23 total
Accused's statement to police excluded under s. 24(2) due to breach of right to counsel upon arrest.
The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude a videotaped statement made to police, arguing it was involuntary and obtained in breach of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.
The court found the statement was voluntary, as there were no threats, inducements, or oppressive circumstances.
However, the court held that the police breached the accused's s. 10(b) rights by failing to provide him with an immediate opportunity to consult counsel upon arrest, despite facilities being available.
Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's rights.
The statement was excluded.
Prior rulings after mistrial set aside due to reasonable apprehension of bias.
The Crown sought to prevent the accused from re‑litigating two pre‑trial rulings made during an earlier jury trial that ended in a mistrial after the trial judge recused himself for a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from a personal tax dispute with the Canada Revenue Agency.
The Crown relied on s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code, which presumes that evidentiary and Charter rulings from a mistrial remain binding at a new trial unless the interests of justice require otherwise.
The court held that although the provision creates a presumption favouring preservation of prior rulings, the circumstances of the recusal and the trial judge’s own comments suggesting that earlier rulings might appear influenced by the conflict undermined confidence in those decisions.
Given that concern, the interests of justice required that the impugned motions be re‑litigated before the new trial judge.
The Crown’s application to bind the parties to the earlier rulings was dismissed.
Section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay dismissed due to case complexity and accused's waiver.
The applicant, charged with tax fraud, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.
The total time from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of the trial was approximately 85 months.
The court applied the Morin framework and found that the delay was not unreasonable given the extreme complexity of the case, the voluminous electronic disclosure, the involvement of multiple co-accused, and the applicant's waiver of earlier trial dates to retain her preferred counsel.
The application was dismissed.