Jacob Stilman

During a criminal trial for firearms-related offences, the accused challenged the admissibility of a videotaped police statement on the basis that it was involuntary.

The voir dire focused on whether police made threats or inducements suggesting that other detainees would be released if the accused accepted responsibility for a firearm.

The court applied the voluntariness test from R. v. Oickle and assessed conflicting testimony from the accused and a police officer regarding their interaction in the holding cells.

Due to minimal police notes, the absence of recordings of the critical interaction, and gaps in the evidentiary record, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary.

The statement was ruled inadmissible, effectively preventing the prosecution from continuing.

Media organizations applied for access to previously sealed informations to obtain (ITOs) relating to a production order and search warrant issued during a criminal investigation.

The accused sought continuation of a publication ban, arguing that publication of intercepted communications referenced in the ITOs would compromise his right to a fair trial on an extortion charge.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court held that the accused failed to demonstrate a real and serious risk to trial fairness, given existing publicity, the passage of time before trial, jury instructions, and the challenge for cause process.

A third party mentioned in the ITOs argued that publication would damage his reputation, but the court held that third parties generally lack standing to seek publication bans absent exceptional circumstances.

The court concluded that the open court principle prevailed and lifted the remaining publication bans.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault entered in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility by allegedly giving the complainant a “credibility handicap” and by applying different credibility standards to the complainant and the accused.

The court reviewed the applicable appellate standard under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code and the deference owed to trial-level credibility findings.

The court concluded that the trial judge properly applied the R. v. W.(D.) framework and conducted a detailed analysis of both the accused’s and the complainant’s evidence.

Finding no error in principle and no unreasonable verdict, the appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The central issue was whether police complied with the "forthwith" requirement under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code when demanding an approved screening device sample.

The officer formed reasonable suspicion at 12:25 a.m. but did not make the demand until 12:32 a.m., and the approved screening device was not administered until 12:44 a.m., resulting in a 19-minute delay.

The court found that the officer failed to comply with the immediacy requirement and breached the accused's Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b).

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2), and the charge was dismissed.

The defendants were charged with unlawful production of a controlled substance (marijuana) and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following the discovery of a grow operation in their residence.

Police attended the residence in response to a 911 call regarding a shooting in which one defendant was shot in the abdomen.

While conducting what was characterized as a cursory search for additional victims and evidence related to the shooting, officers descended into the basement without a warrant and discovered a marijuana grow operation.

The defence brought a Charter application under section 8 seeking exclusion of the drug evidence on the basis of an unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found that the police had no legal basis to search the basement, that the search was not reasonably incidental to the shooting investigation, and that the conduct constituted a serious breach of Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the defendants were acquitted on both charges.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and administering a stupefying substance against a child complainant over a period in 2008–2009.

The prosecution relied primarily on the testimony of the child complainant, as no other witnesses observed the alleged offences.

The court found significant reliability and credibility concerns in the complainant’s evolving statements, communication difficulties, inconsistencies, and possible external influence.

The complainant’s mother, the only potential source of corroborative evidence, was also found to be a highly unreliable witness.

The court concluded that the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer advised him to testify, resulting in a virtual confession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that trial counsel's advice was a reasonable exercise of judgment given the formidable Crown case, and was a strategic attempt to show the conduct fell short of the 'marked departure' standard.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the court found no basis to interfere.