Denise Bellamy

The plaintiff, an elderly man, was severely beaten by individuals on a union picket line.

He sued the defendants in their personal capacity and, after the two-year limitation period expired, sought a Representation Order under Rule 12.07 to bind all union members.

The motions judge granted the order based on the common law 'special circumstances' doctrine.

However, subsequent Court of Appeal decisions eliminated this doctrine.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that a Representation Order effectively adds new parties to the action.

Consequently, the expiration of the limitation period was fatal to the application, and the appeal was allowed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing his complaint of an unlawful reprisal under s. 50 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, as well as several subsequent reconsideration decisions.

The application was brought nearly six years after the initial decision.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review post-Dunsmuir and found the Board's decisions eminently reasonable.

The Court also held that the Board's refusal to grant the self-represented applicant an adjournment on the day of the hearing was a reasonable exercise of its discretion.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claims for funeral expenses and nervous shock following the murder of her son.

The Board had denied the claims under s. 17(1) of the Compensation for Victims of Crime Act, finding the son's death was a direct result of his involvement in illegal drug transactions.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board erred in law by failing to undertake a proportionality analysis between the victim's alleged conduct and the offenders' criminal conduct.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted Board for rehearing.

The defendants in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident brought a motion to bifurcate the jury trial to determine liability before damages.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no jurisdiction to bifurcate a trial with a valid jury notice.

On appeal, the order was set aside, with the appeal judge finding jurisdiction and ordering bifurcation.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a court lacks jurisdiction to bifurcate a trial with an extant jury notice if any party objects.

The court further held that even if jurisdiction existed, the test for bifurcation requires demonstrating an exceptional case, not merely a clear benefit in time and expense.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of an arbitration award that reinstated a teacher who had been terminated for professional misconduct involving special needs students.

The arbitration board found the teacher's conduct warranted a significant disciplinary response but not termination, effectively imposing a four-and-a-half-year suspension without pay.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator's decision to give the teacher a second chance fell within a range of reasonable outcomes and was supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed a decision approving the passing of accounts by the respondent, his brother and the estate trustee of their late father's estate.

The appellant argued that the application judge erred by not ordering a trial of an issue regarding a forgiven promissory note and the respondent's claim for compensation under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge had ample evidence to conclude a trial was unnecessary and made no error in principle in approving the compensation.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board denying her claim for nervous shock after witnessing her brother's death.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for questions of law is correctness.

The Court found that the Board applied the correct standard of proof and properly concluded that there was insufficient medical evidence to establish a recognizable psychiatric or psychosomatic condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the respondents' complete success on an appeal and cross-appeal, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs for the appeal, cross-appeal, and the underlying application.

However, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs for three related motions, noting the applicants had made unfounded and speculative allegations of wrongdoing, unnecessarily complicating the proceedings.

The court fixed the total costs payable by the applicants to the respondents at $125,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The applicant, a manager of a hazardous waste facility, sought judicial review of a justice of the peace's order compelling him to submit to an interview and produce documents under s. 163.1(2) of the Environmental Protection Act.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the order, finding that the statutory provision authorizes investigators to use devices and techniques but does not explicitly confer the power to compel third parties to answer questions or produce documents.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) sought judicial review of an Assessment Review Board decision that directed MPAC to bring a complaint to correct palpable errors in the assessment roll for two severed parcels.

The Board limited the complaint to apportioning the existing $773,000 assessment between the parcels, precluding MPAC from seeking an increased current value assessment of $1,650,000 due to MPAC's delay and resulting prejudice to the taxpayer.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board correctly and reasonably exercised its discretion under section 40.1(b) of the Assessment Act.

The appellant franchisor appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding it vicariously liable for a fire that occurred at a franchisee's location and caused smoke damage to the respondent's neighbouring business.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by characterizing the franchisee as an employee rather than an independent contractor.

The court further held that the trial judge erred by inferring the franchisee's negligence solely from its failure to attend the trial, as there was no evidence as to the cause of the fire.

The action against the franchisor was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board terminating his tenancy unless he paid certain arrears and fees.

Prior to the hearing, the appellant paid the required sum of $6,880.11 and remained in the rental unit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as moot and awarded costs of $750 to the respondent.

Following the dissolution of the law firm representing the plaintiff in a proposed class proceeding, the plaintiff served a Notice of Change of Solicitors to appoint a new firm formed by some of the former partners.

The appellant, a firm formed by another former partner who had been the supervising lawyer, moved to set aside the Notice or replace the representative plaintiff.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff's choice of counsel was adequate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made no error of law and his decision was reasonable.

The appellant appealed an OMB decision regarding an application by the respondent.

After leave to appeal was partially granted, the lake in question was reclassified as under threshold, rendering the appeal moot.

The respondent subsequently withdrew her application before the OMB.

The parties sought costs for the leave motion, perfection of the appeal, and the appearance.

The Divisional Court ordered no costs, finding that the appeal became moot through external circumstances and no fault of the respondents.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Master Dash on the issue of costs only.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, finding that the Master erred in exercising his discretion with respect to costs against the plaintiffs.

The court noted that a relevant precedent with virtually identical facts had not been brought to the Master's attention.

Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision of the lower court.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for security for costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, no reason to doubt the correctness of the lower court's decision, and that the proposed appeal did not raise matters of general importance due to the exceptional factual circumstances of the case.

The court also dismissed the defendants' motion for security for costs, as there was no good reason to believe the plaintiff's action was frivolous and vexatious.

Given the mixed results, no costs were awarded.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay.

The court found that the appellant met the test to restore the appeal, noting she maintained a firm intention to appeal, provided a reasonable explanation for the delay due to a mistake at the Registrar's office, and raised serious issues.

The motion was granted, the appeal was restored, and the appellant was ordered to perfect the appeal by a specified date.

No costs were awarded.

The defendants brought an unopposed motion for leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for summary judgment in a class action.

The underlying issue was whether an administration fee charged for late payments constituted 'interest' under s. 347 of the Criminal Code.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and noting the importance of the issue for suppliers generally.

The appeal will be heard alongside the defendants' appeal as of right from the order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision granting summary judgment in favour of the co-defendants in an action arising from a 2001 motor vehicle accident.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of review from Housen v. Nikolaisen, finding that the Master made no palpable and overriding error of fact and was correct in his application of the law.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding co-defendants.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order of Justice Wilton-Siegel regarding an Anton Piller order.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which properly applied the test from Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition.

The court also found that the appeal did not raise matters of general importance, as the issues were essentially factual and lacked jurisprudential value.

Costs of $7,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs.