Epstein

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for offences including robbery with a firearm and aggravated assault.

The trial judge had erred by failing to apply the five-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 344(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Despite this error, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to interfere with the sentence.

The Court noted the respondent's youth, the co-offender's sentence, and fresh evidence demonstrating substantial rehabilitative gains during his time in the reformatory system.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife with a weapon and assaulting his adult son, and was sentenced to 25 days in jail.

He appealed his convictions, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that they were equivocal, involuntary, and uninformed due to stress, lack of sleep, and a misunderstanding of the appeal process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a proper plea comprehension inquiry, the appellant made unequivocal admissions of guilt, and his ability to make a conscious choice was not impaired.

The appellant appealed the motion judge's decision to strike the pleadings against CIBC for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages arising from a 2009 fire.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred because the statement of claim was issued in September 2013, outside the two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the discoverability principle did not assist the appellant as he was aware of his psychological difficulties by July 2011.

The plaintiff was injured in a charity bicycle ride when the defendant swerved and clipped his wheel.

The defendant pleaded volenti and contributory negligence, and served a jury notice.

At trial, the judge struck the jury notice, finding that the jury would be confused by the waiver signed by the participants and the volenti defence.

The trial judge found the defendant entirely liable.

The defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by striking the jury notice.

The volenti defence is not a claim for declaratory relief, and a properly instructed jury could understand the limited legal effect of the waiver.

The respondent was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued for non-pecuniary damages.

The trial judge found the respondent met the statutory impairment threshold but dismissed the action because the respondent did not provide corroborating evidence of his change in function from a witness other than himself, as required by s. 4.3(5) of O. Reg. 461/96.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the regulation does not preclude the injured person from providing the corroborative evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the regulation requires corroboration of the physician's evidence, which can be provided by the injured person's own testimony.

The appellants appealed their convictions arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident.

The jury convicted the appellant driver of dangerous driving causing death but acquitted him of dangerous driving causing bodily harm arising from the same incident.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts irreconcilably inconsistent, as both charges relied on the same evidence regarding the identity of the driver and the nature of the driving.

The conviction for dangerous driving causing death was quashed and an acquittal entered due to issue estoppel.

The related convictions for obstructing police and being an accessory after the fact were also quashed, with a new trial ordered for the obstruction charges.

The vendor mistakenly accepted an agreement of purchase and sale for one of two adjacent properties without a condition tying the sale to the second property.

The purchaser attempted to waive the conditions for its benefit by faxing notice to the vendor's solicitor, rather than delivering it personally to the vendor as required by the agreement.

The vendor refused to close, relying on the strict notice requirements.

The purchaser sued for specific performance or damages and brought a motion for partial summary judgment, which was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the entire agreement clause precluded implied terms regarding notice, and that the vendor had not waived the requirement for personal delivery.

The appellant tenant appealed a ruling that a commercial lease and its right of first refusal were properly terminated by the respondent landlord.

The landlord had unconditionally accepted a third-party offer to purchase the leased premises without first notifying the tenant or allowing it to match the offer, and then purported to terminate the lease.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the landlord was obliged to inform the tenant of the offer and afford it an opportunity to match before unconditionally accepting the third-party offer.

The court ordered the landlord to enter into an agreement of purchase and sale with the tenant on the same terms.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for assault and attempted kidnapping, was detained at a mental health facility.

His treating physician found him incapable of consenting to antipsychotic medication for his delusional disorder, a finding confirmed by the Consent and Capacity Board and upheld by the Superior Court.

On appeal, the appellant argued the physician's evidence was uncorroborated and the incapacity finding was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the physician's evidence was corroborated by the appellant's own testimony and documentary evidence, and the board's conclusion that the appellant could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing medication was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the complainant and the appellant.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the trial judge's credibility assessments are entitled to deference and the reasons provided ample explanation for accepting the complainant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed, except for a stay of the conviction on count 1 under the Kienapple principle.

The respondent lawyers were victims of a fraud scheme where they deposited counterfeit cheques into their trust accounts and issued instruments payable to 'Nithiyakalyaani Jewellers'.

The instruments were deposited into an account at the appellant bank.

The trial judge found the bank liable in conversion, holding that the payee was not non-existing or fictitious.

The Court of Appeal allowed the bank's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in applying the plausibility doctrine.

Because the respondents had no knowledge of the actual corporation 'Nithiyakalyaani Jewellers Ltd.' when they drew the instruments, the payee was a non-existing person under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act, providing the bank with a complete defence to conversion.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for adverse possession.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the third requirement for adverse possession—effective exclusion of the true owner—applies even in cases of mutual mistake and was not met on the facts.

The appeal was dismissed, but the trial costs award was reduced from full indemnity to substantial indemnity.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was not unreasonable given the appellant's admitted non-compliance with previous dispositions, lack of insight into his condition and medical needs, and recent events.

The appellant appealed her conviction and 18-month sentence for aggravated assault.

She argued the trial judge failed to give adequate reasons by omitting mention of specific evidence and erred in refusing to reopen the trial based on fresh evidence concerning the complainant's victim impact statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the omitted evidence was not prominent and the trial judge properly exercised her discretion in refusing to reopen the trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 18-month sentence was not manifestly excessive.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge considered an email exchange in isolation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably interpreted the appellant's email response to the complainant's detailed allegations as a virtual confession when viewed in the context of all the evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board transferring him from Ontario Shores to Waypoint.

The appellant conceded he represented a significant threat to public safety and required a custodial order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision to transfer the appellant was reasonable, based on the correct legal test, and entitled to deference.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of his estranged wife.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in admitting gunshot residue (GSR) evidence found on his hands and clothing, claiming it was obtained following an unlawful arrest and arbitrary detention in violation of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

He also argued the GSR evidence's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the use of his post-arrest statements to police.

The Court of Appeal found that while the arrest was unlawful and the detention arbitrary, the GSR evidence was properly admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also found no error in the admission of the GSR evidence on a probative value/prejudicial effect analysis, and concluded the jury instructions regarding the appellant's statements did not prejudice him.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order striking out his claim without leave to amend and dismissing his action for malicious prosecution and other claims.

He also sought an adjournment and to admit fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment and fresh evidence application, finding the evidence irrelevant.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the claim was fatally flawed, raised allegations beyond the limitation period, and sought damages for non-existent causes of action.

The appellant landlord appealed the dismissal of its action for unpaid rent against the respondent commercial tenants.

The trial judge had dismissed the action on the basis that the landlord forfeited its right to sue for rent by re-entering the premises before the 15-day statutory period expired under the Commercial Tenancies Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether the premises had been abandoned, which would allow immediate re-entry without prejudicing the claim for rent.

A trial of an issue was ordered to determine the application of the Act, including the issue of abandonment.