George Corsianos

This costs endorsement addresses two motions: the plaintiffs' successful motion for leave to file an affidavit and their unsuccessful motion for interim recovery of personal property.

The court found mixed success, noting that the plaintiffs were prima facie entitled to costs for the leave motion and the defendant for the recovery motion, both on a partial indemnity basis.

However, due to the mixed outcome and overreaching costs claims by both parties, the court ultimately ordered that each party bear their own costs for both motions.

This endorsement addresses several motions in a contentious family dispute involving co-owned property and personal belongings.

The parties are sisters and their family members.

The plaintiffs brought motions for a receiver, to strike affidavits, to stay a counterclaim, for leave to file a new affidavit (Martin affidavit), and for interim recovery of personal property (a piano and sheet music).

The court granted the leave motion, finding the new affidavit responsive to a matter raised on cross-examination regarding the admissibility of bail affidavits.

For the recovery motion, the court granted the recovery of sheet music but dismissed the recovery of the piano, finding that the plaintiffs did not meet the high threshold of showing substantial grounds for ownership, as credibility issues were best left for trial.

The parties agreed to continue efforts to sell the co-owned property and the court provided directions for this process.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent $200,000 for breach of a factoring agreement that was not pleaded.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's finding that it was liable for intentional interference with economic relations and the award of $175,000 in damages at large to the appellants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, setting aside the $200,000 judgment because the claim was not pleaded and would have been statute-barred.

The Court dismissed the cross-appeal, upholding the finding of intentional interference with economic relations and the damages at large award, and refused to allow the respondent to raise equitable set-off for the first time on appeal.

A trucking company sought repayment of customer payments retained by a factoring company after the parties terminated their factoring agreement.

The defendant alleged the funds were applied to a $50,000 oral consulting agreement and outstanding contractual fees.

The court rejected that evidence as inconsistent with the documentary record and drew adverse inferences from missing accounting records.

Finding no juristic reason for the defendant to retain the funds, the court held the retention constituted unjust enrichment and ordered repayment.

The applicant trucking company sought to terminate a factoring agreement with the respondent and requested a buy-out statement, a release letter, and the discharge of a PPSA registration.

The respondent refused, arguing it owned the purchased invoices absolutely and had no obligation to sell them back.

The court held that the PPSA applied to the transaction and, pursuant to section 56, the applicant was entitled to pay the outstanding obligations and have the registration discharged.

The court ordered the respondent to provide the buy-out statement and, upon payment, release the customers and discharge the PPSA registration.

The appellant, Day & Ross Inc., appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering it to pay $18,100 to the respondent, a factoring company that purchased invoices from a motor carrier.

Day & Ross had withheld payment, claiming equitable set-off for a spoiled load of cauliflower that it had paid the shipper for.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that Day & Ross acted as a load broker with no legal obligation to pay the shipper, that there was no implied assignment of the shipper's claim, and that equitable set-off did not apply.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding her personally liable for unpaid paralegal invoices.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of personal liability because the appellant failed to disclose she was contracting on behalf of a corporation.

However, the court allowed the appeal on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired before the appellant was added as a defendant.

The court held that the limitation period began to run 30 days after the invoice date, not after subsequent demands for payment.

The action against the appellant was dismissed.

A dispute arose between a second mortgagee and a subsequent mortgagee over entitlement to interest from the proceeds of sale of mortgaged property.

Prior to advancing funds and registering a third mortgage, the subsequent mortgagee received email assurances from the second mortgagee that the second mortgage was in good standing.

In fact, interest payments under the second mortgage had never been made and had been privately waived or deferred between the second mortgagee and the mortgagor.

The court held that the representations created an equitable estoppel preventing the second mortgagee from claiming interest arrears that were inconsistent with those assurances.

The second mortgagee was limited to interest accruing only after the last representation that the mortgage was current.

The plaintiff factoring company sued the defendant transportation company and its principal for breach of a factoring agreement and personal guarantee.

The defendants counterclaimed for intentional interference with economic relations, alleging the plaintiff unlawfully seized funds and ruined their business relationship with a major client after the factoring agreement had been orally terminated.

The court found that promissory estoppel precluded the plaintiff from relying on the terminated factoring agreement.

However, the defendant still owed $200,000 for third-party invoices assigned to the plaintiff.

On the counterclaim, the court found the plaintiff liable to the corporate defendant for intentional interference with economic relations, awarding $175,000 in damages at large, but dismissed the principal's personal claims as derivative.

Following a family law trial concerning property division and spousal support, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The applicant sought full recovery costs exceeding $123,000 plus expert fees, while the respondent argued that success was divided and no costs should be awarded.

The court found that although the applicant was unsuccessful on spousal support, she achieved success on the primary property issues at trial.

Applying proportionality and partial indemnity principles, the court reduced the claimed fees and declined to award full recovery costs.

Costs were fixed for fees, disbursements, and a reduced contribution toward expert expenses.

The parties separated after a 25-year marriage.

The respondent obtained a divorce in Greece, while the applicant commenced proceedings in Ontario for property division and spousal support.

Applying Greek law to the property division, the court determined the incremental increase in each party's assets and ordered the respondent to pay the applicant an equalization payment of $63,284.18, plus $50,000 for her share of their jointly owned yacht.

The court dismissed the applicant's claim for spousal support, finding that under the Divorce Act, an Ontario court lacks jurisdiction to grant corollary relief once a foreign divorce has been granted, and alternatively, that there was no entitlement to support.

The plaintiff lender brought a motion for summary judgment to recover monies loaned to a corporate borrower under a debenture.

The borrower acknowledged borrowing funds but disputed the precise amount owed and raised concerns about payment preference because multiple lenders were listed in the debenture.

The court found there were no genuine issues requiring a trial, concluding that default was established through non-payment since 2010 and the borrower’s insolvency.

Documentary evidence, including a series of cheques totaling nearly $3 million, established the indebtedness.

Summary judgment was granted for $2,800,000 with provision that payment be made in a manner that would avoid preferential treatment among lenders.

Following a lengthy motion and cross-motion concerning an ex parte order, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The court reviewed written submissions regarding entitlement to costs.

The judge found the underlying motion results were mixed: the defendants failed in their cross-motion to set aside the ex parte order, while the plaintiff’s motion materials contained significant deficiencies that would normally have justified setting the order aside but for equitable considerations.

Given that both sides effectively lost aspects of the litigation, the court held that no party should receive costs.

The moving defendants sought to set aside a previously granted ex parte Mareva injunction and related orders, alleging the plaintiff failed to make full and fair disclosure when obtaining the original order.

The court considered allegations of multiple instances of non‑disclosure and misstatements, including failure to disclose certain agreements, undisclosed referral commissions, and a one‑sided interpretation of financial statements.

While the court found that the plaintiff had not fully met the stringent duty of full and frank disclosure required for ex parte relief, it held that setting aside the injunction would create an injustice given evidence suggesting insolvency, questionable financial practices, and potential dissipation of assets.

Exercising discretion, the court declined to dissolve the injunction and maintained the existing orders.

The defendants’ motion was therefore dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing a promissory note, arguing the motion judge erred in refusing a longer adjournment and in not granting a stay based on a counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the refusal of the adjournment and agreeing there was no genuine issue for trial.

The court also held that the counterclaim was not sufficiently related to the claim on the promissory note to warrant a stay.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.