John Semenoff

The defendant was charged with driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device (ASD) test on grounds of alleged breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown sought to uphold the conviction based on the officer's reasonable suspicion of alcohol consumption.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to suspect alcohol in the defendant's body based on the odour emanating from the vehicle, and that the delay in formally advising the defendant of arrest did not constitute arbitrary detention.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with multiple aggravated assaults involving a hammer.

Police officers recognized the accused from a police broadcast containing video and still photos of a suspect.

The officers detained the accused for investigative purposes and, after confirming his identity against the broadcast photos, arrested him.

The accused challenged the legality of the arrest, arguing the officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found the officers had both subjective and objective grounds to arrest the accused, acting in good faith based on the broadcast and their observations.

The arrest was ruled lawful.

The accused pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 arising from a scheme that diverted $497,000 from an elderly victim’s bank account and to attempting to obstruct justice during the subsequent jury trial.

The fraud involved directing the transfer of the funds to a third party and misleading investors about the legitimacy of the funds, causing financial and emotional harm to multiple victims.

While the direct victim was reimbursed by the bank, other victims suffered substantial losses and reputational damage.

The court found significant aggravating factors, including the organized and prolonged nature of the fraud and the accused’s attempt to influence witnesses during trial.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed custodial sentences of 16 months for fraud and 12 months consecutive for attempting to obstruct justice, with credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The applicant brought a motion in the Superior Court of Justice to strike a previously entered guilty plea for sexual assault and related offences.

In support of the motion, the applicant filed an affidavit alleging that former counsel pressured him to plead guilty and provided incorrect advice.

The Crown sought an affidavit from former counsel responding to those allegations, raising a dispute over whether portions of the affidavit were protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court held that where a client alleges misconduct or breach of duty by counsel, privilege is waived to the extent necessary for counsel to respond fairly.

The impugned paragraphs of the former counsel’s affidavit were found relevant to the allegations and were permitted to remain, subject only to a minor agreed deletion.

The accused was charged with multiple offences arising from two incidents, including sexual assault, assault, uttering threats, unlawful entry, and breaches of recognizance conditions.

The court applied the credibility framework from R. v. W.(D.) and rejected the accused’s testimony, finding it unreliable and inconsistent with the surrounding evidence.

The complainant’s account of the February incident was accepted, supported by medical evidence of cervical bruising and corroborative circumstances.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, assault in an elevator, uttering threats including threats to kill the complainant’s dog, unlawful entry into the complainant’s apartment, and several recognizance breaches.

However, the accused was acquitted of assault with a weapon and possession of a weapon due to insufficient corroboration and lack of independent evidence regarding the alleged knife incident.

The applicant sought prerogative relief by way of certiorari and prohibition to quash a trial judge’s ruling refusing disclosure of Intoxilyzer maintenance and operational records in an impaired driving prosecution.

The applicant argued the materials constituted first‑party disclosure under Stinchcombe or, alternatively, that the trial judge erred in finding them third‑party records lacking likely relevance.

The court held that certiorari should rarely intervene during ongoing criminal proceedings where an adequate appellate remedy exists and that only a palpable infringement of a constitutional right would justify such relief.

The court found the trial judge was entitled to conclude the records were third‑party materials and not likely relevant to the accuracy or operability of the breath testing instrument.

No jurisdictional error or breach of the right to full answer and defence was established.

The accused was charged with two alcohol driving offences under section 253(1) of the Criminal Code: impaired operation and operation with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown alleged the accused had care and control of a motor vehicle on May 19, 2013.

The accused admitted to being too impaired to drive but contested whether he was in care and control.

The trial judge found that the accused did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion, there was no realistic risk he would change his mind and drive, and there was no realistic risk of unintentional motion creating danger.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The offender was convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud and fraud after impersonating a bank customer and directing a financial institution to transfer $497,000 from the victim’s account to another account.

The scheme involved obtaining confidential banking information from a co‑conspirator and using it to take over the victim’s account.

The court considered significant aggravating factors including the large amount involved, planning and organization of the offence, commission of the offence while on release for a similar charge, and the offender’s prior fraud convictions.

Although the funds were ultimately recovered and the offender had family and health circumstances, denunciation and deterrence were emphasized.

A penitentiary sentence within the three‑to‑five‑year range for serious bank fraud was imposed.

A co-accused sought leave to introduce evidence of another co-accused’s prior fraud conviction to support an inference that the co-accused independently possessed the ability to commit the alleged fraud.

The court considered whether the prior conviction had sufficient probative value to assist the moving party’s defence.

Applying the principles governing admission of bad character evidence between co-accused and the balancing test articulated in Seaboyer and subsequent authorities, the court found the evidentiary nexus weak and the probative value minimal.

The earlier offence involved different conduct and did not establish the capability alleged by the moving party.

The prejudicial effect to the co-accused substantially outweighed any limited probative value.

Multiple accused brought directed verdict motions in a jury trial alleging fraud and conspiracy involving the takeover of ING Direct customer bank accounts using confidential customer information.

The court reviewed the legal requirements for conspiracy, emphasizing the need for proof of an agreement and a shared unlawful objective, which may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.

The court held that there was some evidence capable of supporting an inference of conspiratorial agreement for certain counts, including evidence that one accused obtained confidential banking information and that another used that information to access accounts and transfer funds.

The motions for directed verdicts were dismissed for several accused because the evidence could permit a properly instructed jury to infer participation in the conspiracy or fraud.

However, one accused obtained a directed verdict of acquittal on a specific fraud count due to insufficient evidence linking him to the fraudulent transfer of funds.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 24(2) seeking exclusion of a handgun discovered during a traffic stop, alleging breaches of ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Police had stopped the vehicle for a defective tail light, discovered a hunting knife in the door compartment, and conducted a safety-focused scan of the vehicle interior that revealed a loaded handgun beside the driver’s seat.

The court held the officer was entitled to conduct a limited safety search of the vehicle in the context of an investigative detention following discovery of the knife.

Even if the search had been unreasonable, the Grant factors favoured admission of the handgun evidence.

The Charter application was dismissed.

The accused brought a motion under s. 591(3)(b) of the Criminal Code seeking severance from co‑accused in a joint fraud prosecution relating to a scheme involving unauthorized access to banking information and transfers of funds from customer accounts.

The applicant argued that a co‑accused might introduce evidence of the applicant’s prior fraud conviction involving the same financial institution, which could cause significant prejudice in a jury trial.

The Crown opposed severance, submitting that the concern was speculative and that any prejudice could be addressed through jury instructions.

The court emphasized the strong presumption favouring joint trials where charges arise from the same series of events and held that the risk of prejudice was not sufficiently established at this stage.

Because it was uncertain whether the evidence would be tendered or admitted at trial, the severance application was found to be premature and speculative.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The trial judge had found that the Crown failed to prove the accused had care or control of an operable vehicle within the two-hour statutory presumption period under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Evidence showed the accused was seated in a damaged and potentially inoperable vehicle awaiting a tow truck after a collision, and the timing of the incident relative to the breath samples was uncertain.

The appeal court held that the trial judge correctly applied the law governing care or control and the statutory presumption, and that the factual findings regarding operability and timing were supported by the evidence.

The Crown therefore failed to establish any legal error or unreasonable verdict.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application challenging the arresting officer’s reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and breath demand.

The appellant contended the officer improperly relied on an unidentified bystander’s identification and that evidence obtained after the arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal court held that the officer’s subjective belief was objectively reasonable when considering the totality of the circumstances, including dispatch information, the accident scene, the bystander identification, and the appellant’s signs of impairment.

The court found no Charter breach and concluded the trial judge properly applied governing jurisprudence.

Alternatively, even if a breach existed, exclusion of the breath samples and statements would not have been justified under the Grant framework.

The Court held that under s. 16(3) of the Canada Evidence Act, an adult witness with mental disabilities is competent if they can communicate evidence and promise to tell the truth.

Requiring abstract understanding of truth-telling obligations was rejected.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.