Gil v. Jafari, 2017 ONSC 6109
CITATION: Gil v. Jafari, 2017 ONSC 6109
COURT FILE NO.: CV-11-423821
DATE: 20171016
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
GHASEM GIL Plaintiff
– and –
GARRY SHAPRIO and SHAPIRO & CHO and SHAWN JAFARI Defendants
Patrick Di Monte, for the Plaintiff
Flora M. Poon, for the Defendant Shawn Jafari
HEARD: March 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 22, 23, 2017, followed by written submissions ended July 7, 2017
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUSTICE W. MATHESON
[1] This action arises from a failed business venture between two former friends – the plaintiff Ghasem Gil and the defendant Shawn Jafari. This action has been dismissed as against the other two defendants.[^1] Both the plaintiff Gil and the defendant Jafari, who is also a plaintiff by counterclaim, make claims that they are entitled to certain funds that have been paid into court in this action.
[2] The parties embarked on a business venture in relation to the purchase, demolition, construction and sale of two houses in Toronto. When the second property was sold, the parties attempted, unsuccessfully, to agree on how the proceeds of the sale should be divided between them. To say that the parties kept incomplete records would be an understatement. They have poor records, the significance of which is exacerbated by the fact that many of the financial transactions at issue were done using cash. Ultimately, this action was commenced and the defendant brought a counterclaim against the plaintiff for similar relief regarding claims to the remaining funds arising from their business venture.
[3] Both the amended statement of claim and the counterclaim assert a number of claims and types of relief sought. However, at trial, the parties only sought to enforce the agreement between them and only in relation to the funds currently paid into court in regard to this matter, as well as interest and costs. No other claim or relief was pursued at trial.
Business venture
[4] At the relevant time, the plaintiff was in the luxury automobile business. For much of the relevant time period, he was working with a business called Prestige Toys that sold high-end automobiles.
[5] The defendant is a paralegal. He had a friend who was a real estate agent and was encouraging him to invest in real estate. The real estate agent had convinced the owners of two properties to sell, and suggested that those properties would be a great investment for the defendant.
[6] The two properties were at 256 and 259 Dunview Avenue in Toronto and were across the street from one another.
[7] The defendant did not have sufficient funds for this proposed investment. He had known the plaintiff for years prior to these events and had purchased cars from him. They had invested in another project together in the past. The defendant had discussions with the plaintiff about becoming involved in this new venture.
[8] Neither of the parties had much experience in the construction of houses.
[9] The parties decided to proceed. They decided that the property at 256 Dunview would be purchased and put in the plaintiff’s name and the property at 259 Dunview would be purchased and put in the defendant’s name. Both existing houses would be demolished, new houses would be constructed and each of the properties would be sold.
[10] The parties hired the defendant’s father, Aziz Jafari, to manage the building project for both houses. To avoid confusion with similar names, Aziz Jafari is called, in these reasons, Aziz.
[11] Aziz testified at trial. He is now 70 years of age. He immigrated to Canada in 1969 and after retraining had a career in information technology for about 31 years. At the time of this project, he was retired. Although he testified at trial that his information technology background assisted with project management, he had very little construction experience. He had a small amount of experience before coming to Canada decades earlier, and after his retirement he was involved in one extensive home renovation project. He held no licensure as a building contractor or other designation in the construction industry.
[12] With respect to finances, the parties orally agreed on a 65/35 division of profits: 65% to the plaintiff and 35% to the defendant. This is not disputed. The split reflected the anticipated difference in financial contributions by each party. Later on, they entered into a written agreement, described below.
Purchase and sale of the properties
[13] In late 2007, the defendant purchased 259 Dunview for $645,900, partly funded by a first mortgage in favour of the Bank of Montreal. The defendant advanced $105,808.15 to finance the purchase of the property.
[14] In early 2008, the plaintiff purchased 256 Dunview for $745,900, partly funded by a first mortgage in favour of the Royal Bank of Canada. The plaintiff advanced $198,000 to finance the purchase of the property.
[15] After purchase, both properties also had mortgages registered against them in relation to construction loans. A lawyer, Jerry Balitsky, testified at trial. He represented the various construction lenders. He provided a detailed summary of the amounts advanced under the construction loans with respect to each property. His evidence was ultimately not disputed apart from two immaterial calculation errors raised in final argument.
[16] During the construction project the parties came to the job sites regularly, but they were both very busy with their own businesses. For the most part, Aziz was the main person on site.
[17] The plaintiff testified that in about June 2010, he terminated Aziz’s services and from that point forward Aziz continued to attend at the jobsite only to protect his son’s interest. This termination is disputed. In any event, Aziz did still attend the site until October 2010 and dealt with trades and some paperwork even after that time. The parties each dealt directly with the trades some of the time, including making direct payments to them.
[18] The plaintiff refinanced 256 Dunview with the Bank of Nova Scotia in 2010 and also obtained a personal loan, which was secured by a second mortgage on the property.
[19] 259 Dunview was sold first. It was sold for $1,555,000 in February 2010. The net proceeds were distributed as follows:
(i) $332,431.45 to the plaintiff; (ii) $153,546.23 to the defendant; (iii) a further $44,500 to the defendant; (iv) $50,000 to the joint venture bank account; (v) $16,989 to Aziz for services rendered; and, (vi) there was a further $5,000 that the defendant concedes he likely received.
[20] I find that the amount paid to Aziz was as an expense of the project and that the defendant received the $5,000. The $50,000 went into the joint account for use in 256 Dunview. As such, it was both a payout to the parties and a reinvestment by them in equal amount, and therefore a neutral event. It was not an additional advance by either party.
[21] I therefore find that the plaintiff received a payout of $332,431.45 and the defendant received $203,046.23 from the net proceeds of sale of 259 Dunview.
[22] In 2010, the relationship between the parties began to deteriorate. In October 2010, the defendant registered a caution against 256 Dunview without informing the plaintiff, leading to further acrimony once it was discovered by the plaintiff.
[23] Ultimately, 256 Dunview was sold for $1,850,000 in January 2011. All the mortgages and other expenses were paid, including the second mortgage securing the personal loan to the plaintiff. The second mortgage payout was $303,256.09.
[24] The net proceeds of the sale of 256 Dunview totaled $311,075.18. Given the dispute between the parties about entitlement to those funds, the monies were paid into court. There is currently approximately $328,600 with the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice, which includes accumulated interest.
[25] The determination of entitlement to the funds that have been paid into court is dependent on certain factual disputes, including the amount of the total monies advanced made by each party and the related issue of cost of construction. Before addressing the facts in more detail, I will address submissions made about the credibility of witnesses and problems with the documents.
Witness issues
[26] Various issues have been raised about the weight that should be given to evidence from the trial witnesses. The exception is Mr. Balitsky – the lawyer for the construction lenders. Mr. Balitsky was called by the plaintiff. No issue was raised regarding his credibility. The credibility of every other witness was attacked by the other side in final argument.
[27] The plaintiff called Mike Juma as a witness. At the relevant time, Mr. Juma had a business called Northern Finishings that provided kitchen cabinetry for the newly built houses on the Dunview properties. He was also a friend of the plaintiff and had some construction background. When the parties were having difficultly determining the financial consequences of their business venture, Mr. Juma agreed to help. He gathered information and documentation, and prepared some documents that complied information.
[28] I found Mr. Juma to be a credible witness. His testimony was straightforward and he did not claim to know everything about the situation. He readily admitted his friendship with the plaintiff and his extensive dealings with the plaintiff when he was trying to assist the parties. He was responsive during cross-examination. The defendant testified that Mr. Juma’s objective was to inflate the plaintiff’s financial contribution. That allegation was not sufficiently put to Mr. Juma in his cross-examination, but, even ignoring the rule in Browne v. Dunn (1893), 1893 CanLII 65 (FOREP), 6 R. 67 (H.L.), I find that based on the trial evidence Mr. Juma was not improperly motivated. However, he had limited first hand evidence regarding the matters at issue.
[29] The rule in Browne v. Dunn was not followed by either side with other witnesses as well, which I have taken into account in assessing the evidence.
[30] Aziz was the defendant’s witness. The plaintiff made a similar submission about Aziz. He submitted that Aziz’s evidence was undermined because Aziz was motivated to assist his son. Like Mr. Juma, I found Aziz to be a credible witness. He was straightforward and responsive. As is reflected in some of his emails, at the relevant time he was obviously having trouble not only with the plaintiff but also with his own son. He did not pretend otherwise. However, I find that Aziz’s evidence was not especially reliable. I accept that he was making an effort to keep records of financial transactions, but find that the records were not entirely accurate, and were materially incomplete, as was his recollection at trial.
[31] In addition, Aziz gave some evidence about pricing new homes on a square footage basis. However, he did not have the experience or expertise to give reliable evidence in that area. He was essentially recounting things he had been told informally by what he described as four or five friends who were builders. I conclude that his disputed evidence in that area should be given no weight.
[32] The plaintiff asked that I take judicial notice of certain evidence about construction cost per square foot and what that cost includes. I decline to do so because that information is not sufficiently notorious.
[33] The other trial witnesses were the parties. Both testified in a manner that advocated for their position rather than focusing on providing evidence. Both were unresponsive in cross-examination. Both were successfully challenged on some documents. Both felt free to make serious (and ultimately unproved) allegations. I did not find either of them consistently credible. I have therefore approached their evidence with significant caution and have accepted their evidence only in part.
Documentation issues
[34] The financial disputes arise mainly because of the poor recordkeeping regarding this business venture, combined with extensive cash payments made to trades without receipts. The documentation regarding what trades were contracted to do and at what price, what was actually paid for goods and for trades, and where the money came from, is incomplete.
[35] Aziz testified that numerous trades insisted on being paid in cash, even in large amounts. Receipts were not obtained for the most part. Some trades were also paid partly by cheque and partly by cash. As well, Aziz did not make all of the payments; the parties made some of them. Aziz did send emails to the parties on a regular basis with financial information that he had compiled, but based upon his testimony I find that these emails did not completely record all the payments and are not completely accurate.
[36] The parties did open a joint account at the Bank of Nova Scotia for this business venture, but did not just use that account. Advances were deposited into that account, but not all of them. Payments were made out of that account, but not all of them. Other bank accounts were used. Some payments were also made using personal credit cards. The defendant submits that the plaintiff ought to have produced further bank records.
[37] Another document issue arose during the trial, regarding about 60 emails that the plaintiff submitted had been sent by Aziz. The defendant claimed they were fabricated. Ultimately, the plaintiff did not tender those emails as trial evidence, lessening the significance of this issue. However, I note that the defendant’s evidence in this regard did not establish fabrication.
[38] I have taken into account the frailties in the documentation and findings of credibility and reliability in my findings of fact.
Analysis
[39] This case was presented at trial as a series of factual disputes that, once determined, would provide the information to distribute the remaining funds under the agreement between the parties.
November 2010 Agreement
[40] Before the second property was sold, the parties entered into a formal written agreement dated November 16, 2010 (the “Agreement”). There is also a disputed prior agreement, dated May 7, 2009. The plaintiff attested at trial that the signature on the earlier agreement is not his. The defendant did not displace this evidence and submitted that the differences between the two documents were not material in any event. The earlier agreement was therefore not the focus of either party.
[41] The Agreement set out how the proceeds received from the sale of 256 Dunview (defined as the “Property”) were to be distributed, as follows:
3.0 DISTRIBUTIONS
All proceeds received by the Syndicate after the sale of the Property shall be distributed in the following order priorities:
(a) the repayment of any loans to a lender or lenders to the Development Project;
(b) the repayment of all other debts, taxes and liabilities of the Dunview Development Project including the cost of construction of the house;
(c) [struck out]
(d) the repayment to the Syndicate Members of their respective advances to the Dunview Ave. Development Project;
(e) the payment of the remaining monies, if any, to the Syndicate Members in accordance with their respective stated interest; and
(f) in the event that any forms of taxation and/or governmental penalties apply to the sale of the Property subsequent to the above noted payments, all syndicate members agree to reimburse [the plaintiff] for such liability, according to their respective interest in the Dunview Avenue Development Project.
[42] It is agreed that all payments under subparagraphs (a), (b) and (f), above, have been made. The main issue relates to subparagraph (d) – advances made by the parties. The plaintiff submits that he made advances in excess of 65% of the total monies expended. The defendant disputes this position yet concedes that based on the documentation it is unclear how much each side actually advanced. There is no dispute that after advances are repaid under subparagraph (d), any profit would be split 65/35 under subparagraph (e).
[43] It is therefore necessary, as a matter of fact, to quantify the advances of the parties for the purpose of determining the necessary payments under subparagraph (d).
Burden of proof
[44] The defendant places significant emphasis on what he describes as the plaintiff’s failure to prove his claim, and relies among things on the absence of comprehensive records to support the plaintiff’s claim. Of course, the plaintiff does bear a burden of proof, but the defendant is also a plaintiff by counterclaim and does so as well. Further, these parties conducted their business, to their knowledge, in a manner that meant that there were incomplete and problematic records. They used multiple bank accounts and personal credit cards. The defendant even wrote a cheque to Prestige Toys in relation to this venture and the plaintiff testified that that company was also a source of funds for him. The parties used considerable cash without receipts. The parties did not use a professional bookkeeper to keep the business records. Having conducted their business in this way, neither side is in a position to now insist on complete documentation before a claim is established.
Issues
[45] The Agreement requires the repayment of the parties’ respective advances to the project. There was considerable trial evidence regarding the figures that would assist in determining the quantum of those advances in the absence of complete records. Ultimately, the bulk of the evidence focused on two things: the total cost of construction and the sources of the funds that were used to pay those costs. Much of the financial information is not separated between the two properties, especially with respect to the costs of construction. Both parties therefore take the available financial information for both properties into account.
Determination of net advances
[46] I find that although the parties began contributing funds in accordance with their 65/35 split at the early stages that practice did not continue throughout the completion of 256 Dunview. Aziz tried to keep track of the advances by each party, but testified that when the trades were pushing him hard, he put pressure on both parties to come up with the money rather than following the 65/35 split. Further, his records were incomplete. I therefore find that it is not appropriate to rely solely on Aziz’s records or to assume a 65/35 split, both submissions of the defendant.
[47] It was agreed in the course of the trial evidence that the financing for this business venture came from these sources:
(i) funds advanced by the parties; (ii) bank financing; and, (iii) private construction mortgage financing.
[48] The amounts advanced through bank and private construction mortgage financing were agreed by the end of the trial. The costs of acquisition and source of those funds is also agreed. Therefore, the parties’ total advances after acquisition can be ascertained by determining the total cost of construction and removing the amounts received from the third-party funding sources.
[49] The necessary steps to determine the total amounts advanced by the parties and not yet repaid are as follows:
(i) determine the cost of construction after acquisition of the properties; (ii) determine how much of the costs of construction was paid for by the parties rather than from other sources of financing, and determine the split – that is how much was advanced by each party; (iii) determine the total amounts advanced by each party including costs of acquisition; (iv) determine the amounts already received by each party and any other adjustments; and, (v) arrive at the net amount of advances still due to be paid to each party under the Agreement.
(i) Cost of construction
[50] For the costs of construction, the plaintiff relies on the work done by Mr. Juma when he attempted to assist the parties in determining these figures. Mr. Juma collected all the available paperwork from Aziz and charts were prepared setting out conclusions drawn from the paperwork and from questions Mr. Juma asked of the parties. From the standpoint of this trial, this work is relevant only when it resulted in agreement to his figures. Indeed, many of the individual figures were ultimately agreed at trial. But to the extent that his figures were not agreed, he is not a witness to what was actually done except regarding his own kitchen contract. I have therefore not given his assumptions or conclusions weight – he was not an expert witness who had undertaken a damages assessment.
[51] The documentation collected by Mr. Juma and resulting lists enumerated many expenditures to trades and material suppliers that are costs of construction that are no longer in dispute. At the outset of trial, the agreed items totaled $843,448.57.
[52] A number of further items were ultimately agreed by the end of the trial: Low voltage - $24,129; Project Management (Aziz) - $47,000; Stucco – $58,250; rough carpentry - $51,348; Zia Carpentry - $50,500; miscellaneous – $18,550. These items total: $249,777.
[53] The quantum of a number of other expenditures remained disputed at trial and some expenditures were disputed altogether. Much of the dispute arose because of the frequent use of cash payments and the defendant’s position, at trial, that amounts should not be included without sufficient documentation. However, I find that there were substantial cash payments based upon the evidence of the plaintiff and Aziz, including payments beyond those documented by Aziz.
[54] The defendant’s figures for the disputed items totaled approximately $200,000 and the plaintiff’s figures were in excess of $300,000. Based on the trial evidence of not only the plaintiff but also Aziz, and the available documentation regarding the disputed amounts, I find that additional amounts were paid totaling $295,613.13 as set out in the attached Schedule I.
[55] The above figures regarding construction costs total as follows:
| Category | Amount |
|---|---|
| Costs agreed at outset of trial | $843,448.57 |
| Additional agreed costs | $249,777 |
| Schedule I costs | $295,613.13 |
| Total: | $1,388,838.70 |
[56] I therefore find that these costs of construction are $1,388,838.70. Although not determinative, this figure falls within a range of figures put forward by the defendant before the litigation.
(ii) Construction financing advanced by the parties
[57] Moving to the source of funds, the total amount of money advanced through the construction loans was the subject of Mr. Balitsky’s testimony. I accept those amounts, which, with minor corrections, result in a total of $826,087.94.
[58] In turn, the financing from the parties for these post-acquisition amounts totals $562,750.76 ($1,388,838.70 - $826,087.94). The actual split between the parties must now be determined.
[59] The plaintiff approaches the issue of actual advances for these expenditures by working back from some figures put forward by the defendant before the litigation. More specifically, the defendant provided Mr. Juma with three figures that represented his advances:
(1) by email dated March 11, 2011, the defendant told Mr. Juma that based on the information he had at the time, his financial contribution was $189,182; (2) about a year later, a calculation prepared by the defendant dated February 2012 arrived at $183,332; and, (3) in an email dated April 20, 2012, the defendant revised the figure for his financial contribution to $198,225.06.
[60] I have considered all the documentation and the qualifications the defendant puts forward about the above documents. Based on the trial evidence and the documentation underlying the above figures, I conclude that the defendant’s February 2012 calculation and underlying figures are the appropriate starting point to determine the defendant’s total advances. Most of the advances listed are not disputed. Having considered the evidence, $14,000 must be deducted as duplication, arriving at an amount advanced of $169,332 by the defendant, which is in addition to the initial amount advanced to purchase the property. Given the admissions about the sources of financing, the balance of the advances came from the plaintiff.
[61] At trial, the defendant took the position that in the absence of documentation, the split 65/35 should be used to determine how much was advanced by each side, despite evidence that the parties departed from that split in making the needed advances to pay for the construction. Using that approach, about $196,000 would be treated as advanced by the defendant rather than $169,332. This arbitrary approach is not appropriate. The defendant was well aware of the use of considerable cash and allowed the venture to be conducted without adequate documentation. Both he and the plaintiff are responsible for these poor business practices.
[62] I conclude that it is appropriate to quantify the defendant’s advances as done above and determine the plaintiff’s advances by deducting the defendant’s advances from the overall costs. I therefore find that with respect to this aspect of the financing, totaling $562,750.76 of advances, the advances from the parties were as follows: $393,418.76 by the plaintiff and $169,332 by the defendant.
(iii) Total advances from the parties
[63] The parties advanced other funds as well. As set out above, the initial monies advanced to purchase the properties are agreed: $198,000 by the plaintiff and $105,808.15 by the defendant.
[64] There were certainly costs of the related transactions (such as legal costs, land transfer tax and disbursements) but they were paid out of the proceeds of sale and therefore need not be considered when assessing advances from the parties.
[65] The plaintiff then raises carrying costs, or soft costs, and submits that they ought to be included. Each of the parties carried the first mortgage on the property that they held legal title to and each was responsible to pay utilities.
[66] The Agreement refers only to advances. This wording is capable of including soft costs. Further, the mortgage carrying costs were treated as advances in some of the documentation. Even the defendant included those costs in his worksheets before the litigation. As well, although the amount was disputed at trial, there was no serious dispute about insurance payments being advances. I conclude that these amounts should be included. However, that was not the case for utility bills, which I conclude ought not be included.
[67] The mortgage carrying costs were as follows: $121,783.62 by the plaintiff (RBC$86,236.50; BNS$35,547.12) and $61,866.48 by the defendant (BMO). The actual cost of insurance was disputed and the documentation put forward at trial was incomplete. Based upon the evidence available at trial, I find that those amounts were as follows: $4,724.64 paid by the plaintiff and $2,223.36 paid by the defendant.
[68] The total advances for the financing of the project by each party is therefore as follows:
| Advances | Plaintiff | Defendant |
|---|---|---|
| Construction costs | $393,418.76 | $169,332 |
| Initial financing for purchase | $198,000 | $105,808.15 |
| Mortgage carrying costs | $121,783.62 | $61,866.48 |
| Insurance | $4,724.64 | $2,223.36 |
| Total advances: | $717,927.02 | $339,229.99 |
[69] This shows a modest increased level of advances by the plaintiff, beyond 65%, which accords with the evidence overall.
(iv) Amounts already received/adjustments
[70] As a result of the distribution of the funds from the sale of 259 Dunview, the parties have already received the following funds: the plaintiff has received $332,431.45 and the defendant has received $203,046.23.
[71] It is agreed that the plaintiff has also already received an additional $303,256.09 by virtue of the repayment of his second mortgage upon the sale of 256 Dunview. Further, it is agreed that the plaintiff received $11,026.35 of the Bank of Nova Scotia financing for non-business venture purposes and that amount must be accounted for against his share.
[72] I therefore find that the plaintiff has already received $646,713.89 and the defendant received $203,046.23, as follows:
| Amounts already received | Plaintiff | Defendant |
|---|---|---|
| Funds from sale of 259 | $332,431.45 | $203,046.23 |
| Repayment of second mortgage | $303,256.09 | |
| Agreed additional amount | $11,026.35 | |
| Total | $646,713.89 | $203,046.23 |
(v) Net amount of financing from the parties
[73] There are therefore outstanding advances to be repaid in these amounts:
| Plaintiff | Defendant | |
|---|---|---|
| Advances | $717,927.62 | $339,229.99 |
| Already received | $646,713.89 | $203,046.23 |
| Net (amount due): | $71,213.13 | $136,183.76 |
[74] Under the Agreement, these amounts are due to be repaid before any profits are distributed. These amounts total $207,396.89.
[75] There is about $328,600 in court. If there were no other claims to address, the balance of the monies in court, approximately $121,000, would then be split 65/35, resulting in total entitlements of roughly $150,000 for the plaintiff ($71,213.13 plus 65% of the remaining funds) and $178,000 for the defendant ($136,183.76 plus 35% of the remaining funds). However, I do not have an up-to-date figure on the total monies in court and other items have been raised that the parties submit have an impact on the distribution of the funds in court.
[76] Specifically, each side claims pre-judgment interest from the monies paid into court. The plaintiff also claims legal costs for specific costs orders already made in the proceeding pre-trial. I conclude that the parties should make further written submissions on these matters, as well as any costs claimed for the action and trial. I have therefore set a schedule for written submissions, and those submissions shall address any claims for pre and post-judgment interest and legal costs.
Judgment
[77] I therefore order and declare as follows:
(1) the plaintiff is entitled to payment of $71,213.13 as unpaid advances, from the proceeds of sale of 256 Dunview;
(2) the defendant is entitled to payment of $136,183.76 as unpaid advances, from the proceeds of sale of 256 Dunview;
(3) submissions on the issues of interest and legal costs shall be made as follows: the plaintiff shall make submissions by delivering his brief written submissions together with any applicable costs outline by November 3, 2017; the defendant shall deliver his brief written submissions and any applicable costs outline by November 24, 2017; the plaintiff shall deliver any brief written reply by December 1, 2017; and,
(4) after the issues of legal costs and pre-judgment interest are determined, and subject to the impact, if any, of those determinations, any remaining funds from the proceeds of sale of 256 Dunview shall be split, 65% to the plaintiff and 35% to the defendant.
[78] In accordance with the order of Master Abrams dated February 14, 2017, the parties shall give Gary Shapiro and Shapiro & Cho notice prior to seeking the payment out of the funds in court, as set out more specifically in that order. In addition, a copy of these reasons for judgment shall be provided to counsel to Gary Shapiro and Shapiro & Cho by plaintiff’s counsel.
[79] Given the order of Master Abrams referred to above, and the matters remaining to be determined, I make no order now permitting the payment out of any funds in court. Monies may be paid out of court at this stage only with the consent of the parties and of Gary Shapiro and Shapiro & Cho.
[80] The parties may request an order for payment out of the funds in court in their written submissions on the schedule set out in paragraph 77(3) above. If they do so, they must serve their submissions on counsel to Gary Shapiro and Shapiro & Cho.
[81] If a request for payment out is made by either party in his written submissions, Gary Shapiro and Shapiro & Cho may participate in the process by making written submissions by December 8, 2017. If they do so, the parties shall have one week to deliver any responding submissions. Gary Shapiro and Shapiro & Cho may also take the position that an alternative process should be used before an order for the payment out is made, rather than addressing the issue in written submissions. If so, they should write to me with their position, copied to the parties, at any time on or before December 8, 2017.
Justice W. Matheson
Released: October 16, 2017
SCHEDULE I
| Item | Amount |
|---|---|
| Amati | $31,370 |
| Drywall | $71,295 |
| Izmir Stone | $15,732.13 |
| Kitchen/vanities/closets | $76,840 |
| VIP Railing | $6,000 |
| HVAC | $28,328 |
| Countertop | $5,782 |
| MB Closet | $2,034 |
| Porch ceiling | $1,250 |
| Master bedroom closet | $2,234 |
| Extra Landscaping | $23,748 |
| Painters’ extras | $14,000 |
| Molding | $17,000 |
| Total | $295,613.13 |
CITATION: Gil v. Jafari, 2017 ONSC 6109
COURT FILE NO.: CV-11-423821
DATE: 20171016
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
GHASEM GIL Plaintiff
– and –
GARRY SHAPRIO and SHAPIRO & CHO and SHAWN JAFARI Defendants
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Justice Matheson
Released: October 16, 2017
[^1]: All further references to “the defendant” in these reasons are references to Mr. Jafari. All references to the “parties” are references to Mr. Gil and Mr. Jafari.