Harvey J. Ash

The moving party, the Estate Trustee, sought an order for possession of a condominium unit, which was the sole significant asset of the deceased's estate.

The responding party, the deceased's son and sole residual beneficiary, resided in the unit and opposed the motion, seeking a stay pending his application against the Estate Trustee for negligence and misfeasance.

The court declined to stay the motion, finding that the Estate Trustee was acting within his authority to sell the unit to pay estate debts and ongoing expenses.

The court granted the order for possession, adjourning the request for a writ of possession to allow the responding party time to find alternative accommodations.

The plaintiff sought clarification on a request for costs against his former counsel under Rule 57.07(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that Rule 57.07(1) applies only to a 'lawyer for a party' and not to a former lawyer whose retainer had ended.

Furthermore, the court found insufficient evidence to conduct the required holistic examination of the former counsel's conduct.

The request for costs against the former lawyer was dismissed.

An experienced private mortgage lender advanced $100,000 secured by a first mortgage in a property transaction that proved to be fraudulent.

The borrower admitted participating in the fraud but died without assets.

The central issue at trial was whether the solicitor who acted for both borrower and lender or the mortgage broker was responsible for orchestrating the scheme.

The court accepted corroborated evidence that the solicitor was the architect and principal beneficiary of the fraud, drawing adverse inferences from his failure to testify and from suspicious documents in his file.

Judgment was granted for the lender for her losses with prejudgment interest and punitive damages, and the third‑party claim against the broker was dismissed.

The applicants, owners of adjacent properties, sought a declaration that the respondents unlawfully obstructed a shared right-of-way by constructing an addition to their home.

The right-of-way was granted for the purpose of vehicular ingress and egress to the applicants' garages.

The court found that while the addition permanently occupied a portion of the right-of-way, it did not substantially interfere with the applicants' ability to access their garages by vehicle.

The application was dismissed, as the encroachment did not constitute an actionable interference with the specific limited purpose of the right-of-way.