Eadit Rokach

J.C. was found guilty after trial of two counts of sexual interference and one count of accessing child pornography.

The sexual assault counts were stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen to increase sentences for child sexual offences, imposed a global sentence of 6.5 years in custody.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the young age and vulnerability of the victims (his 2-year-old daughter and 9-year-old niece), the abuse of trust, and the location of the offences.

Mitigating factors included J.C.'s lack of criminal record, stable employment history, and community support.

The court also addressed the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for accessing child pornography, finding it unconstitutional based on R. v. John.

Ancillary orders for DNA, SOIRA registration, and various prohibitions were also imposed.

D.W. pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation involving the complainant G.J., who was 13-15 years old at the time of the offence (1988-1990).

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the abuse of a position of trust and authority, the grooming and manipulation of a vulnerable child, the repetitive nature of the abuse over two years, and the profound, long-lasting impact on the victim and her family.

Mitigating factors included the offender's guilty plea, lack of a prior criminal record, low risk of reoffending, and strong family support.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for child abuse offences.

The court sentenced D.W. to three years and six months in jail, along with a DNA order and a 10-year SOIRA order.

Kalu Solomon pleaded guilty to multiple serious offences, including a gunpoint kidnapping, aggravated assault with a shank on a fellow inmate, and assaults/threats against correctional officers.

The court considered aggravating factors such as his extensive criminal record and institutional misconducts, and mitigating factors including his guilty plea, rehabilitative efforts, strong family support, harsh conditions of custody, and experience of racial slurs.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 8.5 years, while the defence sought a time-served sentence of approximately 6.4 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years, crediting Solomon with 7 years for pre-sentence custody (including a year of Duncan credit for harsh conditions), resulting in an additional year to serve.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime s. 109 order and a DNA order, plus three years of probation.

J.C. was charged with two counts of sexual assault, two counts of sexual interference, one count of assault, and one count of accessing child pornography.

The court found J.C. guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference with respect to his two-year-old daughter (S.) and his nine-year-old niece (K.), and guilty of accessing child pornography.

J.C. was acquitted of assaulting his wife (A.A.), as the court found his actions were consistent with self-defence or defence of property.

The case involved detailed analysis of witness credibility, forensic evidence, and the legal distinction between possessing and accessing child pornography.

The defendant, Charmare Crawford, was convicted of aggravated assault and failure to comply with a release order following a trial.

The sentencing decision considered the primary principles of denunciation, general and specific deterrence, and rehabilitation.

The court noted the unprovoked nature of the knife attack, which resulted in serious injury, but also gave significant weight to the defendant's genuine and successful efforts towards rehabilitation since the offence, including stable employment and distancing himself from past criminal associations.

After reviewing comparable sentencing jurisprudence for aggravated assault, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 3 years and 3 months, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

The Crown applied to have the offender declared a dangerous offender following convictions for aggravated assault and other violent offences.

The court found the offender met the criteria for dangerous offender designation, including a high likelihood of harmful recidivism and intractable violent conduct, despite the offender's claims of willingness to engage in treatment.

However, the court declined to impose an indeterminate sentence, opting instead for a lengthy determinate sentence of 14 years (minus pre-trial custody) followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order, finding that external controls and potential future treatment could adequately manage the risk to public safety.

Michael Haughton, 47, sought a second bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, citing the availability of electronic monitoring as a material change in circumstances.

This followed a previous dismissal of his bail application where the Crown met its onus on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found electronic monitoring to be a material change but ultimately dismissed the application, concluding that the proposed release plan, even with electronic monitoring, was insufficient to address the substantial likelihood of re-offending due to Haughton's extensive criminal record, history of non-compliance, and severe crack cocaine addiction.

The court also found that confidence in the administration of justice would be seriously eroded by his release.

Michael Haughton, charged with numerous break and enter offences and breaches of court orders, sought a bail review based on a material change in circumstances, including delays due to COVID-19 and his asthma.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found the Crown's case strong and the proposed surety plan inadequate.

Despite the increased risk of COVID-19 in custody and the applicant's asthma, the court determined that the risk to public safety and the need to maintain confidence in the administration of justice outweighed these concerns, dismissing the bail review application.

B.L.P. pleaded guilty to aggravated assault.

A Gardiner hearing was held to determine aggravating facts for sentencing, specifically whether a knife was used during the assault on the complainant, A.W. The court assessed conflicting testimonies from the complainant and the accused, along with physical evidence.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and the accused's inconsistent, concluding that the aggravating facts, including the use of a knife, were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with two counts of assault and one count of threatening death against his estranged wife.

The Crown's case rested entirely on the complainant's testimony regarding two incidents approximately two weeks apart.

The accused testified in his own defence, denying the allegations and providing an alternative account of events.

The court found that the complainant's evidence was largely uncorroborated, while the accused's version received some corroboration from a defence witness.

After careful consideration of credibility and the totality of evidence, the court determined that the Crown had failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

The accused, M.B., was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against C.S., then age 15.

The case proceeded as a blended lost evidence application and trial.

The defence sought a stay of proceedings due to missing audio from the complainant's police interview, alleging a Charter breach.

The court found unacceptable negligence by the police but no abuse of process or irreparable prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence, thus denying the stay.

On the merits of the trial, the court found the complainant's credibility highly problematic, particularly regarding a second alleged incident which was found to be fabricated.

The court also considered the defence of mistake of age for the first incident, finding that the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove M.B.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all four counts, and M.B. was acquitted.

The accused, M.B., applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) and s. 24(1) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay in commencing and completing trial.

Applying the R. v. Jordan framework, the court calculated the total delay and deducted defence-attributable delay, finding a net non-defence delay of 27 months and 6 days, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The court determined that the defence did not demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite the proceedings and that the case did not take "markedly longer" than reasonable, considering local circumstances and Crown efforts.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving his spouse's 12-year-old niece, JW.

The incident occurred during a family visit, where JW alleged the defendant lightly touched her breast and she later observed him making "jerking movements" in his groin area.

The defendant testified he was attempting to wake JW to move her from an uncomfortable sleeping arrangement and denied any intentional sexual touching, suggesting the breast contact was accidental while reaching for her shoulder.

The court applied the R v W(D) test for conflicting evidence and the R v Chase factors for sexual assault.

The judge found both witnesses credible but concluded that the touching was likely accidental and lacked sexual connotation or aggression.

The Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant was acquitted.

The accused challenged the validity of a search warrant executed at their residence on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 7, and 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Information to Obtain (ITO) was heavily redacted to protect informer privilege.

The court applied the Garofoli step six procedure to determine whether a judicial summary of the redacted portions was sufficient to allow the accused to challenge the warrant.

The court found no Charter breaches and dismissed the application, holding that the ITO contained sufficient reasonable grounds for the search warrant and that the judicial summary adequately protected the accused's right to make full answer and defence while preserving informer privilege.

The offender was found guilty of second degree murder after shooting an unarmed victim in the back as he fled a house party.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 15 to 17 years, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.

The court found the use of a loaded firearm and shooting a fleeing victim to be significant aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused was tried on charges arising from a residential break and enter proved entirely by circumstantial evidence.

The court held that the surveillance evidence, tracking data, association with co-actors, counter-surveillance driving, and video evidence placing the accused at the refuge location shortly after the offence established that he was the fourth participant in the Mazda used during the offence.

Applying the rule that guilt must be the only reasonable inference on circumstantial evidence, the court rejected alternative explanations.

The accused was found guilty of break, enter and theft, and of possession of property obtained by crime on a theory of joint possession.

The applicant sought a stay of robbery-related charges on the basis that the anticipated 30-month period from charge to trial breached s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Morin framework, the court found that 14.2 months of delay was institutional, 10.8 months was inherent, 4.25 months was attributable to the Crown, and 0.75 months was attributable to the defence.

The court rejected most claims of actual prejudice, inferred only modest prejudice from the overall delay, and gave weight to the seriousness of the armed robbery charge.

Balancing all factors, the court held the applicant had been brought to trial within a reasonable time and dismissed the stay application.

In a second‑degree murder prosecution, the accused brought a motion to exclude proposed in‑dock identification evidence from a Crown witness.

The witness first identified the accused approximately ten and a half months after the homicide during testimony at another individual’s preliminary inquiry, after seeing the accused’s photograph in media reports following his arrest.

The identification arose through leading questions and occurred in circumstances suggesting contamination and suggestion.

The court held that the identification did not qualify as reliable recognition evidence and had no meaningful probative value while posing a substantial risk of prejudice.

Exercising its discretion, the court excluded the evidence from the jury.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired by alcohol and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown presented evidence from a civilian witness, a police constable, and a breath technician showing signs of impairment and breath readings of 190 and 180 milligrams.

The accused testified that he had consumed only two beers before driving and consumed a 13-ounce bottle of vodka after arriving at the Home Depot parking lot.

The court found credible evidence supporting the post-driving consumption of alcohol and, considering all evidence together, harboured a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired at the time of driving.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The offender was convicted after trial as a party to robbery while armed with a handgun contrary to s. 344 of the Criminal Code.

The court considered the mandatory minimum sentence, parity with co‑accused, and whether the sentence should run concurrently or consecutively to an existing sentence for a separate robbery.

The court held that the minimum sentence was five years because the Crown had not provided notice under s. 727 to rely on a prior conviction for enhanced punishment.

Applying parity with co‑offenders and the totality principle, the court concluded a concurrent sentence was appropriate.

A six‑year custodial sentence was imposed, concurrent with an existing sentence, resulting in an effective total sentence of approximately eight years and four months.