W. Matheson

The Saugeen Ojibway Nation (SON) brought two actions against the Crown and several municipalities.

In the Aboriginal Title Claim, SON sought a novel declaration of Aboriginal title to a large portion of the submerged lands in Lake Huron and Georgian Bay.

The court dismissed this claim, finding that while SON had a spiritual connection to the water and relied on fishing, they did not establish sufficient and exclusive physical occupation of the claimed submerged lands at the time of British sovereignty in 1763.

In the Treaty Claim, SON alleged that the Crown breached Treaty 45½ (1836) by failing to protect the Bruce Peninsula from settler encroachments, and breached duties during the negotiation of Treaty 72 (1854).

The court found that the Crown breached the honour of the Crown by failing to diligently fulfill its promise to protect the Peninsula from squatters, and by inappropriate conduct during the August 1854 treaty negotiations.

However, the court dismissed the claims for breach of fiduciary duty.

The court also declared that Treaty 72 did not extinguish SON's harvesting rights, which continue on unsold lands and on sold lands where the use is not incompatible with harvesting.

Property-specific remedies and defences were deferred to a second phase of the trial.

The defendant requested an order dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's claim primarily sought to relitigate a landlord-tenant dispute that had already been decided by the Landlord and Tenant Board and the Divisional Court.

The court dismissed the claims related to the tenancy dispute against the landlords, a paralegal, and a lawyer as an abuse of process.

However, the court allowed the claims alleging police assault against the Toronto Police Services Board and defamation against two tenants to proceed, as they were not clearly frivolous on the face of the pleadings.

The Landlord and Tenant Board requested an order dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff sought $30 million in damages against the Board, alleging misconduct, bias, and procedural unfairness during her eviction proceedings.

The court found the action was an attempt to relitigate issues already decided by the Board and the Divisional Court.

The action was dismissed as a collateral attack and an abuse of process.

The defendant, Integral Development LLC, moved to set aside a default judgment of $8.05 million arising from a failed commercial real estate transaction.

The defendant argued it had a plausible excuse for failing to defend the action and an arguable defence on the merits, specifically that a condition in the agreement of purchase and sale was never met.

The court applied the five-factor test for setting aside a default judgment and found that the defendant's excuse was plausible and its defence had an air of reality.

The court exercised its discretion to set aside the default judgment, allowing the defendant to defend the claim on its merits.

The defendant employer moved for summary judgment to dismiss a negligent misrepresentation claim regarding group life insurance benefits.

The plaintiff alleged the employer failed to adequately communicate a change in the definition of 'accident' in the policy, which resulted in the denial of accidental death benefits following the employee's fatal fall.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding no evidence of inaccurate information, negligence, reliance, or damages to support the misrepresentation claim.

The respondents brought a motion to strike out two applications challenging the constitutionality of the Global Adjustment under the Electricity Act, 1998.

The responding party argued that the Global Adjustment was an unconstitutional tax that violated s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court applied the Lawson and Westbank tests, concluding that the Global Adjustment is a regulatory charge tied to a complex regulatory scheme, not a tax.

The court found it plain and obvious that the applications could not succeed and granted the motion to strike.

Following a trial judgment where the plaintiff was awarded $76,275 in a breach of contract action originally claiming $250,000, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The plaintiff sought approximately $78,000, while the defendant argued for a 50% reduction based on the judgment falling within the simplified rules limit.

The court rejected both the plaintiff's claim for substantial indemnity and the defendant's request for a 50% reduction, but factored the late abandonment of the consequential damages claim into the award.

Costs were fixed at $55,000 all-inclusive.

The plaintiffs sued a father and son after the son breached an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The son forfeited his deposit, and the plaintiffs sought further damages from the father, alleging the son acted as his agent or that the father induced the breach.

The father moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action against him.

The court granted the motion, finding no evidence of an agency relationship or that the father intended to induce a breach of contract.

The court held that partial summary judgment was appropriate to remove the father from the action, leaving only the quantification of damages against the son.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medications.

The appellant argued the Board erred in applying the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act and misapprehended the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the legal principles from Starson v. Swayze and reasonably concluded the appellant could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decision.

The plaintiff purchased an edge banding machine from the defendant for its cabinetry business.

The machine failed to perform its more sophisticated functions, such as rounding, which the court found to be a breach of implicit terms of the contract.

However, because the plaintiff had accepted the goods under the Sale of Goods Act, the breach of condition was treated as a breach of warranty.

The court found the plaintiff failed to fully mitigate its damages by not taking reasonable steps to sell the machine.

Damages were awarded to the plaintiff for 50% of the contract price plus HST, totaling $76,275.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against his title insurer, FCT, for amounts owing under a policy following a mortgage fraud.

The parties agreed that some amount was owing, leaving only the quantification of interest and coverage of certain fees in dispute.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to compound interest as provided in the mortgage, rejecting FCT's argument to substitute statutory interest.

However, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims for a notice of sale fee and a lender's fee, finding they were not covered under the policy's terms.

The plaintiff and defendant engaged in a joint venture to purchase, demolish, rebuild, and sell two residential properties.

Following the sale of the second property, the parties disputed the division of the net proceeds, which were paid into court.

Due to poor record-keeping and extensive cash payments, the court had to determine the total cost of construction and the respective financial advances made by each party.

The court calculated the net outstanding advances owed to each party and ordered that these amounts be paid out before the remaining funds are split 65/35 in accordance with their agreement.

The defendant solicitors requested an order dismissing the action against them under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff corporation alleged misappropriation of trust funds under the Construction Lien Act.

The court declined to dismiss the action, finding that the core allegation of misappropriation of trust funds was not plainly an abuse of process on its face, though noting the plaintiff risked adverse costs and must be represented by a lawyer.

The plaintiff sued the police and Crown Attorneys for negligent investigation, unlawful arrest, and intentional infliction of mental suffering following an acquittal on a murder charge that involved a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The Crown Attorneys moved to strike the plaintiff's claim and a crossclaim brought by the police for negligent legal advice.

The court struck the plaintiff's claim against the Crown Attorneys, finding it barred by absolute common law immunity, which only allows claims for malicious prosecution.

However, the court refused to strike the police crossclaim for negligent legal advice, finding it was not plain and obvious that Crown Attorneys do not owe a duty of care to police when providing legal advice during an investigation.

The court also held that statutory immunity under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act applied to the plaintiff's claim but not the crossclaim.

The appellant insurer appealed an arbitration decision regarding a priority dispute over statutory accident benefits for a claimant injured on an all-terrain vehicle (ATV).

The arbitrator found that the respondent's policy, which specifically insured the ATV, met the definition of an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

However, the arbitrator erred by concluding that the appellant's general automobile policy, which did not cover the ATV, was still subject to the priority scheme in s. 268(2) of the Insurance Act.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the threshold for statutory accident benefits must be met under each specific policy before the priority scheme is engaged.

Since only the respondent's policy provided coverage, the priority scheme did not apply, and the appeal was granted.

Following the defendant's successful motion for summary judgment, the court determined the quantum of costs.

The defendant sought approximately $331,500 on a partial and substantial indemnity basis, relying on a favourable offer to settle.

The plaintiff argued for $210,000.

The court found the matter complex but noted excessive hourly rates for junior counsel and insufficient delegation.

Costs were fixed at $240,000 all-inclusive.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs were unsuccessful in setting aside a conveyance of the family home, the successful defendants sought costs.

The plaintiffs argued no costs should be awarded or that the Estate should pay.

The court awarded the successful defendant grandson $15,000 in partial indemnity costs, noting the plaintiffs chose to proceed to trial after discovery.

The self-represented defendant was awarded no costs due to lack of documentation.

The request for a non-party costs order against the Estate was dismissed.

The plaintiff estate trustee brought an action regarding the proceeds from the sale of a property jointly developed by the deceased and the defendant, her former common-law partner.

The defendant relied on a cohabitation agreement that provided property division would be determined solely by legal ownership.

The plaintiff relied on a subsequent oral property development agreement, confirmed in writing by the defendant, that provided for the return of investments and equal sharing of profits.

The court found that neither party understood the cohabitation agreement to apply to their property development activities and set it aside in part under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act.

The court awarded the plaintiff $3,145,682.88 based on the property development agreement.

In this divorce application, the parties sought sole custody of their young child, equalization of net family property, and spousal and child support.

The respondent father argued the applicant mother's mental illness rendered her unfit for sole custody, while the mother raised concerns about parental alienation by the father's family.

The court ordered a shared parenting arrangement with divided decision-making authority, finding the mother's mental health was stable and posed no risk.

For equalization, the court found that $176,000 advanced to the father by his own father were gifts, not loans, resulting in an equalization payment of $114,261.02 to the mother.

Claims for spousal and child support were dismissed after imputing income to both parties.

The plaintiffs sought to set aside the conveyance of their deceased father's family home to himself and his grandson as joint tenants, arguing resulting trust and undue influence.

The court found that the presumption of resulting trust applied to the transfer to the adult grandson, but it was rebutted by evidence showing the grandfather intended the transfer as a gift to reward the grandson for financially saving the house from power of sale proceedings.

The court also found no express undue influence and that any presumption of undue influence was rebutted by the grandfather's clear, independent intentions.

The action was dismissed.