Donna Anne Wowk

Following a decision on cross-motions regarding spousal support, property sale, and disclosure, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The applicant was largely successful on the main issue of spousal support, while the respondent had partial success on his motion.

The court found that neither party's offer to settle engaged the costs consequences of Rule 18(14) of the Family Law Rules.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court reduced the applicant's claimed costs and awarded her partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,765.

This interim motion addressed parental alienation in a custody dispute involving two children.

The court found clear evidence that the children had been alienated from the respondent mother through the combined efforts of the applicant father and Caroline Hay, a former nanny with a close bond to the children.

The court emphasized the need for immediate action in parental alienation cases.

It ordered the parties and children to forthwith attend reintegration therapy with Andrea Barclay, with costs shared, and prohibited Caroline Hay from having any contact with the children.

The court rejected the applicant's proposal to continue therapy with Melissa Healy, finding her approach to reintegration inappropriate.

A judicial review was scheduled to determine the necessity of a s.30 assessment and a residential schedule after the therapy report.

The applicant brought a motion seeking reimbursement for s. 7 expenses, further advances, and orders regarding a child's treatment and custody.

The respondent had a history of non-compliance with s. 7 expense orders, including failing to pay tuition, which caused a crisis for one child.

The court ordered the respondent to immediately reimburse the applicant for a specific university tuition payment.

The remaining s. 7 claims and the motions concerning the child's custody and treatment were adjourned, with the court noting the respondent's lack of collaboration and late disclosure as contributing factors to the ongoing issues and delays.

Directions for cost submissions were also provided, with the court highlighting the respondent's conduct.

The moving party husband sought leave to appeal an order restraining him from depleting assets, requiring a certificate of pending litigation, and ordering him to post a $4 million letter of credit under sections 12 and 40 of the Family Law Act.

He also sought a stay of the order.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal solely on the issue of whether the court has jurisdiction under the Family Law Act to order the posting of a bond or letter of credit, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of that specific relief.

The court also granted a stay of the requirement to post the letter of credit pending the appeal.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a motion brought by the Applicant under sections 12 and 40 of the Family Law Act.

The court found that success on the underlying motion was divided, with the Applicant securing significant asset preservation orders while the Respondent successfully resisted broader relief.

The Respondent's prior unreasonable conduct justified the Applicant's motion, but both parties acted reasonably during the motion itself and in their settlement efforts.

Considering these factors, the court awarded the Applicant full disbursements and approximately 50% of her legal fees.

The applicant sought interim orders under sections 12 and 40 of the Family Law Act to restrain the respondent from dissipating assets, alleging depletion of capital that would impair her equalization and retroactive support claims.

The respondent opposed, arguing the applicant failed to meet the burden of proof and the relief sought was excessive.

The court found that while reckless depletion was not proven, there was a real risk the applicant would be unable to collect on a significant judgment due to the respondent's financial arrangements and delays.

The court granted a more tailored interim order, preserving specific assets, requiring the registration of a certificate of pending litigation against a cottage, and mandating a $4 million bond or letter of credit, while allowing the respondent to conduct ordinary course business with reporting requirements.

The respondent in a family law proceeding brought a motion to adjourn the trial scheduled for January 2016 to April or May 2016.

The moving party argued that an adjournment was necessary due to outstanding expert reports, incomplete questioning, and a pending section 30 assessment report.

The responding party opposed the motion, citing prejudice and the moving party's failure to comply with previous timetables.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party had twice consented to trial dates and failed to comply with the associated timetables, and that further delay would prejudice the responding party and the parties' child.

The mother appealed a 2011 order finding her in contempt and a 2013 order reversing custody of the parties' three children to the father and limiting her access.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

The contempt finding was set aside because the interim orders allegedly breached had been superseded by Minutes of Settlement.

The court found the trial judge erred in relying on the Child and Family Services Act and parens patriae jurisdiction, but upheld the decision to reverse custody based on the trial judge's finding of emotional abuse by the mother.

However, the court found the trial judge erred by not setting a fixed timeframe for an access review.

The court ordered a review of access arrangements and increased the mother's access in the interim.

Costs payable by the mother for the proceedings below were reduced from $400,000 to $200,000.

The children's aid society appealed the dismissal of its child protection application regarding three children.

The respondent father brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing there were no current protection concerns.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the appeal lacked merit and that, in the absence of any evidence of existing child protection concerns, proceeding with the appeal would be contrary to the best interests of the children and the administration of justice.

On a family law motion in the Court of Appeal, the appellant sought appointment of the Children’s Lawyer to represent three children on a custody appeal and to potentially obtain further expert assessment evidence.

The court held that the appeal would focus on whether the trial judge erred in transferring custody, a determination entitled to significant appellate deference, and that introducing further investigation at the appellate stage risked distorting the appeal process.

The court found that the children had already been the subject of extensive professional intervention and that any involvement by the Children’s Lawyer would likely cause delay and further polarization.

The motion was dismissed, with costs fixed in favour of the respondent.

The applicant brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support retroactive to the parties’ separation.

The court found that the respondent’s true income for support purposes could not be determined with certainty due to incomplete disclosure and competing assumptions in expert financial analysis.

Pending further disclosure, questioning, and expert reports, the court made an interim determination using the respondent’s expert’s income estimate of $1,050,703.

Temporary child support of $12,500 per month and spousal support of $26,000 per month were ordered, along with ongoing payment of certain family expenses.

The support orders were expressly subject to reconsideration once full financial disclosure and expert evidence were completed.

The applicant wife sought interim spousal support, and the respondent husband moved to set aside an ex parte preservation order.

The parties were married in Iran, and the husband sponsored the wife to Canada.

The wife alleged the husband attempted to trap her in Iran to avoid paying a $540,000 Meher agreement and equalization.

The court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the Meher and equalization, and that the wife would suffer irreparable harm if the husband divested his assets.

The preservation order was continued with a minor variation.

The court also imputed an income of $200,000 to the husband based on his lifestyle and family financial support, ordering him to pay interim spousal support yielding $3,250 net monthly.

The applicant mother, who had sole custody of the child, sought to relocate to New Jersey to live with her new husband.

The respondent father opposed the move and sought custody.

The court applied the Gordon v. Goertz framework and found that the move was in the child's best interests, noting the mother's role as primary caregiver and the bona fide nature of the relocation.

The court permitted the move, varied the access schedule to provide the father with less frequent but longer visits, and ordered the father to pay child support arrears and ongoing support without imputing income to the mother for her temporary leave of absence.

The moving party mother sought an order extending the time to file a notice of appeal from a final order granting Crown wardship of her two children to the children's aid society.

The mother had been deported to the United States but had secretly resided in Canada during the proceedings, deliberately avoiding participation.

The court applied the test for extending time to appeal and found no bona fide intention to appeal, no merit to the proposed appeal, and significant prejudice to the children's need for permanency.

The motion to extend time was dismissed.

The applicant Children's Aid Society sought leave to appeal a costs order requiring it to pay the respondent stepfather's costs on a full recovery basis in a child protection and status review proceeding.

The motion judge granted leave to appeal, finding reason to believe the costs judge misapprehended facts regarding whether the Society withheld expert reports from the respondent, and erred in principle by treating a status review application as an extension of a protection application for costs purposes.

The appellants appealed an order declining jurisdiction on judicial review and habeas corpus regarding a child apprehension.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the applications judge properly declined jurisdiction because an effective alternative remedy existed in the ongoing proceedings before the Ontario Court of Justice.

The court also noted that no appeal lies from a refusal to grant leave under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, and that habeas corpus was unavailable as the child was detained under valid court orders.

Following the dismissal of an appeal regarding a child protection application, the court considered written submissions on costs.

The court set aside the application judge's costs order against the foster parents, finding they were motivated by the children's best interests rather than self-interest.

The court noted it is not the norm to award costs against unsuccessful applicants in child protection cases.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs for both the application and the appeal.

The appellants, foster parents of three young siblings, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing their application for an order granting them residence of the children pending the final determination of child protection proceedings.

The children had been apprehended over two years prior, but no protection finding had yet been made.

The foster parents argued that the inordinate delay created a gap in the Child and Family Services Act, justifying the Superior Court's exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay did not bring the matter outside the ambit of the legislation, and that the Ontario Court of Justice retained jurisdiction to determine the children's best interests, including the impact of the delay and their attachments to the foster parents.