Iain A.C. MacKinnon

The plaintiff sued the defendant for defamation over Twitter posts alleging the plaintiff made women uncomfortable at a social event.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the statements were true.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court used its fact-finding powers to assess credibility on the paper record.

The court found the defendant established the defence of truth on a balance of probabilities, noting corroborating affidavits and the plaintiff's own bizarre and derogatory affidavit evidence.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the action dismissed.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation sought to vary a sealing order made at trial to gain access to DVD audio recordings of an undercover operative for journalistic purposes.

The trial judge had sealed the recordings to protect the identity of the undercover agent.

The Crown opposed the motion, arguing that the circumstances justifying the original sealing order remained unchanged.

The appellate court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and found that the sealing order was no longer necessary because reasonable alternative measures—specifically, voice and facial alterations—could adequately protect the operative's identity while allowing media access.

The court granted the motion subject to conditions regarding alteration of the recordings.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The plaintiff had sued the defendants for publishing an article in a Chinese language newspaper about her arrest for fraud, which was based on an RCMP press release.

The charges were later withdrawn.

The court found that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the publication of the fact of a criminal charge, even after withdrawal, does not support a defamation claim.

Furthermore, the Google translation of the article relied upon by the plaintiff demonstrated that the article accurately stated she faced prison 'if convicted'.

The claim was struck without leave to amend as it was frivolous and vexatious.

The defendant, Marker Volkl (International) GmbH, brought a motion under Rule 21.01 to strike the plaintiff's (Tucows.com Co.) claim for declaratory relief.

The plaintiff sought declarations regarding its ownership of a domain name after an adverse decision under the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP), which ordered the transfer of the domain name to the defendant.

The defendant argued that the declarations sought were not justiciable and lacked utility as they related exclusively to the UDRP test, which Canadian courts have no jurisdiction to apply or enforce.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the jurisprudence on the interplay between UDRP decisions and domestic court jurisdiction for declaratory relief was unsettled and should not be resolved on a Rule 21.01 motion.

The defendant in a civil sexual assault action sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion for a declaration that the deemed undertaking rule did not apply to the disclosure of discovery evidence to his criminal counsel for impeachment purposes.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order requiring pre-approval to use the impeachment exception, and noting the issue is of sufficient importance to the profession and administration of justice.

The appellants, Vice Media Canada Inc. and journalist Ben Makuch, appealed the dismissal of their application to quash a production order requiring them to produce documents relating to their communications with Farah Shirdon, a Canadian resident who had joined ISIS and was charged with terrorism offences.

The appellants also sought to unseal the affidavit supporting the production order and challenged a non-publication order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the production order, finding that the Garofoli standard of review applied and that the issuing judge reasonably balanced the competing interests of law enforcement and freedom of the press.

The court allowed the appeal in part regarding the sealing order, directing that most material be unsealed with limited redactions.

The court also addressed the non-publication order, finding it a valid alternative to sealing but noting that certain portions of the affidavit may not require the publication ban.

The appellant appealed a libel judgment arising from nine online blog posts published during and after a human rights tribunal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s findings that multiple statements were defamatory, that the appellant acted with malice, and that malice defeated any otherwise available fair comment defence.

Although the court held that describing the respondent as an anti-Semite was opinion rather than fact, that error did not affect the outcome because the malice finding remained dispositive.

The court also upheld the damages award of $50,000 in general damages and $30,000 in aggravated damages, together with appeal costs to the respondent.

Greenfix Golf Inc. sued Sportcover International Inc. for breach of a distribution agreement, alleging unpaid minimum royalties.

Sportcover defended by arguing the minimums were not payment obligations but protection against early termination, and counterclaimed for negligent misrepresentation.

The court found that the distribution agreement clearly stipulated annual minimum royalty payments and rejected Sportcover's interpretation.

The court also dismissed Sportcover's defenses of estoppel and waiver, and its counterclaim for negligent misrepresentation, finding no detrimental reliance or valid misrepresentation.

Damages were awarded to Greenfix based on the unpaid minimum royalties, and the court found no duty to mitigate under the "lost volume" principle given the non-exclusive nature of the agreement.

The applicants, Dellen Millard and Mark Smich, sought an order prohibiting or delaying the publication of all evidence, submissions, and rulings made during their ongoing first-degree murder trial (Bosma case) and in the absence of the jury, until the completion of their separate trial for the murder of Laura Babcock.

The Crown and a Media Coalition opposed the broad scope of the requested ban, arguing that open court principles should apply and that jury safeguards provide adequate protection.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test, requiring a convincing evidentiary basis for a serious risk of prejudice that cannot be addressed by alternative measures.

The court granted the publication ban in part, extending it to specific mid-trial voir dire rulings and objections deemed to have a direct impact on the Babcock case and the applicants' fair trial rights, particularly concerning the "Eliminator" device and the transmission of letters from jail, as well as matters potentially affecting Ms. Noudga's fair trial rights.

The court released Reasons for Judgment subject to a temporary publication ban to allow parties to consider redactions.

As counsel for the applicants and respondent advised that no redactions were requested, the court rescinded the temporary publication ban.

The applicants, a media company and a journalist, sought to quash or vary a production order requiring them to produce communications with a suspected terrorist, and to unseal the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the applications to quash or vary the production order, finding that the authorizing justice properly balanced the state's interest in investigating serious crimes with the media's right to privacy under the Lessard principles.

The court allowed the application to vary the sealing order in part, permitting access to a redacted version of the ITO, but imposed a temporary publication ban on certain details to protect the fair trial rights of the accused and the integrity of the ongoing investigation.

The applicants, facing three separate first-degree murder trials, sought an unprecedented publication ban on all evidence to be adduced at their first trial (the Bosma murder) until the completion of their subsequent trials, arguing that pre-trial publicity would prejudice future juries.

Alternatively, they sought to extend the statutory publication ban on pre-trial motions.

The court dismissed the request for a blanket ban on trial evidence, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate a serious risk to trial fairness and that jury safeguards would be sufficient.

However, the court granted the alternative request, extending the publication ban on pre-trial motions until the conclusion of the subsequent Babcock trial due to the high risk of prejudice from overlapping inadmissible evidence.

A media coalition applied for an order allowing the publication of certain pre-trial motions in a high-profile first-degree murder case, arguing that the statutory publication ban under s. 648(1) of the Criminal Code should not apply to all pre-trial motions.

The Crown and the accused opposed the application, arguing that s. 648(1) provides a blanket statutory ban on all reporting of any information concerning pre-trial applications brought before the designated trial judge.

The court dismissed the media's application, holding that the statutory ban under s. 648(1) is mandatory and applies to all pre-trial motions adjudicated by the trial judge, whether litigated before or after a jury is selected.

The plaintiff sued a newspaper publisher after it published her real name despite a Criminal Code publication ban protecting the identity of complainants and witnesses in a sexual assault retrial.

The court held that breach of the order did not create automatic civil liability, but the publisher owed a duty of care in negligence because the order created sufficient proximity and the risk of physical or psychological harm from disclosure was foreseeable.

Applying the standard of a reasonably prudent reporter, the court found the newspaper failed to preserve and verify the scope of the order before reporting.

The plaintiff proved serious and prolonged psychological injury, including a social anxiety disorder, caused in fact and in law by the breach, but failed to prove future care costs or entitlement to punitive damages.

Judgment was granted against the corporate defendant for $40,000 plus interest, and the action was dismissed against the individual reporter.

The plaintiff, a witness in a sexual assault re-trial, sued a newspaper and its reporter for negligence after her identity was published in breach of a court-ordered publication ban.

The court found that while breach of a publication ban does not automatically result in civil liability, the newspaper owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.

The reporter breached the standard of care of a reasonably prudent journalist by failing to verify the scope of the publication ban.

The court concluded that the publication caused the plaintiff to suffer compensable psychological injury, including social anxiety disorder and agoraphobia, and awarded $40,000 in general damages against the newspaper.

The action against the reporter personally was dismissed on consent.

Following a judgment in favour of the plaintiff in a defamation action, the court determined the quantum of costs and pre-judgment interest.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $121,000, while the defendant argued for partial indemnity costs of $30,000 to $40,000.

The court considered the plaintiff's offers to settle, post-judgment conduct, and the use of the simplified procedure, ultimately fixing costs at $65,000 for fees and $8,000 for disbursements.

The court also held that defamation is not a 'personal injury' for the purposes of the 5% pre-judgment interest rate under s. 128(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, and applied the default rate of 1.3%.

The plaintiff, a law student, sued the defendant, a blogger and political commentator, for defamation arising from nine blog posts.

The posts related to a British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal hearing involving Maclean's magazine, where the plaintiff testified.

The defendant repeatedly called the plaintiff a 'liar' and an 'anti-Semite' in his posts.

The court found the words were defamatory and that the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege failed, largely due to factual inaccuracies and the defendant's express malice toward the plaintiff's perceived associate.

The court awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in general damages and $30,000 in aggravated damages, and ordered the removal of the defamatory words from the defendant's website.

Media organizations applied for access to and the ability to publish the contents of an Information to Obtain supporting a search warrant in a major police investigation.

The Provincial Crown and an accused sought a publication ban on references to non-consensual intercepted private communications, arguing protection of the wiretap regime and fair trial rights.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court held that generalized concerns about the wiretap regime and speculative risks to a future jury trial were insufficient to justify restricting openness.

The court emphasized the strong presumption of open courts and the public interest in scrutiny of judicial authorizations and police investigations.

Balancing the competing interests, the court concluded that the salutary effects of a publication ban did not outweigh the significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression and public accountability.

Media organizations applied for access to portions of a sealed information to obtain (ITO) used to secure a search warrant in a criminal investigation.

The Crown had released a version with extensive edits, including redactions relating to innocent third parties.

Applying the open court principle and the Dagenais/Mentuck test under s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code, the court held that the Crown failed to establish a serious risk to the administration of justice justifying continued secrecy.

Assertions that the redacted material constituted non‑essential narrative or could harm innocent persons were unsupported by evidence.

The court ordered disclosure of the redacted material subject to limited exceptions for personal identifiers, certain references involving the mayor’s spouse, and portions potentially affecting the accused’s fair trial rights.

Multiple media organizations applied under s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code to vary sealing orders relating to search warrants, general warrants, and production orders obtained during a terrorism investigation.

The court considered the open court principle and the Dagenais‑Mentuck framework governing restrictions on publication and access to court records.

While recognizing the strong presumption of openness once search warrants are executed, the court found that publication of certain highly incriminating and potentially inadmissible material in the Informations to Obtain posed a serious risk to the proper administration of justice and to the accused persons’ fair trial rights given the extensive publicity surrounding the terrorism allegations.

The court therefore permitted access to the materials but imposed time‑limited publication bans on evidence supporting the charges and maintained sealing for portions relating to ongoing investigations and identifying information of innocent third parties.