John P. Schuman

The mother appealed a Crown wardship order, arguing that institutional delays in the appeal process, specifically regarding transcript preparation, breached her s. 7 Charter rights by allowing the child to bond with a prospective adoptive family over four years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Charter application, finding that the delay did not cause the substantive prejudice alleged, as the passage of time also allowed the mother to improve her situation, but it remained in the child's best interests to stay with the adoptive family.

The mother was awarded costs for the Charter application payable by the Attorney General.

The father brought a motion seeking recusal of the trial judge and a declaration of mistrial on two grounds: (1) late disclosure and non-disclosure of notes from Jennifer Shneer, the mother's therapist employed by the child protection society, which the father claimed prejudiced his ability to conduct his case; and (2) an alleged apprehension of bias arising from a distant familial relationship between the judge and the proposed witness.

The court dismissed the motion in its entirety, finding no prejudicial disclosure, no basis for declaring a mistrial, and no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The father brought a Notice of Constitutional Question challenging the court's scheduling of a child protection trial, arguing that adjournments exceeding 30 days and the failure to schedule consecutive trial dates violated his Charter rights under sections 7 and 15.

The father sought various remedies including dismissal of the application, placement of children in his care, or modified access arrangements.

The court dismissed the constitutional motion in its entirety, finding that the scheduling decisions were within the court's jurisdiction and discretion, that no Charter rights were violated, and that the sought remedies were neither appropriate nor just in the circumstances.

The appellant mother appealed an order making her child a Crown ward with no access.

The Court of Appeal previously ordered a new assessment because the proposed adoptive parents had separated.

The court-appointed assessor reported that the child was thriving with the adoptive family and would suffer emotional distress if moved.

The Court of Appeal accepted the assessor's recommendation, found it was in the child's best interests to remain with the adoptive family, and dismissed the appeal regarding Crown wardship and access.

A constitutional question regarding delay was deferred.

The mother appealed a decision dismissing her status review application regarding her child, who had been made a Crown ward with no access.

On appeal, both the mother and the Children's Aid Society sought to introduce fresh evidence, including evidence that the child's prospective adoptive parents had separated.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could impact the outcome, and ordered an assessment report to evaluate the impact of the separation on the child.

The court also requested submissions from the Attorney General of Ontario regarding the mother's claim that institutional delays violated her section 7 Charter rights.

The appeal was reserved pending receipt of the further material.

The respondent father sought costs against both the mother and her counsel, Rocco Achampong, following the stay of his Ontario Court of Justice custody application when the mother commenced divorce proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice.

The father claimed $6,135 in full indemnity costs.

The court found that while the mother was entitled to proceed in the Superior Court of Justice, her counsel's conduct in bringing a motion without notice in that court while actively corresponding with the father's counsel about an imminent motion in the Ontario Court of Justice constituted a breach of professional obligations.

The court awarded costs against the counsel personally but dismissed the claim against the mother.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's decision that used final offer selection to determine child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The appellant argued that the process was contrary to law because it was ill-suited for multiple issues, lacked sworn testimony and cross-examination, and the arbitrator's reasons were inadequate.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that family law arbitrations are not required to mirror court processes, the parties were treated equally and fairly, and the arbitrator's reasons were sufficient.

The applicant brought an emergency motion for temporary custody of two young children following a recent separation and an incident that resulted in the applicant being removed from the matrimonial home by police.

The respondent opposed the motion on the basis that the matter was not urgent.

The court found urgency under Rule 14(4.2) of the Family Law Rules due to the abrupt separation of the children from their primary caregiver and the infant’s dependence on breastfeeding.

Considering the best interests of the children and the applicant’s role as primary caregiver, the court ordered that temporary custody be transferred to the applicant.

The respondent was granted generous access and further steps in the proceeding were directed, including an early case conference and financial disclosure.

Following the dismissal of a husband's motion seeking reconsideration of an earlier family law order, the wife sought costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The court rejected allegations that the motion had been brought in bad faith but found the husband's decision to pursue reconsideration rather than an appeal to be unreasonable.

As a result, the court determined that full recovery of the wife's reasonable costs was warranted, subject to a minor reduction reflecting items for which costs had previously been denied.

The husband was ordered to pay the reduced costs amount, enforceable as spousal support through the Family Responsibility Office.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order awarding joint custody of the child to both parents and establishing a mechanism for determining private tutoring.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the joint custody order was consistent with the best interests of the child, the parties' initial separation agreement, and the recommendation of the Children's Lawyer.

The court also upheld the tutoring provision as a common-sense mechanism to identify the best educational support for the child.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment that awarded sole custody of the parties' three children to the respondent mother, imputed income to him for child support purposes, awarded open-ended spousal support, and determined the equalization of net family property including a farm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custody award and the finding of intentional underemployment, noting the trial judge was in the best position to assess the evidence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding spousal support and property equalization, finding the trial judge's reasons were inadequate to permit appellate review.

Those issues were remitted for a new trial.