James A. Ramsay

Following cross-motions where success was divided, both parties sought costs.

The court found that the applicant acted in bad faith by seeking a last-minute adjournment and bringing meritless motions to prolong her retention of the matrimonial home.

The respondent was awarded costs of $50,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, which included a reduction to reflect the applicant's success on support issues.

The appellant appealed convictions for driving with excessive blood alcohol, possession of marijuana, and possession of cocaine, arguing Charter breaches related to arbitrary detention, unreasonable search, and the right to counsel.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the seizure of marijuana lawful as an incident of arrest for stunt driving, the detention not arbitrary, and no breach of the right to be informed of reasons for detention.

While there was a five-minute delay in informing the appellant of his right to counsel, no evidence was obtained as a result.

The court also found that roadside questioning about alcohol consumption, even after the appellant requested counsel, was permissible under the Orbansky doctrine as part of the impaired driving screening process, thus no breach of the right to counsel occurred in that regard.

This endorsement addresses costs following a summary judgment motion where the defendant achieved partial success on minor claims but failed on the two main claims.

Both parties sought costs.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $15,000 in partial indemnity costs, reduced to reflect the defendant's minor successes.

The court found that it was not unreasonable for the defendant to have brought the summary judgment motion.

The applicant, widow of the deceased, sought directions under Rule 75.06 regarding the estate, including payment of a debt to TD Bank and issuance of a certificate of appointment as executor.

The respondents, children from the deceased's first marriage, objected to the appointment and resisted debt payment, arguing the debt was secured against the matrimonial home now solely owned by the applicant.

The court ordered the TD Bank debt paid from the estate, granted the certificate of appointment to the applicant, and awarded costs against the respondents for an abandoned motion and for unreasonably delaying debt payments, finding their objections lacked merit.

The applicant sought costs for a previous motion.

The court awarded the applicant $2,500, less than the $3,300 requested, noting the applicant's partial success and lack of serious settlement effort.

The respondent's position on access was deemed "ridiculous" making settlement unlikely.

The court declined to make the costs enforceable as child support, as the motion did not pertain to child support.

The defendant, Robert Mills, moved for partial summary judgment and leave to amend his statement of defence to plead the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs claimed for breach of contract and tort related to the purchase of residences and a common recreational complex.

The court granted summary judgment to the defendant on claims for breach of privacy, breach of contract regarding monthly fees for club access, and deficiencies in construction.

However, the court dismissed the defendant's request for summary judgment on claims related to the delay in building the clubhouse and misrepresentation about golf course proximity/view, finding these issues required a trial due to intertwined facts and the need to potentially pierce the corporate veil.

Leave to amend the statement of defence to plead limitation periods for breach of contract and golf course representations was also denied.

The applicant mother brought a motion for a temporary order changing the terms of access for the parties' four-year-old son pending trial.

The court found that the respondent father had used the existing access order to extend conflict, including improperly keeping the child over Serbian Orthodox Christmas in 2018 and keeping the child out of school during mid-week access.

To minimize conflict, the court temporarily cancelled the father's mid-week access, granted the mother access for Serbian Orthodox Christmas in 2019, and permitted the mother to cancel one weekend access to take the child on a March break vacation.

This motion determined priority between creditors following a judicial sale of a residential property.

Pollard Windows Inc., a construction lien claimant, sought priority over 1746878 Ontario Inc., an assignee of a mortgage.

The court found that the mortgage held by 1746878 Ontario Inc. was a fraudulent conveyance, part of a scheme by the controlling individual (Andrew Ferri) and related entities to defeat creditors.

The court rejected 1746878 Ontario Inc.'s claims of priority, finding that the alleged notice of sale was invalid, it failed to prove any actual advances under the mortgage, and the transaction bore numerous badges of fraud.

Pollard Windows Inc. was granted priority for its judgment and costs.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions and cross-motions in a family law dispute following a 2014 separation.

The court dismissed the Applicant's requests for an adjournment, a voice of the child report, a preservation order against the Respondent's assets, and further disclosure.

It also dismissed the Respondent's request for a further parenting assessment.

The court granted the Applicant's motion to increase temporary child support to $9,277 per month and temporary spousal support to $8,500 per month, based on the Respondent's averaged income of $750,000.

Retroactive support was left for trial.

A support deduction order was issued, and all other relief sought was dismissed.

The Respondent moved for exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to facilitate its sale, offering a $600,000 equalization advance and an increase in temporary spousal support.

The Applicant resisted, citing the children's best interests and difficulty finding alternative accommodation.

The court granted the Respondent's motion, finding that the delay was not due to the Respondent's disclosure issues, that moving was inevitable for the children, and that the Applicant would be able to find suitable housing with the provided funds and support.

The parties, separated since 2015, brought cross-motions for temporary orders concerning the residence and access of their two daughters.

The respondent sought police enforcement of access, an order compelling the applicant to retain a therapist, and make-up time.

The applicant sought a restraining order against the respondent, suspension of access, temporary custody, and permission to change the children's school.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion in its entirety, finding his requests unfounded and noting his failure to facilitate therapeutic intervention and potential parental alienation.

The respondent's motion was largely granted, affirming previous access orders and directing the applicant to comply with therapeutic requirements, encourage the children's relationship with their mother, and cease disparaging the respondent or involving his new partner in access exchanges.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excessive blood alcohol, arguing that his Charter rights under sections 9 and 10(b) were infringed due to a delay in being informed of his right to counsel in French.

The trial judge admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted in good faith and the breach had minimal impact on the appellant's rights.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's decision, deferring to the trial judge's application of the R. v. Grant analysis.

The court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of police conduct or the impact of the delay on the appellant's ability to exercise his rights, noting that breath samples are considered non-intrusive.

The applicant sought to change the living arrangements for the parties' 17-year-old child, arguing the child would be better off living with him.

The court agreed but declined to force the issue against the older teenager's wishes, noting it could do more harm than good.

The court varied previous orders to grant joint custody, with the child's principal residence remaining with the respondent and secondary residence with the applicant according to the child's wishes.

Child support payable by the respondent was also terminated.

The plaintiff sought costs of approximately $3,000 for a motion heard on January 13, 2017, where the court granted possession of the subject property and enjoined a sale under power of sale.

The mortgagee, 1746878 Ontario Inc., argued it should not be liable for costs as it took no part in that motion.

The court agreed, noting that 1746878 Ontario Inc. did not appear until a later date, and declined to order costs against it for the January 13 motion.

The respondent mother brought a motion to suspend the applicant father's parenting time pending a Family and Children's Services (FACS) investigation into allegations that the father's step-son inappropriately touched the parties' child.

The court noted that both parents had inappropriately obtained taped statements from the child, resulting in contradictory accounts.

The court found the allegations serious but concluded it was not necessary to deny the father contact with the children.

The court ordered the resumption of the existing parenting schedule with conditions, including that the child not share a bedroom and that the parties engage in counselling.

The applicant mother brought a motion for a temporary order for custody of the parties' two children, proposing limited access for the respondent father.

The mother raised concerns regarding the father's mental health and parenting style.

The court found the father's mental health was well-managed and the mother's parenting concerns were minor.

The court ordered a temporary parenting schedule that provided the father with significant overnight parenting time, noting that it was in the children's best interests to maximize time with both parents.

The applicant sought sole custody of the parties' four children and child support, while the respondent sought joint custody and shared residence.

The respondent had been unemployed, lost his driver's licence due to a drinking and driving conviction, and lacked suitable housing.

The court awarded sole custody to the applicant with access at her discretion.

The court also imputed an annual income of $40,000 to the respondent for ongoing child support and ordered the respondent's share of the matrimonial home proceeds to be applied to retroactive child support and costs.

The parties separated after a nine-year relationship and seven-year marriage.

The applicant sought sole custody, no access for the respondent, child and spousal support, and a restraining order due to the respondent's volatile behaviour when intoxicated.

The court granted the applicant sole custody and issued a restraining order, but allowed the respondent supervised access and reconciliation counselling.

Child support was ordered based on the respondent's current income, spousal support was terminated, and retroactive support was ordered for the period following separation.

The parties are neighbours involved in a dispute over rights of way.

The respondents brought a motion under s. 7 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 to stay the applications pending arbitration, relying on an agreement that disputes over maintenance expenses or the nature of use of the rights of way shall be arbitrated.

The court found that the core dispute was about the existence of the rights of way, not their maintenance or nature of use.

The motion to stay was dismissed, except for one alternative claim regarding minimum use guidelines.

The offender was convicted of sexual interference after digitally penetrating and fondling the 12-year-old cousin of his girlfriend.

The court accepted a joint submission from counsel, sentencing the offender to nine months' imprisonment less credit for pre-sentence custody at a 1.5:1 ratio, along with ancillary orders.

The court noted the severe impact on the victim and expressed disagreement with a prior decision finding the current one-year mandatory minimum for the offence unconstitutional, though the older nine-month minimum applied in this case.