Epstein

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision, arguing that the court below erred in its assessment of credibility and the risk of witness tainting.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the appeal did not raise a question of law requiring clarification and that the arguments were not sufficiently strong to warrant a second appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable based on differences in transaction methodology, lack of exclusive opportunity, and logistical improbability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of different methodologies, noting the appellant was caught on video misappropriating funds and had the victim's PIN, and concluding the logistics pointed to the appellant rather than anyone else.

The appellant appealed an order for possession.

On consent, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the condition that the order for possession not be enforced until July 1, 2014.

The respondents were awarded costs of $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant appealed the decision of the motion judge granting summary judgment and awarding costs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant appealed the order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motion judge and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision, arguing the motion judge erred in accepting the respondent's expert evidence on the interpretation of the commercial reasonableness standard under the Uniform Commercial Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge was entitled to accept the expert's opinion, especially since the appellants chose not to put forward any expert evidence of their own.

The court also rejected arguments regarding the expert's alleged bias.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's findings regarding net family property deductions, imputed income for child support, and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the appellant failed to discharge the onus of proving his date of marriage deductions due to a lack of documentation.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's imputation of income, including capital gains, for child support purposes, nor in the modest spousal support award granted to the respondent.

The appellants appealed the decision of the motion judge dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's res judicata analysis and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $6,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order granting summary judgment on a mortgage and dismissing an application for relief under sections 22 and 23 of the Mortgages Act.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the summary judgment.

The Court also held that the application for statutory relief was overtaken by subsequent events, as the mortgage had matured and the mortgagee was in possession of the property.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiffs sued the quarry owner (Miller Group) and the blasting operator (Sernoskies) for damages caused by a fly rock incident.

The plaintiffs and the operator entered into a Pierringer settlement agreement, releasing the operator and restricting claims against the owner to several liability.

The owner cross-claimed against the operator, alleging an implied indemnity agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the owner's cross-claim and its motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the owner's appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to address the threshold issue of whether an implied indemnity agreement existed, which could eliminate the owner's liability entirely.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination.

The parties separated after a long marriage during which they built a successful real estate business.

Following separation, the appellant was convicted of sexual assault, unilaterally terminated the business partnership, and diverted commissions to himself.

The trial judge awarded the respondent $200,000 in lump sum spousal support.

The appellant appealed the entitlement, form, and quantum of the award, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application and the appeal, finding the lump sum award appropriately addressed the economic disadvantage and hardship suffered by the respondent.

The respondent invested $57,000 in a fraudulent investment scheme through the appellant and a third party.

The trial judge found the appellant liable for the loss based on a breach of constructive trust as a trustee de son tort.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by deciding liability on a theory that was not pleaded.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidentiary basis for a breach of trust, as the appellant did not guarantee the investment or participate in any wrongdoing.

The appellant, a prolific child sex offender diagnosed as a psychopath, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge conflated risk reduction with risk elimination and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting psychopaths can be effectively treated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly applied the long-term offender criteria and correctly concluded the appellant's risk could not be safely managed in the community.

The fresh evidence application was also dismissed as it merely offered a concurring opinion to evidence already rejected at trial and lacked sufficient probative value to affect the outcome.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action by the motion judge.

The motion judge had dismissed the action because the appellant failed to pay security for costs into court as required by a previous order.

The Court of Appeal found a proper basis for the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent due to unfounded public allegations against respondent's counsel.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent bank approximately $6 million and declaring the judgment survived bankruptcy due to fraud.

The appellant argued the record was insufficient due to inadequate documentary production by the bank, which he claimed was necessary to determine his intent regarding a cheque-kiting scheme.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the summary judgment test and noting the appellant had over six years to bring a production motion but failed to do so until two days before the peremptory hearing.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application for a declaration that $70,000 advanced to her daughter and the respondent was a loan, not a gift.

During the application hearing, the judge made several comments indicating he would have difficulty making an adverse credibility finding against the respondent because he was a police officer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge's comments created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court set aside the judgment and ordered a trial of the issues due to the conflicting evidence.

The appellants brought an action against a mortgage broker and its professional liability insurer for damages arising from the broker's alleged fraud.

The insurer rescinded the policy due to material misrepresentations made by the broker during the application process.

The appellants appealed the summary judgment dismissing their action against the insurer, arguing that an undertaking given by the insurer to the Financial Services Commission of Ontario (FSCO) to provide fraud coverage negated the right of rescission.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the misrepresentations were material, the FSCO undertaking was predicated on a valid policy, and relief from forfeiture was unavailable because the misrepresentations constituted non-compliance with a condition precedent.

The appellant owned a family camp property.

The respondent, her former son-in-law, had occupied, maintained, and improved the camp for over 20 years.

When the respondent refused to allow his son to use the camp, the appellant attempted to revoke his licence to occupy it.

The trial judge found that the respondent had an equitable right to use the camp during his lifetime based on proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment, and granted an exclusive licence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the trial judge's application of equitable principles or his choice of remedy.

The self-represented appellant applied to review two orders: one fixing the date for his appeals and another dismissing his application for the appointment of specific counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant had previously dismissed or refused to cooperate with three appointed counsel, leading to the appointment of amicus curiae.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the applications, finding that the appointment of amicus was appropriate to control the court's process and prevent further frustration of the proceedings, consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ontario v. Criminal Lawyers' Association.

The appellant was stopped for speeding and arrested for breaching his recognizance curfew.

During a search of the vehicle incident to that arrest, the officer smelled raw marihuana, leading to a second arrest for possession and a further search of the trunk, which revealed 18.1 pounds of marihuana.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the search violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the initial arrest, the search of the front of the car was justified for officer safety, and the officer's testimony regarding the smell of marihuana was credible, making the subsequent search of the trunk lawful.