Andrew R. Kerr

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion to transfer an action from the East Region (Ottawa) to the Toronto Region.

The Defendant, as the successful moving party, sought costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and bill of costs, considering factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the principle of proportionality under Rule 1:04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the time spent by the moving party's counsel, particularly on cross-examinations deemed unnecessary, was not proportional to the straightforward nature of the transfer motion.

The Plaintiff was ordered to pay the Defendant partial indemnity costs in the all-inclusive amount of $1,990.00, significantly less than the $8,107.50 sought.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer the action and all related enforcement proceedings from the East Region (Ottawa) to the Toronto Region.

The plaintiff had previously obtained default summary judgment in Ottawa for credit card debt and was seeking to enforce a writ of seizure and sale against the defendant's home in Toronto.

The court applied the factors under Rule 13.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure holistically.

Finding that the defendant lived in Toronto, the subject property was in Toronto, and both parties had Toronto counsel, the court concluded that Toronto was a significantly better venue for the remaining post-judgment steps.

The motion to transfer was granted.

In a personal injury claim arising from a motor vehicle accident, the jury awarded the plaintiff general damages.

The defendants subsequently brought a threshold motion, arguing that the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss was barred because she failed to establish a permanent, serious impairment of an important physical, mental, or psychological function under the Insurance Act.

The court, applying the three-part Meyer v. Bright inquiry, found that while the plaintiff experienced intermittent pain, her impairment did not substantially interfere with her regular employment or most usual daily activities, considering her age and pre-accident lifestyle.

The court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages.

In a civil jury trial for damages from a motor vehicle accident, the court ruled on whether a proposed jury question concerning the plaintiff's lost earning capacity should be submitted.

The court found insufficient evidence to allow the jury to reasonably calculate or quantify this loss without speculation, as there was no adduced evidence of the plaintiff's annual income before or after the accident.

Citing established jurisprudence, the court determined that a question should only go to the jury if there is "reasonable evidence" to support a judicial finding.

Consequently, the question regarding loss of earning capacity was not put to the jury.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's 15-year-old personal injury action for delay and breach of court orders, primarily stemming from the plaintiff's failure to complete defence medical examinations.

The plaintiff, who had been self-represented for a significant period, refused to be examined by male doctors due to severe anxiety and later had conflicts with female examining doctors.

The court found the delay was inordinate but excusable given the circumstances, and that the defendant suffered no actual prejudice.

The motion to dismiss was denied, but the court ordered the plaintiff to attend a defence medical examination with a female specialist under strict conditions, including audio recording, warning that failure to comply would result in dismissal.

The defendants moved to dismiss a civil action alleging assault and false arrest by a police officer on the basis of delay under Rule 24.01(1)(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and for breach of a prior court order.

The action had been commenced more than fourteen years earlier and had seen virtually no progress for almost a decade following examinations for discovery, with numerous undertakings remaining unanswered and the plaintiff failing to comply with an order requiring her to appoint counsel or file a notice of intention to act in person.

The court held that the delay was inordinate and inexcusable and that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from the lengthy passage of time.

Although the delay was not found to be intentional and contumelious, the circumstances created a substantial risk that a fair trial would no longer be possible.

The action was dismissed for delay, with costs awarded to the defendants.

The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's 15-year-old personal injury action for delay and breach of court orders, primarily due to the plaintiff's failure to complete defence medical examinations.

The plaintiff, who had been self-represented for a significant period, refused to be examined by male doctors due to severe anxiety stemming from a past assault, and later had confrontational interactions with female examiners.

The Master found the delay was inordinate but excusable under the circumstances, and that the defendant suffered no actual prejudice.

The motion to dismiss was denied, but the Master imposed strict terms for a final defence medical examination, including that it be conducted by a female specialist and be audio recorded.

The court determined costs following a motion by the defendant to strike portions of the statement of claim.

Although the defendant succeeded in striking certain allegations as irrelevant or related only to a barred wrongful dismissal claim, the relief granted was significantly narrower than what was sought.

The court found the motion was necessitated by the plaintiff advancing irrelevant matters that would have unnecessarily expanded discovery and prolonged the litigation.

However, because the defendant attempted to strike substantially more material than was warranted, full costs were not justified.

Partial costs were awarded to the defendant.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 25.11(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of a statement of claim as an abuse of process following a prior order that barred the plaintiff’s wrongful dismissal and long‑term disability claims due to delay.

The plaintiff issued a revised statement of claim that removed certain paragraphs but retained factual allegations the defendant argued were tied to the barred claims.

The court held that pleadings must contain material facts rather than evidence and should avoid irrelevant allegations that would delay a fair trial.

While most of the pleading was permitted to stand, the court found certain portions were not germane to the remaining causes of action and would unnecessarily complicate the proceeding.

The court ordered limited portions of the pleading struck while otherwise allowing the claim to proceed.