Epstein

The respondent physician commenced an action for loss of income after his hospital privileges were temporarily restricted following an incident in the operating room.

The appellant hospital and doctors brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction because the respondent had not first proceeded to a hearing before the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) under the Public Hospitals Act.

The motion judge dismissed the jurisdictional challenge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the respondent had followed through with the hospital's internal dispute resolution process, which concluded with his return to full practice, and therefore he was not required to seek a hearing before the HPARB before commencing his civil action.

The parties, two dentists operating through professional corporations, entered into a joint venture agreement that provided for termination on 90 days' notice but was silent on the consequences of termination.

The respondent gave notice of termination and sought to exclude the appellant from the practice and buy out his interest.

The application judge declared the joint venture terminated, excluded the appellant from the practice, and directed that the appellant's interest be sold to the respondent, with financial issues to be resolved separately.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge had jurisdiction and that terminating the appellant's ownership interest was necessary to give business efficacy to the termination provision and the parties' common intention.

The appellant was involved in a rear-end motor vehicle collision when she attempted to turn left into a private driveway and was struck by the respondents' vehicle attempting to pass her.

The trial judge apportioned liability equally at 50 percent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that while the appellant was negligent in failing to check her mirrors and signal in time under s. 142(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, the trial judge erred by failing to conduct a causation analysis.

The Court reapportioned liability, finding the respondent driver 90 percent responsible for driving too fast for the conditions and attempting an unsafe pass, and the appellant 10 percent responsible for her contributory negligence.

The self-represented appellant appeared for the hearing of her appeal, but the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) revealed that its materials had never been served on her.

The Court of Appeal found it would be unfair to proceed and adjourned the appeal.

Due to the late adjournment caused by the OCL's failure to serve its materials, the court ordered the OCL to pay costs thrown away of $1,000 to both the appellant and the respondent.

The appellant teachers were wrongfully dismissed by the respondent private school.

The motion judge reduced their reasonable notice period from twelve months to six months due to the school's financial difficulties and a presumption about the availability of alternative teaching positions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an employer's financial circumstances are not relevant to determining the reasonable notice period under the Bardal factors.

The twelve-month notice period was restored.

A fire broke out in the appellants' garage while their son, the respondent, was working on his car.

The appellants' home insurer paid for the property damage and brought a subrogated action against the respondent's automobile insurer.

The trial judge dismissed the subrogated claim on the basis that the respondent was an unnamed insured under the homeowner's policy, and an insurer cannot subrogate against its own insured.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the respondent fell within the policy's definition of an insured, had an insurable interest in the property based on the factual expectancy test, and that policy reasons strongly militated against allowing an insurer to sue its own insured.

Following a successful appeal regarding the operation of a homeless shelter, the appellant church sought full indemnity costs of $163,479.54, arguing it was a public interest litigant.

The respondent municipality argued no costs should be awarded as it was also acting in the public interest.

The Court of Appeal rejected both arguments, finding the case did not meet the exceptional threshold for full indemnity costs under Carter, nor did the municipality's enforcement of its by-law exempt it from the normal costs rules.

Costs were awarded to the appellant on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $90,000.

The appellant was convicted of participating in or contributing to the activities of a terrorist group after attending a training camp and providing computer assistance to the group's leaders.

On appeal, he challenged the admission of intercepted private communications obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter, undated departure letters found in his bedroom, and cross-examination on religious and ideological materials.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the actus reus of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and finding the jury instructions substantially complied with the law.

The appellant mother appealed a finding of contempt for failing to comply with a temporary access order.

The motion judge had ordered her to pay a $5,000 fine and $10,000 in costs, to be set off against the respondent father's child support arrears and ongoing obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application of the three-part test for contempt, the direct payment of the fine, the unusual but justified set-off against child support, or the decision not to bifurcate the proceedings to allow purging of the contempt.

The appellant appealed a decision implying a contractual obligation to disclose financial information to the respondent, enabling the respondent to determine whether to exercise an option to acquire up to a 20% interest in a limited partnership.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge correctly applied the business efficacy test.

The Court held that the option right would be illusory without the implied right to disclosure, and that implying such a term was necessary to give business efficacy to the parties' agreement.

The appellant church operated a homeless shelter in its basement.

The respondent municipality sought an injunction to stop the shelter, arguing it violated the local zoning by-law which permitted 'church' uses but prohibited soup kitchens and food banks.

The application judge granted the injunction.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in his interpretation of the by-law.

The Court found that the homeless shelter fell within the by-law's definition of 'church-sponsored community activities and projects'.

The appeal was allowed and the injunction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Crown and members of the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

The motion judge had dismissed the action on several grounds, including judicial immunity, improper notice, non-compliance with the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, and improper collateral attack, characterizing the action as an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

Metrolinx purchased a railway corridor from CN and requested that Enbridge relocate six gas pipelines crossing under the railway.

A dispute arose over who should bear the relocation costs.

The application judge found that under the historical agreements, Enbridge was responsible for the costs, and that CN had assigned these rights to Metrolinx.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Enbridge's appeal, holding that the application judge made no palpable and overriding error in interpreting the complex commercial agreements.

The appellant, facing charges under the Provincial Offences Act for failing to comply with property standards orders under the Building Code Act, sought advanced funding to mount a constitutional challenge against the Building Code Act.

He argued the Act violated his section 7 Charter rights by threatening his shelter.

The application judge dismissed the request.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, finding the constitutional challenge lacked merit because section 7 does not protect property rights and the Building Code Act itself does not authorize the seizure of property.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and uttering a threat to cause death.

The complainant died before trial.

Her preliminary inquiry testimony and a videotaped statement to police were admitted into evidence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the videotaped statement for the truth of its contents, over-relying on the complainant's demeanour, and applying different levels of scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the videotaped statement was not necessary and constituted an inadmissible prior consistent statement.

The court also found the trial judge placed undue weight on demeanour evidence not subject to cross-examination and applied an uneven standard of scrutiny.

The appeal was allowed and the convictions were set aside.

The appellants sold their home to the respondents.

After signing the agreement of purchase and sale, which contained an entire agreement clause, the appellants completed a Seller Property Information Statement (SPIS) stating the property was not subject to flooding and undertaking to disclose any important changes.

Before closing, the basement flooded, but the appellants did not disclose this.

After closing, the basement flooded again.

The respondents sued for negligent misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal held that while the entire agreement clause did not preclude a tort claim based on the post-contractual SPIS, the claim failed because the respondents could not prove they reasonably relied on the misrepresentation to their detriment.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside an Environmental Review Tribunal's revocation of a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind farm project.

The Tribunal had found the project would cause serious and irreversible harm to the Blanding's turtle due to increased road mortality.

The Court of Appeal held the Divisional Court erred in its standard of review application, finding the Tribunal's decision on serious and irreversible harm was reasonable despite lacking precise numerical data.

However, the Court of Appeal agreed the Tribunal erred in revoking the approval without allowing the parties to make submissions on the appropriate remedy.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to determine the remedy.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and related offences based primarily on recognition evidence from a former romantic partner who identified him from a wanted poster.

The trial judge accepted this evidence while dismissing conflicting eyewitness descriptions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to critically analyze the problematic aspects of the recognition evidence and by ignoring exculpatory eyewitness testimony.

The Court concluded the verdicts were unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment declaring that the franchise disclosure document they provided to the respondents was materially deficient, entitling the respondents to rescind the franchise agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that summary judgment was appropriate and that the disclosure document's failure to include properly verified financial statements, a compliant certificate, and information about ongoing litigation amounted to a material deficiency equivalent to no disclosure at all.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after stabbing his housemate, who subsequently died of a heart attack due to severe underlying heart disease.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury's finding on causation was unreasonable because the medical expert could not definitively state the stab wounds contributed to the death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to consider non-medical evidence, including the circumstances of the altercation, which reasonably linked the extreme stress and blood loss from the attack to the victim's death.