Jennifer Myers

In a voir dire during a first-degree murder trial, the court considered the admissibility of several pre-arrest statements made by the two accused to police.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary because the accused were suspects and should have been given a primary caution, and that police used trickery by telling them they were not suspects.

The court found that the accused were not suspects at the time of the interviews based on the objective standard of reasonable suspicion.

The court held that even if they were suspects, the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, as there were no threats, promises, or oppressive circumstances, and the accused had operating minds.

The court also rejected arguments that section 7 of the Charter was violated, noting it does not apply prior to detention.

All pre-arrest statements were ruled admissible.

The accused, Elaine Biddersingh, was found guilty of second-degree murder of her step-daughter, Melonie Biddersingh, after a jury trial.

The court considered the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence (prolonged abuse, malnutrition, and eventual drowning of the victim, followed by concealment of the body), and the jury's recommendations to determine the period of parole ineligibility.

The court rejected the defence's mitigating factors, including the passage of time and the accused's pro-social lifestyle, due to lack of genuine remorse and acceptance of responsibility.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 16 years, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the respondent on a charge of first-degree murder.

The Crown argued the judge committed jurisdictional errors by failing to consider the whole of the evidence and deciding issues reserved for the trier of fact.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge improperly engaged in a piecemeal analysis of circumstantial evidence, specifically video surveillance showing the respondent allegedly retrieving and passing a firearm to the co-accused shortly before the murder.

The court quashed the discharge and ordered mandamus directing the preliminary inquiry judge to order the respondent to stand trial.

The applicant, who was separately indicted for first-degree murder, sought a partial or delayed publication ban on her anticipated testimony at her co-accused's trial.

She argued that pre-trial publicity and media reports of her evidence would taint the jury pool for her upcoming trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding no real and substantial risk to her fair trial rights.

The court held that reasonable alternative measures, such as the challenge for cause process and strong judicial directions to the jury, were sufficient to ensure an impartial jury.

The offender was convicted by a jury of manslaughter after being charged with second degree murder arising from a fatal shooting during a struggle in a hotel room.

The sentencing judge considered competing theories regarding who brought the firearm and whether the killing occurred during a robbery, self‑defence, or provocation.

The court found it was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender brought the gun to commit a robbery, concluding instead that the deceased likely brought the firearm and that the offender gained control of it during an ambush and struggle.

While the killing was unlawful, the offender lacked the state of mind for murder.

Balancing denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, the offender’s youth and background, and aggravating factors including a prior record and probation status, the court imposed an eight‑year penitentiary sentence with credit for pre‑trial custody.

The accused, on trial for second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude several documents seized by police from an abandoned apartment he formerly occupied.

The documents included a probation order, letters from a girlfriend, drawings depicting a gun, and a driver's licence suspension notice.

The Crown sought to introduce the documents to negate the accused's claim of self-defence and innocent purpose.

The court allowed the application and excluded the documents, finding they lacked relevance and probative value, and that their prejudicial effect far outweighed any potential probative value.

The Crown brought a motion seeking to admit evidence of an alleged robbery occurring four days before a fatal shooting as similar fact evidence in a second degree murder trial.

The Crown argued that the earlier incident shared distinctive similarities with the charged offence, including the use of a firearm, hotel-room encounters with sex trade workers, and the use of the same cellphone number to arrange meetings.

The respondent opposed admission, arguing that the similarities were generic and that the evidentiary link between the accused and the earlier robbery was weak and largely hearsay.

The court held that the similarities were not sufficiently distinctive and that the evidence linking the accused to the earlier incident was not cogent.

As the probative value did not outweigh the prejudicial effect, the proposed similar fact evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The applicants sought to exclude text messages obtained by police through a production order directed to a telecommunications provider, arguing that the messages constituted private communications requiring a wiretap authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code.

The court accepted that text messages attract a reasonable expectation of privacy but held that the statutory regime governing interceptions applies only to contemporaneous surveillance of communications.

The retrieval of stored text messages from a service provider after the communication had occurred did not amount to an interception.

The court found that the use of a production order under s. 487.012 of the Criminal Code was the proper legal mechanism and did not violate s. 8 of the Charter.