James W. Sloan

The plaintiff brought a summary judgment motion claiming constructive dismissal after 22 years of service.

Following a corporate acquisition, the defendant unilaterally revoked the plaintiff's long-standing arrangement to work from home three days a week, placed her on a performance improvement plan, and arbitrarily reduced her bonus.

The court found that the ability to work from home was an essential term of the employment contract and its unilateral removal, along with the bonus reduction, constituted constructive dismissal.

The plaintiff was awarded damages based on a 22-month notice period, subject to minor deductions, plus compensation for the underpaid bonus.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent damages for the wrongful termination of a six-month fixed-term consulting contract.

The appellant argued that damages should be limited to the two-week early termination notice period provided in the contract, and that the respondent had a duty to mitigate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant never actually invoked the early termination clause until two days before the contract expired, effectively keeping the respondent on call.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the respondent was entitled to the balance of the fixed-term contract price without a duty to mitigate.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing their claim for damages caused by storm water flowing from the respondent's property.

The respondent had regraded and repaved his driveway, altering the natural drainage and causing water to flow into the appellants' basement window wells.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in relying on outdated law regarding natural water flow.

The court held that the respondent's artificial alteration of the driveway surface, which directed water onto the appellants' property, constituted an actionable nuisance.

Judgment was entered for the appellants for $14,000 to install a protective curb.

The plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis after obtaining a judgment for $11,826.98 in a mortgage dispute.

The court declined to award costs to either party.

The court found that the plaintiffs had grossly overreached by demanding almost four times their entitlement before agreeing to discharge the mortgage, while the defendant had maintained an unreasonable position regarding the interest rate, rendering the matter virtually unsettleable.

The applicant purchased a contaminated property from the respondent.

The agreement of purchase and sale required the respondent to remediate the property to specific Ministry of Environment standards using in situ injections.

After several unsuccessful injection attempts, the respondent's experts proposed a Site Specific Risk Assessment (SSRA) instead of further injections or excavation.

The applicant sought specific performance of the remediation or funds to complete it, while the respondent sought a declaration that an SSRA satisfied its obligations.

The court found insufficient evidence regarding current contamination levels, the feasibility of excavation, and the impact of an SSRA on property value, and ordered the parties to obtain further expert evidence using trust funds before making a final determination.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking relief regarding custody and access that had already been dealt with on a final basis.

The court noted the respondent's history of failing to cooperate with court orders, including refusing to participate in a family assessment and failing to pay previously ordered costs.

The court dismissed the motion as procedurally improper, noting that any attempt to change the final orders would require a formal motion to change, and ordered costs against the respondent.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to determine the amount owing by the defendant on a mortgage.

The court found that the stated interest rate of 0.8% was a typo and the agreed rate was 8%.

The court disallowed the plaintiffs' claims for a lender's fee, an automatic renewal fee, and administrative fees, finding the renewal fee to be a penalty and the others unsupported by evidence.

The court also found the plaintiffs had received a payment of $86,184.68, contrary to their assertions.

The defendant was ordered to pay the remaining balance of $11,826.98, and the plaintiffs were denied their pre-litigation legal fees.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $10,400 in damages for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale related to property repairs and water damage.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for how the damage amounts were calculated, which claims were accepted or rejected, and what specific repairs were required under the contract.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on the issue of damages before a different deputy judge.

The applicant mother sought to relocate with the nine-year-old child of the marriage from Simcoe to Exeter, Ontario, to live with her fiancé and be closer to her extended family.

The child has type 1 diabetes and struggles with reading and writing.

The parties had been sharing parenting on a week-about basis.

The court applied the Gordon v. Goertz framework and found that the proposed move would require excessive driving, disrupting the child's life and the existing shared parenting arrangement.

The court concluded that the move was primarily for the mother's benefit and not in the child's best interests, dismissing the application.

The plaintiff insurer brought a motion to enforce a settlement reached during a Financial Services Commission of Ontario arbitration regarding statutory accident benefits.

The defendant insured had rescinded the settlement within two days, relying on the cooling-off period set out in section 9.1 of Ontario Regulation 664 and explicitly included in the settlement release drafted by the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that because the cooling-off clause was attached to and formed part of the signed settlement documentation, the defendant was entitled to rely on it to rescind the agreement.

Following a motion where the moving party successfully sought to withdraw admissions involving approximately $14,000,000, the court determined the issue of costs.

The court found that the responding parties took a tactical and precarious position in opposing the motion, as the granting of leave was foreseeable absent any evidence of prejudice.

Costs were awarded to the moving party fixed at $15,000.

Following a summary judgment motion where success was divided, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The parties had previously agreed to cap costs at $20,000 for the successful party.

Finding that the responding party was more successful based on the issues proceeding to trial, the court ordered the moving party to pay costs fixed at $10,000.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct from 2008, involving domestic assault and unauthorized possession of a firearm, as similar fact evidence in a trial for similar charges.

The Crown argued the evidence was necessary to rebut the defence's assertion that the complainant planted the firearms.

The court applied the Handy framework and dismissed the application, finding the prior incident lacked sufficient similarity to the current charges and that its admission would be highly prejudicial.

The moving party, in the midst of complex family trust litigation, sought leave to withdraw admissions made in a previous affidavit and to file three new affidavits.

The moving party argued the admissions regarding multi-million dollar shareholder loans were made inadvertently due to confusion and reliance on her former, now-deceased counsel.

The responding parties opposed, arguing the admissions were formal and the new evidence was an attempt to repair her case mid-hearing.

The court granted the motion, finding the admissions were likely inadvertent, raised a triable issue, and caused no non-compensable legal prejudice to the responding parties.

The court emphasized the need to decide the case on its true merits rather than a solicitor's or party's mistake.

Following a three-week jury trial in a personal injury action, the plaintiff was awarded $241,740 in damages.

Prior to trial, the defendants had served an offer to settle for $375,000 plus costs.

Because the jury award was less favourable than the defendants' offer, the defendants sought costs from the date of the offer pursuant to Rule 49.10.

The plaintiff argued that her impecuniosity should relieve her from paying the defendants' costs, as it would effectively offset her damages award.

The court rejected this argument, finding no reason to deviate from the normal costs rules.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer, and the defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs thereafter.

The respondent was successful on a half-day motion brought by the applicants to remove her solicitors and add a defendant.

She sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis of $81,193.45, or alternatively on a partial indemnity basis of $61,637.67.

The court found that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted and that the requested amounts were disproportionate.

Costs were fixed and awarded to the respondent in the total amount of $42,520.33.

The appellant mother appealed a trial decision making two of her children Crown wards without access and granting custody of her third child, who has Down syndrome, to the biological father without access to the mother.

The mother argued the trial judge erred in assessing evidence, including child hearsay and medical evidence, and in denying her access.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, credibility findings, or determination that access was not in the children's best interests given the mother's history of physical discipline, lack of insight, and failure to address the children's needs.

The applicants brought a motion to remove Cambridge LLP as solicitors of record for Sheila O’Donovan and to add Adam Cappelli as a party respondent.

The court applied a nine-factor test to assess the solicitor removal request, considering the likelihood of Mr. Cappelli being a witness and potential conflicts.

The court found no real conflict and upheld the client's right to choose counsel.

The motion to add Mr. Cappelli as a respondent was dismissed due to the advanced stage of the proceedings and delay by the applicants, though without prejudice to a future application for passing accounts.

The applicant sought to exclude statements made to police, arguing they were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights due to a failure to advise of the right to remain silent and to counsel.

The court found that while the rights were read, the police failed to maintain an adequate contemporaneous record of the accused's utterances regarding the marijuana plants and the offer to show the light switch.

This failure raised a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the statements, leading to their exclusion.

This endorsement addresses two applications concerning the estate of Frank Ernest Warren: one by the estate trustees to pass their accounts, and a cross-application by beneficiary Cheryl Bolton alleging breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duties, and seeking the removal of the trustees and reimbursement for improperly converted monies and excessive legal fees.

The estate, valued at approximately $316,000, included a "Henson-like" trust for Ms. Bolton, who receives ODSP.

The court found that the trustees, who resided in Scotland, unduly burdened the estate.

The court disallowed the trustees' compensation, significantly reduced the legal fees charged by their counsel (finding 70% of clerk time was for trustee work and disallowing certain legal research), and ordered the removal of the estate trustees.

Reimbursement for the trustees' flights, hotel, and meal expenses was approved.

The court was particularly troubled by the trustees' proposal to collapse the Henson trust, which would have been detrimental to the beneficiary and contrary to the testator's wishes.