury trial arising from a planned home invasion robbery, the court delivered written reasons for several evidentiary and procedural rulings made during the trial.

The accused sought a mistrial based on the Crown’s opening statement, challenged the admissibility of autopsy photographs and expert textile‑damage evidence, and requested a directed verdict removing first‑degree murder from the jury’s consideration for two accused.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, admitted the photographs and expert evidence, and held that there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could find the relevant accused to have been substantial and integral causes of death under the constructive first‑degree murder provisions of the Criminal Code.

Additional rulings addressed corrective jury instructions, the absence of a required Vetrovec warning for a key civilian witness, and a defence request that the Crown or court call additional witnesses.

The jury ultimately convicted one accused of first‑degree murder and the others of second‑degree murder.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to quash search warrants and exclude evidence obtained from searches of his residences and storage lockers, alleging police misconduct and fabrication of information in the Informations to Obtain (ITOs).

The court rejected the defence theory that police had planted firearms and drugs, finding the accused’s explanation for the incriminating evidence implausible.

However, the court found that the affiant officer deliberately fabricated portions of the ITO, including altering dates and inventing information to strengthen the grounds for the warrants.

Although the remaining evidence could have supported the issuance of the warrants, the deliberate fabrication was found to be so subversive of the prior authorization process that the warrants were quashed.

Applying the framework in Grant, the court excluded the seized guns, drugs, and related evidence under s.24(2) of the Charter due to the seriousness of the police misconduct, while admitting the accused’s voluntary statements to police.

The plaintiff moved for judgment on a $35,000 loan secured by a second mortgage.

The defendants admitted the debt but alleged an oral agreement whereby the plaintiff would discharge the mortgage upon payment of $20,000 on closing and $15,000 by instalments, and claimed damages after the property sale failed to close.

The court found the alleged oral agreement lacked certainty because no instalment terms were agreed upon and the evidence supporting the agreement was vague and improbable.

Applying the summary judgment principles from Hryniak, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Judgment was granted for the plaintiff and the defendants’ counterclaim was dismissed.

In a proposed class proceeding, the defendants sought to schedule a pleadings motion to strike certain claims and dismiss the action against several defendants before the certification motion.

The court considered the principles governing sequencing of motions in class proceedings and the factors identified in prior authority regarding whether preliminary motions should precede certification.

Applying those factors, the court held that the pleadings motion would not dispose of the entire proceeding or substantially narrow the issues and could generate interlocutory appeals and delay.

Judicial economy and efficiency favoured hearing the pleadings motion together with the certification motion.

The defendants were therefore directed to deliver their Statement of Defence, without prejudice to bringing their proposed motion later.

The applicants brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against former directors of a religious corporation who continued to act as directors and authorized significant payments after a consent court order replaced them.

The court found the respondents knowingly acted contrary to the order by signing cheques and authorizing approximately $135,000 in corporate disbursements after they were no longer directors, including payments after an additional order expressly prohibiting removal of funds.

Applying the established three-part test for civil contempt, the court held the order was clear, the conduct deliberate, and the breach proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court declined to order repayment of the funds due to practical enforcement and litigation considerations but imposed penalties and costs.

The applicant brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing serious firearms and drug charges to trial.

The court analyzed multiple periods of delay totaling approximately 57 months from arrest to the anticipated trial start, allocating time among inherent case requirements, defence delay, Crown delay, and institutional delay.

Although the applicant had been incarcerated for most of the period and experienced prejudice to liberty and security interests, the court found that most delay resulted from defence actions or inherent case complexity, including counsel availability and pre-trial litigation.

Institutional and Crown delay totaled approximately 11.5 months, falling within the acceptable Morin guidelines.

The court concluded that the delay was not unreasonable and that the applicant’s right to a fair trial had not been prejudiced.