Delmar Doucette

The accused was charged with concealing the dead body of a child.

The trial judge found that the words 'died before . . . birth' in the Criminal Code were unconstitutionally vague and severed the word 'before', leading to the accused's acquittal.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the provision is not unconstitutionally vague when interpreted using the common law 'chance of life' standard, which provides fair notice and limits law enforcement discretion.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge made several errors in her jury instructions.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant killed the victim during a sexual assault, relying on forensic evidence and the appellant's post-offence conduct.

The defence argued the sexual intercourse was consensual and pointed to an alternate suspect.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to properly set out the defence's position and the evidence supporting it.

Furthermore, the trial judge's instructions on the appellant's post-offence conduct and fabricated statements were flawed, and she failed to instruct the jury on how to use the alternate suspect's post-offence conduct.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice and similar fact evidence of two prior incidents involving the appellant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in admitting the similar fact evidence, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its limited probative value.

The evidence lacked sufficient similarity to the charged offence and posed a significant risk of moral and reasoning prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and uttering threats against two former employees at his restaurant.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to properly consider evidence of collusion and animus among the complainants, and misapprehended evidence regarding the duration of one of the assaults.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the convictions related to the first complainant due to the trial judge's failure to critically analyze the evidence of collusion and animus.

The conviction related to the second complainant was upheld, as the trial judge's misapprehension of the assault's duration did not affect the ultimate finding of lack of consent.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder and detained in a mental health facility, sought an absolute discharge and treatment orders as remedies under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada established a new approach for determining whether an administrative tribunal is a court of competent jurisdiction under s. 24(1).

The Court held that the Ontario Review Board has the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies because it has the authority to decide questions of law.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the specific remedies sought by the appellant—an absolute discharge for a dangerous patient and a treatment order—were expressly precluded by the Board's statutory scheme under the Criminal Code.

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The appellant appealed his four-year sentence for extortion, kidnapping, and related offences, arguing it offended the parity principle when compared to the eight-month conditional sentence received by the ringleader of the enterprise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge committed no error in principle.

The disparity was justified by the ringleader's lack of prior record, guilty plea, and rehabilitation, contrasted with the appellant's extensive criminal record and ongoing danger to society.

The appellant appealed his fraud conviction following a guilty plea entered on the second day of trial, arguing he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

He claimed his trial counsel failed to adduce evidence in a section 8 Charter voir dire, failed to review disclosure, and provided improper advice, rendering his plea involuntary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant failed to meet the high threshold for ineffective assistance of counsel and that the guilty plea was voluntary and unequivocal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault involving two young complainants.

The central issue at trial was credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by treating major contradictions and inconsistencies in the complainants' evidence as merely peripheral details.

By failing to properly scrutinize these inconsistencies, the trial judge's credibility assessment was flawed.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed their convictions for a home invasion, arguing that the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence, specifically the victim's description of the perpetrators' accents and the continuity of a durag found at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on how they could use the victim's statements and fairly reviewed the evidence concerning continuity.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the shooting death of his wife, who had recently left him.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting the deceased's ante mortem statements about her fear of him, in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification and gunshot residue evidence, in restricting cross-examination about third-party suspects, in allowing re-examination of an investigator, and in dismissing a mistrial application for late disclosure.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that the late disclosure did not impair the right to make full answer and defence.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings ordered under s. 11(b) of the Charter in a sexual assault case that took 35.5 months to reach trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the delay was extraordinary for a simple case and was primarily caused by the Crown's desire to join the prosecution with a second charge and institutional delays.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding of prejudice and concluded the delay was unreasonable and unacceptable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 12 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding intoxication, the W. (D.) framework, and the temporal relationship between the actus reus and mens rea under Cooper.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury instructions, noting the trial judge properly focused the jury on the appellant's actual intent and correctly applied the legal frameworks.

The court also upheld the 12-year parole ineligibility period as fit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for committing an indecent act in a public place, breach of recognizance, and breach of probation.

At trial, the complainant testified that the appellant exposed his penis while asking her for directions from his car.

The defence argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, suggesting the complainant had mistaken a wooden key chain for a penis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, noted the lack of evidentiary support for the key chain theory, and reasonably rejected the appellant's testimony.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson and arson with intent to defraud insurers.

He argued the trial judge erred in failing to make a threshold ruling on the admissibility of a witness's evidence regarding a conversation between the appellant and an accomplice, and in his jury instructions regarding the accomplices' prior convictions, guilty pleas, and the Vetrovec warning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of multiple historical sexual and physical assaults against his daughter and stepdaughters, receiving a three-year sentence.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to properly scrutinize recovered memory evidence, shifted the burden of proof, and imposed an unfit sentence given his medical needs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of credibility or application of the burden of proof.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the three-year term was at the low end of the range and the evidence did not establish that correctional authorities could not meet the appellant's medical needs.

The appellant in a first-degree murder appeal brought a motion for leave to file an 86-page factum, exceeding the standard 30-page limit.

The Crown consented on the condition that it could also file an 86-page factum.

The motion judge rejected the proposed 86-page factum as excessively long, noting that the grounds of appeal were not fact-based and did not require a 30-page recitation of facts.

The court emphasized that consent between counsel does not override the court's discretion to enforce page limits.

The appellant was granted leave to file a factum not exceeding 40 pages, while the Crown was restricted to the standard 30 pages.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, attempted murder, and manslaughter as a secondary participant in a multiple shooting committed by a principal offender.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the elements of secondary participation, the use of after-the-fact conduct, and bad character evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the jury instructions on secondary participation in first degree murder and attempted murder were seriously flawed and failed to articulate the essential elements the prosecution had to prove.

A new trial was ordered for the murder and attempted murder counts, and the sentence for the manslaughter conviction was reduced to 12 years.

The amicus curiae appointed to assist the self-represented appellant sought to have his fees taxed pursuant to section 684(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the fees should be paid at the standard Legal Aid rate.

The Deputy Registrar found that the case was complex and difficult, and that the requested rate of $235 per hour was reasonable given counsel's expertise.

The fees were taxed at the requested rate.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder after shooting at an individual who had forcibly entered his home.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's jury instructions regarding self-defence on the attempted murder charge were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the instructions conflated the distinct issues of intent to kill and self-defence, leaving the jury with the incorrect impression that self-defence was irrelevant if intent to kill was proven.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.