James Stuart George Macdonald

The plaintiff mortgage broker arranged financing for the defendants' convention centre project.

The plaintiff alleged it was entitled to a 5% ownership interest in the defendant corporation pursuant to an equity agreement, but share certificates were never issued.

Over eight years later, the plaintiff sued.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion to amend its claim to seek only declaratory relief, arguing that under s. 16(1)(a) of the Act, claims for declaratory relief alone are not subject to a limitation period.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to amend its claim and dismissed the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine issue for trial as to whether the plaintiff acquired a beneficial interest that could be subject to declaratory relief without consequential relief.

This was a costs decision following an estate dispute in which a beneficiary successfully recovered her share of legal fees and unauthorized executor compensation paid from the estate.

The court applied the general principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing fairness, reasonableness, indemnity, and proportionality.

The proceeding was found to be neither complex nor of public importance, and no settlement offers affected the analysis.

Partial indemnity costs of $7,942.07 were awarded to the applicant, with apportionment between the respondents based on their respective responsibility for the underlying reimbursement amounts.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for damages arising from a shareholder dispute.

A motion judge granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff for the defendants' breach of an interim agreement, ordering damages and costs.

When the defendants failed to pay, a second motion judge struck their statement of defence.

The defendants appealed both orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the summary judgment, finding the defendants had consented to the procedure and the evidence supported the breach.

However, the Court allowed the appeal of the order striking the defence, holding that such a severe sanction was disproportionate and should not be a remedy of first resort, particularly where the defendants were misled by their former counsel.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs succeeded on liability for nuisance and trespass against a neighbouring trucking company, the Court of Appeal ordered that the plaintiffs recover their costs of the liability portion of the trial, with quantum to be determined by the trial judge.

The court considered the principles governing costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including proportionality, indemnity, reasonable expectations of the losing party, complexity, and the hours reasonably expended.

The court rejected arguments that the plaintiffs’ trial preparation time was excessive and accepted that approximately 75% of the trial concerned liability rather than damages.

Applying partial indemnity rates and allocating costs proportionately, the court fixed the recoverable trial costs and apportioned joint and several liability for the trespass portion of the claim.

The landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing its application for arrears of rent related to an air conditioning charge.

The LTB Member had relied on a previous decision involving the same landlord but a different tenant to find the charge invalid.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Member erred in applying issue estoppel because the parties and the specific issues were different.

The matter was remitted back to the LTB for a re-hearing before a different Member.

The applicant beneficiary brought an application against estate trustees alleging they improperly caused estate funds to pay legal fees incurred in litigation that primarily advanced their personal beneficiary interests.

The dispute arose from prior litigation concerning ownership of a family home that had vested in estate beneficiaries under the Estates Administration Act.

The court held that estate trustees are not entitled to indemnification from estate assets for legal costs incurred to protect their own personal interests, and where both personal and estate interests are engaged, trustees must segregate the costs.

The court found the impugned legal fees were incurred in the respondents’ personal capacities and ordered reimbursement of the applicant’s proportionate share.

The court also held that trustee compensation taken without court approval or beneficiary consent was improper and required repayment of the applicant’s share.

Following a prior decision granting summary judgment to the plaintiff against one defendant, the court determined the quantum of costs payable.

The plaintiff relied on a valid Rule 49 offer to settle and sought substantial indemnity costs after the offer and partial indemnity costs before it.

The court reviewed the reasonableness of the fees claimed, reduced certain hours and travel expenses, and apportioned costs to reflect that judgment was obtained only against one defendant.

Applying the appropriate indemnity scales and reductions, the court fixed the total recoverable fees, taxes, and disbursements.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that it owed no duty to defend or indemnify the insured vendor in an action alleging misrepresentation and breach of contract arising from the sale of a residential property with undisclosed prior fire damage.

The court applied established principles governing the duty to defend, including the “mere possibility” threshold and the requirement to determine the true nature of the claim rather than relying on the labels used in the pleadings.

Although the plaintiffs amended their statement of claim to remove the word “fraudulent” from the allegation of misrepresentation, the underlying facts necessarily implied deliberate deception because the vendor knew of a prior fire and an insurance payout.

The court held that the claim could only be characterized as intentional deceit, which fell outside the policy’s coverage for unintentional bodily injury or property damage.

Summary judgment was granted declaring that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify.

The plaintiffs, who operate a commercial lighting manufacturing business, brought an action against the defendants, who operate an adjacent transport and warehousing business.

The plaintiffs claimed that dust from the defendants' unpaved parking lot constituted a nuisance that interfered with their manufacturing process, causing a loss of productivity.

They also claimed that the defendants' transport trucks repeatedly trespassed onto their driveway, damaging curb stones and displacing concrete blocks.

The court found that the dust constituted an actionable nuisance and awarded damages for loss of productivity and refinishing costs.

The court also found that the trucks trespassed on the plaintiffs' property, holding the corporate defendants and their director personally liable.

Damages were awarded for the trespass, and a permanent injunction was granted to restrain further trespassing.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment awarding sole custody and sole decision-making of their child to the respondent father, with equal parenting time.

The appellant also challenged the trial judge's decision to credit the respondent for certain household expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence and dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the trial judge's conclusions on custody and financial arrangements.

The appellants appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement.

The respondent had purported to accept a Rule 49 offer to settle after a supervisor was appointed over the corporate appellants and after transferring his interest in a shareholder loan to his daughter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the supervision order contained a stay provision and Rule 11 applied to the transfer of interest.

Consequently, accepting the offer and bringing the motion to enforce were steps in the proceeding that required leave of the court, which was not obtained.

The respondent sought a building permit to raise and renovate a cottage that had been submerged and uninhabitable for 14 years.

The municipality refused, arguing the legal nonconforming use had been lost.

The application judge ordered the permit issued, finding the successive owners' intention to repair preserved the use.

The Court of Appeal allowed the municipality's appeal, holding that intention alone, without reasonable steps to resume the use, is insufficient to preserve a legal nonconforming use over such an extensive period.

However, the Court declared that the respondent retained a legal nonconforming use of the land for docking boats, though no new structures could be erected.

The appellants appealed an order declaring that they had repudiated Minutes of Settlement and lifting a stay in bankruptcy proceedings to allow the respondent's action to continue.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in making the declaration of repudiation because the relief was sought by motion rather than by originating process.

However, the Court upheld the order lifting the stay, finding that the motion judge correctly concluded there had been repudiation in the context of the motion to lift the stay.

The appeal was allowed in part to quash the declaration, but dismissed regarding the lifting of the stay.