John May

The respondent sought costs against the applicant following the dismissal of the applicant's motion to recuse the Tribunal Chair.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's conduct in bringing the recusal motion was unreasonable and frivolous, as it lacked factual evidence of bias and was an improper collateral attack on previous interlocutory decisions.

The Tribunal awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis, declining to award substantial indemnity costs as the conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of a production order pending a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The Tribunal found that it had no inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay and that neither the Farm Implements Act nor its Rules of Procedure provided such jurisdiction.

The Tribunal declined to apply the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting that the applicant must first obtain an extension from the Divisional Court before bringing its motion for leave to appeal.

The motion was dismissed.

The respondent, CLAAS of America Inc., sought costs of $5,348.40 against the applicant, Sunova Implement Ltd., following two motions for the production of documents.

The Tribunal found that Sunova's conduct in bringing its own motion without providing evidence of relevancy, and in resisting CLAAS's motion without evidence that the requested documents were irrelevant, was unreasonable.

The Tribunal awarded costs to CLAAS in the requested amount of $5,348.40 on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicant brought a motion seeking the recusal of the Chair of the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the Chair's previous unfavourable rulings on production motions.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to provide cogent evidence to rebut the strong presumption of judicial impartiality.

The Tribunal concluded that making an unfavourable interlocutory decision does not demonstrate pre-judgment or bias, and that the recusal motion was an improper collateral attack on the underlying motion decisions.

The defendants, including CTV and several journalists, brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action arising from a W5 investigative report on dog sledding operations.

The court granted the motion, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiff failed to establish that its defamation claim had substantial merit, as the impugned broadcasts did not identify the plaintiff or lacked essential elements of defamation.

Furthermore, the plaintiff could not show that the defendants lacked valid defences of justification, fair comment, and responsible communication, nor that the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The respondent distributor brought a motion for the production of financial and other documents used by the applicant dealer's expert in preparing a draft report on damages arising from the termination of their dealership agreement.

The applicant argued the motion was premature because the expert report was only a draft.

The Tribunal granted the motion, finding the documents were relevant to the assessment of damages and that foundational documents relied upon by an expert must be disclosed to enable the opposing party to assess its position.

The applicant, a terminated farm implements dealer, brought a motion seeking the production of financial and sales documents from the respondent manufacturer and a successor dealership.

The applicant argued the documents were necessary to calculate damages based on the successor's financial performance.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that the respondent did not have possession, control, or power over the successor's documents.

Furthermore, the Tribunal declined to order production from the successor dealership as a non-party, concluding that the requested documents were not relevant to the established method of calculating damages based on past performance, and that the prejudice of disclosing confidential information to a competitor outweighed any unfairness to the applicant.

Following a hearing, the parties agreed that there would be no order as to costs.

The Divisional Court endorsed the agreement, making no order as to costs.

The applicants raised a preliminary objection seeking the recusal of Leiper J. from the panel on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicants argued that Leiper J.'s involvement in two prior decisions involving the same parties, including a refusal to grant a stay that was later partially reversed by the Court of Appeal, met the threshold for disqualification.

The Divisional Court dismissed the objection, finding that the applicants failed to meet the heavy burden of rebutting the strong presumption of judicial impartiality, noting that prior involvement alone does not establish bias and there were no allegations of improper conduct.

The moving parties sought a stay of an Animal Care Review Board decision confirming a $1.5 million statement of account issued by Animal Welfare Services for the care of approximately 200 seized dogs.

Without a stay, the dogs would be forfeited to the Crown.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the balance of convenience favoured the moving parties, as refusing the stay would render related ongoing proceedings moot and destroy their unique herd of dogs.

The motion for a stay pending judicial review was granted.

The moving parties, operators of a dog-sledding business, sought to set aside a single judge's decision refusing to extend a stay of an Animal Care Review Board costs order regarding the care of their removed dogs.

The Divisional Court panel dismissed the motion, finding no error in the motions judge's balance of convenience analysis, which heavily weighed the mounting public costs of caring for the dogs.

The panel also rejected a request to disqualify one of its members based on prior involvement in a related judicial review, and admitted but gave no weight to fresh evidence of a new statutory application for the dogs' return.

The appellants appealed a Statement of Account in the amount of $1,524,640.00 for the cost of necessaries (boarding) for over 200 sled dogs removed by Animal Welfare Services.

The Board found that the daily boarding rate of $20.00 per dog was reasonable and lower than the actual costs incurred.

The appellants provided no evidence to challenge the costs.

The Board confirmed the Statement of Account in full.

The applicants brought a motion to set aside a previous decision and to admit fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court reserved its decision on the motion.

However, the court ordered that the stay of the Animal Care Review Board's decision be continued pending the release of the court's decision on the motion.

The parties were also directed to advise the court of any resolution reached at an upcoming board hearing.

The moving parties sought to continue a stay of an Animal Care Review Board decision requiring them to pay $505,760 in boarding costs for 200 sled dogs seized under the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried and irreparable harm (forfeiture of the dogs), the balance of convenience favoured the respondent.

The court noted the mounting public cost of boarding the dogs, estimated at $4 million, and the moving parties' inability to pay.

The motion to continue the stay was dismissed.

The applicants sought judicial review of two decisions by the Animal Care Review Board regarding their sled dog business.

The Board had confirmed orders requiring the applicants to improve living conditions for their dogs, including lengthening tethers and remediating doghouses.

When the applicants failed to comply, animal welfare inspectors removed approximately 230 dogs.

The Board subsequently ordered that most of the dogs not be returned until the applicants complied with the orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications for judicial review, finding the Board's interpretation of the tethering requirements reasonable and concluding that the removal and retention of the dogs were justified due to the applicants' ongoing non-compliance with the minimum standards of care.

The moving parties, operators of a dog sledding business, sought a stay of an Animal Care Review Board decision requiring them to pay over $500,000 for the costs of care of over 100 sled dogs removed by animal welfare authorities.

The stay was sought pending the determination of two related applications for judicial review challenging the underlying compliance and removal orders.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm due to the potential forfeiture and euthanization of the specially trained dogs, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay to prevent the judicial reviews from becoming moot.

The court granted the stay on terms, including a requirement for future submissions on financial security for ongoing care costs.

The appellants appealed a Statement of Account issued by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector for over $1.1 million relating to the removal and care of over 200 dogs from their dog sledding business.

The Animal Care Review Board found that the respondent bears the initial evidentiary burden to prove the charges reflect actual and reasonable costs for necessaries.

The Board varied the transportation and veterinary costs to $Nil, finding that transportation for removal is not a necessary, the care during transport fell below prescribed standards, and the respondent failed to prove the veterinary costs did not arise from its own care.

The boarding costs were reduced to $505,760 based on a reasonable daily rate of $20 per dog, resulting in a total varied Statement of Account of $505,760.

In an appeal of a $1.1 million Statement of Account related to the removal of over 200 dogs, the parties brought several preliminary motions.

The Board granted the Respondent's motion to call more than three expert witnesses, finding that the treating veterinarians were 'participant experts' exempt from strict expert report rules.

The Board also granted the Appellants' motions for further disclosure regarding the removal and care of the dogs, and permitted the Appellants' veterinarian to inspect the remaining living dogs subject to specific conditions.

The appellants appealed the removal of over 200 dogs from their dog sledding business properties by Animal Welfare Services.

The dogs were removed following non-compliance with previous orders regarding tether lengths and dog house conditions.

The Board found that while some puppies were not in distress and must be returned immediately, the majority of the dogs were in distress due to inadequate tether lengths, lack of insulation, and poor state of repair of their shelters.

The Board ordered the return of the remaining dogs subject to the appellants achieving compliance with specific standards of care, including three-metre tethers and insulated dog houses.

The appellants run a dog sledding business from which over 200 dogs were removed by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector.

The appellants brought a motion seeking the return of the dogs or a stay, based on the respondent's redaction of boarding facility and veterinarian information from disclosure on the grounds of public interest litigation privilege.

The Board found the redacted information was not protected by privilege, noting it had been disclosed in previous cases.

The Board ordered the respondent to provide the unredacted information to the appellants' counsel, subject to an undertaking not to release it to anyone else, including the appellants.