Donald G. Cormack

The applicant applied for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

After failing to attend a scheduled pre-hearing discussion without excuse, the applicant's counsel successfully moved to be removed from the record.

The applicant again failed to attend the resumed pre-hearing discussion.

The insurer brought a motion to dismiss the application as abandoned and an abuse of process.

The arbitrator granted the motion, finding that permitting the matter to proceed would constitute an abuse of process, and ordered the applicant to pay $750 in expenses to the insurer.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued the tortfeasors, their insurer, and her own insurer under an OPCF 44R endorsement.

The tortfeasors' insurer took an off-coverage position and settled with the appellant for the $200,000 statutory minimum.

The appellant's insurer successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the tortfeasors' policy limits were never legally reduced and the release barred the action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an insurer's off-coverage position and settlement do not reduce liability limits 'by operation of law' without a legal determination.

However, the appellant's action against her own insurer could proceed, wherein she would bear the burden of proving the tortfeasors' policy breach.

The applicant sought expenses for an arbitration proceeding regarding statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer did not seek expenses.

The arbitrator reviewed the criteria under section 12 of Ontario Regulation 664.

Although the applicant achieved significant financial success and made a settlement offer lower than the final award, the arbitrator found the proceeding was unnecessary.

The applicant had failed to produce highly probative evidence regarding his employment history until shortly before or during the hearing, despite the insurer's requests six years prior.

Consequently, the arbitrator ordered that each party bear their own expenses.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident shortly after immigrating to Canada.

He applied for income replacement benefits, relying on a written job offer from his brother's trucking company to establish a legitimate contract of employment under section 4(3) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the applicant lacked the English skills and licensing to perform the job.

The arbitrator found the contract was legitimate, as the parties reasonably intended for the applicant to learn English and obtain his licenses while working.

The arbitrator awarded income replacement benefits, subject to deductions for post-accident income earned from delivering pizzas, and mandatory interest on overdue payments.

The claim for a special award was dismissed because the insurer's delay was due to the applicant's late production of necessary documentation.

The insured struck a pedestrian in a strip mall parking lot while driving alone, contrary to her G1 licence conditions.

She pleaded guilty to Highway Traffic Act offences.

Her insurer denied coverage, arguing she was not 'authorized by law' to drive under Statutory Condition 4(1).

The Court of Appeal held that the guilty pleas did not create issue estoppel in the civil action due to the minor stakes of the traffic tickets compared to the civil suit.

Furthermore, the parking lot was not a 'highway' under the Highway Traffic Act, meaning the graduated licensing restrictions did not apply at the time of the accident.

The insurer was ordered to defend and indemnify the insured.

The infant plaintiff was severely injured when a fence on the appellant's premises fell on him.

A jury awarded approximately $3 million in damages, apportioning liability 95% to the appellant and 5% to the fence installer.

The appellant appealed the apportionment, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a statement from a deceased employee of the installer and failing to caution the jury on its use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, as the jury's reasons for liability focused on the appellant's failure to rectify the fence after it had fallen on three prior occasions, without relying on the disputed statement.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for income replacement benefits (IRBs).

The insurer denied the claim on multiple occasions, but the applicant did not apply for mediation until more than two years after the latest refusal.

The insurer argued the claim was statute-barred under s. 281(5) of the Insurance Act.

The Arbitrator found that none of the insurer's refusals were valid because they either failed to provide adequate reasons, failed to fully explain the dispute resolution process, or were equivocal.

Because a valid refusal was never given, the limitation period was not triggered, and the applicant was not precluded from proceeding to arbitration.

Following an arbitration hearing where the applicant was unsuccessful in claiming statutory accident benefits, the insurer sought its expenses of $13,330.90.

The arbitrator considered the criteria under the Expense Regulation, particularly whether a novel issue was raised.

Although the factual underpinnings of the novel issue were ultimately lacking, the arbitrator found that the applicant proceeded to arbitration primarily to resolve a novel issue regarding the calculation of income replacement benefits based on a full-time job and a job offer.

The arbitrator concluded that the proceeding was not frivolous or vexatious and declined to award expenses to the insurer.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for statutory accident benefits, including income replacement, medical, and housekeeping benefits.

The insurer denied the claims.

At arbitration, the arbitrator found the applicant's testimony regarding his employment and job offers to be inconsistent and not credible, dismissing the claim for income replacement benefits.

The housekeeping claim was dismissed as it fell outside the two-year limitation period and lacked credible evidence.

The medical benefits claim for a work hardening program was dismissed based on the persuasive testimony of the insurer's expert chiropractor, who concluded the treatment was not reasonable or necessary.

All claims were dismissed.

The insurer brought a motion to compel the applicant to comply with undertakings given at a pre-hearing and to produce requested documents.

The arbitrator found that the applicant's counsel failed to comply with specific undertakings and failed to make best efforts to respond to production requests.

The arbitrator ordered compliance and production of most requested documents.

The arbitrator declined to suspend interest on overdue benefits, finding no statutory authority to do so.

Due to the unreasonable delay and default by the applicant's counsel, the arbitrator ordered the counsel to personally pay the insurer's expenses of the motion, fixed at $350.

The appellant, a motor vehicle lessor, was sued after an accident involving its leased vehicle driven by an excluded driver.

The respondent insurer denied coverage based on an OPCF 28A Excluded Driver Endorsement signed by the lessees.

The insurer had provided the appellant with a certificate of insurance noting the endorsement but failed to deliver a copy of the endorsement itself.

The Court of Appeal held that under section 232(3) of the Insurance Act, an insurer must deliver a copy of every endorsement to the insured.

The insurer's failure to do so precluded it from relying on the endorsement, triggering its duty to defend and indemnify the appellant.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a trial judge's decision not to award him costs after successfully defending a motor vehicle accident claim.

The jury found the defendant liable but awarded only $3,000 in damages, and the trial judge subsequently dismissed the action on a threshold motion.

The trial judge declined to award costs to the successful defendant, citing the plaintiff's difficult circumstances, the complexity of the medical history, and the fact that the plaintiff had established liability and some injury.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding that the trial judge did not exercise his discretion based on a misapprehension of facts or an erroneous principle of law.

The plaintiff suffered permanent vestibular toxicity after being treated with the antibiotic Gentamicin for a severe sinus infection.

At trial, the otolaryngologist was found liable for failing to properly monitor for ototoxicity and failing to emphasize the need for ongoing vigilance regarding symptoms.

The trial judge also granted a non-suit dismissing the action against the home care nurses (VON).

On appeal, the Court of Appeal overturned the finding of liability against the doctor, concluding there was no evidence that the two-to-three-day delay in discontinuing the medication caused the plaintiff's injuries.

The Court also rejected an alternative argument based on lack of informed consent, finding that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have continued the medication.

The appeal against the VON was dismissed as no expert evidence established the standard of care for home care nurses.

The minor appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Quebec while a resident of Ontario.

The appellants sued the at-fault driver and their own insurer under the uninsured motorist coverage of their Ontario automobile policy.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against the insurer, finding that Quebec's no-fault legislation applied and barred the tort claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under the lex loci delicti rule, Quebec substantive law applied.

Because Quebec's no-fault regime precluded any tort claim against the driver, the appellants were not 'legally entitled to recover' damages from her, which is a precondition for accessing uninsured motorist coverage under s. 265(1) of the Insurance Act.

The applicant was struck by an uninsured vehicle while walking across a street.

She applied for statutory accident benefits from Wawanesa, which insured the driver of the vehicle on another policy.

Wawanesa returned the application, claiming it was not an insurer because the driver had cancelled her liability coverage days before the accident.

The arbitrator held that Wawanesa, having initially advised the applicant's counsel that the driver was insured, created a sufficient nexus to be considered an insurer.

As the first insurer to receive the application, Wawanesa was required under O. Reg. 283/95 to respond to the application and pay benefits pending any priority dispute.

The defendants appealed a costs award in a motor vehicle action where the jury awarded the plaintiff $20,000.

The trial judge found that the defendants' offer to settle was unenforceable and that section 267.5(9) of the Insurance Act required the statutory deductible to be ignored when considering the cost consequences of an offer to settle under Rule 49.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal because the offer was indeed unenforceable, but clarified that section 267.5(9) does not apply to Rule 49 offers to settle, as doing so would undermine the purpose of the offer to settle rule.

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's order allowing the insured's paralegal to withdraw and permitting the insured to withdraw the arbitration without paying the insurer's costs.

The arbitration involved a claim for a functional assessment initiated by the assessment facility.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding that the arbitrator had the authority to deem the arbitration abandoned and impose terms.

The Delegate confirmed that arbitrators lack statutory authority to order costs against a representative and that it was fair not to order costs against the faultless insured.

Following a preliminary issue hearing where the insurer successfully argued that the applicant was bound by a prior agreement regarding her pre-accident earning capacity, both parties sought their expenses.

The arbitrator found that the insurer was the successful party and was entitled to expenses.

The insurer argued that the applicant's law firm should personally pay the expenses due to an alleged abuse of process and conflict of interest.

The arbitrator held that while the tribunal has jurisdiction under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act to sanction non-parties for egregious abuse of process, the evidence did not establish gross negligence or dereliction of duty by the law firm.

The insurer's expenses were fixed at $500, payable by the applicant, due to the insurer submitting an outrageous and unsubstantiated bill of costs on the eve of the hearing.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received statutory accident benefits.

A previous arbitration dealt with her loss of earning capacity (LEC) benefit, during which her counsel agreed to a specific pre-accident earning capacity (PEC) amount.

Three years later, the applicant sought to challenge the PEC calculation again following a mandatory review under section 33 of the Schedule.

The insurer raised preliminary issues of limitation periods, issue estoppel, and jurisdiction.

The arbitrator found that while the limitation period had not expired and the Commission had jurisdiction, the applicant was bound by her counsel's previous agreement on the PEC amount.

The arbitrator held that section 33 does not automatically reopen the PEC calculation and that the applicant was estopped from relitigating the issue.

The appellants' properties were damaged by a gas explosion caused by the intentional criminal act (arson) of the defendant David Gordon.

The respondent insurer denied coverage to both David Gordon and his wife, Dora Gordon, under a homeowner's policy exclusion for damage caused by the criminal act of 'any person insured by this policy'.

The appellants opposed the insurer's summary judgment motion to protect their potential rights of recovery.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that the clear and unambiguous language of the exclusion clause bound the innocent co-insured to the misconduct of her spouse, thereby excluding coverage for both defendants.