Geoffrey D. E. Adair

The appellants, lawyers and the Attorney General of Canada, appealed a motion judge's dismissal of their motion to dismiss an action brought by an Indian Residential School survivor.

The appellants argued the survivor's action was barred by a release and cause of action bar contained in the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) approval order.

The survivor's action alleged psychological harm due to the initial dismissal of his Independent Assessment Process (IAP) claim, stemming from Canada's alleged failure to disclose relevant documents and the lawyers' negligence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the release did not encompass claims arising from Canada's failure to fulfill its obligations under the IRSSA, nor did it bar the survivor's claim against his former lawyers.

This defamation action involved a motion to set the terms of a discovery plan.

The defendant, Fay Brunning, sought broad documentary disclosure from the plaintiffs, including files related to numerous clients in "Cochrane Actions" and "IAP claims" based on a defence of justification.

The plaintiffs were willing to disclose documents related to a specific client (Claimant H) but argued that Brunning's justification defence was not sufficiently particularized to warrant broader disclosure.

The court found Brunning's request for disclosure overly broad and not supported by the pleadings, limiting disclosure to Claimant H's case and specific communications.

The court also set terms for oral discovery and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs, investors in a real estate development, sought to register a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against three lots and to register a preservation order regarding a vendor take-back mortgage on title.

The property had been sold to a third-party developer, Brampton G&A. The court dismissed the motion, finding that the parties had previously agreed not to register orders on title, the property was an investment property rather than unique, and the existing preservation order requiring mortgage payments to be paid into court provided sufficient protection without encumbering the third party's title.

The plaintiff, an Indian Residential School survivor, sued his former lawyers (the Wallbridge defendants) for negligence.

The negligence claim arose after the defendants initially failed to secure him compensation through an IAP claim for sexual abuse, causing him significant psychological harm.

The plaintiff later succeeded in obtaining compensation with new counsel.

The defendants moved to dismiss the negligence action as an abuse of process, arguing it was barred by the 2006 Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) Approval Order.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the release provisions in the Approval Order did not encompass causes of action that arose after its effective date, nor could claims of solicitor's negligence in the prosecution of an IAP claim have been within the contemplation of the parties to the IRSSA.

In a defamation action arising from statements about the handling of Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement claims, the plaintiffs brought a motion to strike portions of the statement of defence or, alternatively, for particulars.

The court dismissed the motion to strike due to unexplained delay under Rule 2.02, noting it was brought eight months after pleadings closed.

The alternative request for particulars was also dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to show they were unable to plead their case without them.

The defendant, Sunlife Assurance Company of Canada, brought a motion seeking an order to compel the plaintiff, Suzanne McGee, to undergo a neuropsychological evaluation and to adjourn the scheduled pre-trial and trial dates.

The defendant argued this was necessary due to a perceived change in opinion from the plaintiff's orthopedic expert following a Functional Abilities Evaluation (FAE).

The court found that the orthopedic expert's subsequent letter merely summarized the FAE's conclusions, which were outside his area of expertise, and did not constitute a new expert opinion requiring a response.

The court also noted the defendant had previously decided against obtaining its own FAE.

The motion was dismissed, and the defendant was ordered to pay costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the defendants for damages.

The jury found the defendants 62% liable and awarded damages of approximately $2.6 million, including $2.2 million for future care costs.

The trial judge made a conditional assignment order of the plaintiff's future statutory accident benefits (SABs) to the defendants' insurers under section 267.8(12)(a)(ii) of the Insurance Act.

The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the assignment violated strict matching principles and was premature.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the conditional assignment order and rejecting the strict matching approach in favour of a "silo" approach.

The court also denied leave to appeal the trial judge's substantial reduction of the plaintiff's costs award, which was reduced from $795,616.09 to $375,000 due to the plaintiff's counsel's conduct regarding a settlement offer, the lack of material benefit in proceeding to trial, and conduct that unnecessarily extended the trial.

This appeal concerns a franchise dispute where the motion judge granted partial summary judgment for rescission of a franchise agreement and damages of $964,805.33 against the franchisor.

The central issue was whether the franchisor failed to disclose earnings projections that were allegedly shown to the franchisees at a May 2010 meeting, constituting material non-disclosure under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The appellate court allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the rescission judgment and damages award on the basis that the motion judge erred in determining the key disputed factual issue on contradictory evidence without oral testimony.

However, the court upheld the motion judge's determination that the rescission claim was timely, as the limitation period ran from the replacement agreement signed in September 2010 rather than the original agreement signed in June 2010.

The appellants Cadesky & Associates and Barry Seltzer appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The cross-appellant George Jones abandoned the cross-appeal.

The Court of Appeal fixed costs in the amount of $3,750.00 for each of the cross-respondents.

The appellants, a law firm, appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing their defamation action against a lawyer and her firm.

The lawyer, Brunning, practiced "in association" with Williams-Litigation Lawyers, sharing office space and using the firm's letterhead without supervision.

The motion judge found Williams could not be vicariously liable for Brunning's allegedly defamatory correspondence regarding Indian Residential School claims.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the question of liability was novel and important, involving policy considerations that should be determined at trial rather than on summary judgment.

The court emphasized that Williams had authorized Brunning's use of its letterhead and held her out as associated with the firm, creating potential liability.

The appellant insurer appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice regarding insurance policy interpretation.

The insurer argued that there was no "Claim" against an "Insured Person" for a "Wrongful Act" nor was there a "Loss" within the policy's definitions.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's interpretation of the governing principles or the policy language, and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent was awarded costs of $16,000.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's damages assessment following a failed real estate transaction.

The motion judge awarded DHMK Properties Inc. damages based on the difference between the agreed purchase price ($5.3 million) and the property's market value in August 2014 ($4.27 million), without accounting for the vendor's warranty obligations regarding net income or providing reasons for the valuation date selection.

The Court of Appeal found two critical errors: the failure to consider the effect of the vendor's warranty on damages calculation, and the unexplained selection of August 2014 as the valuation date rather than the scheduled closing date.

The court set aside the judgment and remitted the damages assessment to the Superior Court.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following a motion brought by the defendant Brunning for document inspection and particulars, which was largely unsuccessful.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, while Brunning requested costs be reserved or no costs.

The court considered factors under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, noting the plaintiffs' substantial success on the motion.

However, the court also acknowledged that the plaintiffs' initial refusals to provide requested information contributed to the necessity of the motion.

Finding that both parties had "dug in their heels" the court ordered the defendant Fay Brunning to pay the plaintiffs $6,197.40 in costs, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable within 30 days.

The appellants appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of Justice rendered by Justice Paul B. Kane following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and awarded the appellants costs of the appeal in the amount of $22,000.

The costs of the trial were reserved to the discretion of the judge presiding over the re-trial.

Liberty Silver Corporation sought indemnification from Liberty Insurance Underwriters Inc. for legal costs incurred by its officers and directors during an investigation by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC).

Liberty Insurance denied coverage, arguing the investigative order and subpoenas did not constitute a "Claim" against an "Insured Person" for a "Wrongful Act" and that Liberty Silver was no longer "legally obligated to pay" due to an assignment agreement.

The court found the investigative order was a "formal regulatory investigation" and thus a "Claim" and that a holistic interpretation of the policy meant "Wrongful Act" included matters giving rise to such an investigation.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the assignment agreement and statute of limitations.

The application for indemnification was allowed, and Liberty Silver's proposed allocation of defence costs was accepted.

The plaintiffs, having successfully obtained summary judgment against the defendant insurer for coverage, sought full indemnity costs.

The court granted full indemnity costs, finding that insurance companies wrongfully denying coverage should fully compensate successful parties for enforcing that coverage, citing the unique nature of insurance contracts.

The court also found the hourly rates of plaintiffs' counsel to be reasonable and awarded $72,000 in costs.

The plaintiff was rear-ended in a motor vehicle accident and claimed soft tissue damages, chronic pain, anxiety, and depression.

The defendant admitted liability, and the sole issue at trial was damages.

The trial judge qualified a defence psychiatrist as an expert despite serious reservations about his methodology and independence.

The expert's testimony focused primarily on alleged inconsistencies between what the plaintiff told him and her medical records, essentially attacking her credibility rather than providing independent psychiatric assessment.

The jury awarded only general damages of $23,500 and rejected all other heads of damages.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge failed to properly discharge his gatekeeper duty by not conducting a cost-benefit analysis at the qualification stage and failed to exercise his ongoing gatekeeper function when the expert's lack of impartiality became apparent during testimony.

The plaintiffs, a minor and his litigation guardian, sought summary judgment against the defendant insurer to enforce a prior jury award for negligence against the minor's father, who was insured by the defendant.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the negligence did not arise from the use or operation of a motor vehicle and brought a cross-motion for summary judgment.

The court found the jury's particularization of negligence (unsafe unloading area) established a clear nexus between the father's use of the vehicle and the child's injuries, distinguishing it from cases of mere incidental use.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding the insurer liable for damages and costs.

The defendant, Fay Brunning, brought a motion to temporarily stay a defamation action commenced against her by the plaintiffs, James Wallbridge, Almeda Wallbridge, and Wallbridge, Wallbridge, seeking damages in excess of $15 million.

Brunning argued for a stay to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent findings, citing ongoing Requests for Directions (RFDs) within the Independent Assessment Process (IAP) of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement (IRSSA) that raised similar issues regarding the plaintiffs' conduct.

However, the RFDs were subsequently dismissed by Justice Perell, eliminating the multiplicity concern.

Brunning also argued that confidentiality concerns related to IAP documents and solicitor-client privilege prevented her from adequately defending the defamation action.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no outstanding proceedings with common facts, and that mechanisms existed to address confidentiality concerns without preventing Brunning from defending herself.

The court also found that a stay would prejudice the plaintiffs' ability to seek a remedy for the alleged harm.

The applicant, DHMK Properties Inc., sought summary judgment for damages following the respondents' (2296608 Ontario Inc. and Mund Real Estate Group Inc.) repudiation of a real estate purchase agreement.

The respondents had refused to close a $5.3 million transaction and subsequently sued for specific performance with an abatement, which was dismissed.

DHMK claimed $930,000 in damages, representing the difference between the contract price and the property's market value, less the forfeited deposit.

The respondents argued DHMK failed to mitigate by refusing a post-judgment offer to complete the original contract and that the damages calculation was flawed by ignoring a warranty regarding net operating income.

The court granted summary judgment to DHMK for $930,000, affirming the standard measure of damages for breach of a land sale contract and rejecting the respondents' mitigation and damages calculation arguments.