Iain A.C. MacKinnon

The applicants, Dellen Millard and Mark Smich, sought an order prohibiting or delaying the publication of all evidence, submissions, and rulings made during their ongoing first-degree murder trial (Bosma case) and in the absence of the jury, until the completion of their separate trial for the murder of Laura Babcock.

The Crown and a Media Coalition opposed the broad scope of the requested ban, arguing that open court principles should apply and that jury safeguards provide adequate protection.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test, requiring a convincing evidentiary basis for a serious risk of prejudice that cannot be addressed by alternative measures.

The court granted the publication ban in part, extending it to specific mid-trial voir dire rulings and objections deemed to have a direct impact on the Babcock case and the applicants' fair trial rights, particularly concerning the "Eliminator" device and the transmission of letters from jail, as well as matters potentially affecting Ms. Noudga's fair trial rights.

The court released Reasons for Judgment subject to a temporary publication ban to allow parties to consider redactions.

As counsel for the applicants and respondent advised that no redactions were requested, the court rescinded the temporary publication ban.

The applicants, a media company and a journalist, sought to quash or vary a production order requiring them to produce communications with a suspected terrorist, and to unseal the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the applications to quash or vary the production order, finding that the authorizing justice properly balanced the state's interest in investigating serious crimes with the media's right to privacy under the Lessard principles.

The court allowed the application to vary the sealing order in part, permitting access to a redacted version of the ITO, but imposed a temporary publication ban on certain details to protect the fair trial rights of the accused and the integrity of the ongoing investigation.

Following a judgment in favour of the plaintiff in a defamation action, the court determined the quantum of costs and pre-judgment interest.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $121,000, while the defendant argued for partial indemnity costs of $30,000 to $40,000.

The court considered the plaintiff's offers to settle, post-judgment conduct, and the use of the simplified procedure, ultimately fixing costs at $65,000 for fees and $8,000 for disbursements.

The court also held that defamation is not a 'personal injury' for the purposes of the 5% pre-judgment interest rate under s. 128(2) of the Courts of Justice Act, and applied the default rate of 1.3%.

The plaintiff, a law student, sued the defendant, a blogger and political commentator, for defamation arising from nine blog posts.

The posts related to a British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal hearing involving Maclean's magazine, where the plaintiff testified.

The defendant repeatedly called the plaintiff a 'liar' and an 'anti-Semite' in his posts.

The court found the words were defamatory and that the defences of justification, fair comment, and qualified privilege failed, largely due to factual inaccuracies and the defendant's express malice toward the plaintiff's perceived associate.

The court awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in general damages and $30,000 in aggravated damages, and ordered the removal of the defamatory words from the defendant's website.