Deepshikha Dutt

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion for leave to commence a derivative action under the Business Corporations Act (OBCA) as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as section 255 of the OBCA directs appeals of orders made under the Act to the Divisional Court.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The Ontario Harness Horse Association and Central Ontario Standardbred Association appealed an order of the executive director.

The Ontario Racing Commission panel issued procedural directions for an upcoming hearing, including notifying other industry parties to determine their participation.

The panel also scheduled a motion to quash a subpoena and ordered that the executive director's January 7, 2016 order be stayed until the conclusion of the hearing relating to the SRA funds.

The appellants, whose assets were managed by a court-appointed receiver, were reassessed by the CRA for unpaid taxes arising from shareholder loans.

They sought to sue the receiver for gross negligence in failing to engage in tax planning.

The accounting firm also sought leave to crossclaim against the receiver.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's decision dismissing the actions, finding that leave was required to sue the receiver and that the appellants failed to establish a prima facie case of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

The plaintiffs, shareholders in several real estate corporations, sought leave to commence a derivative action and amended their statement of claim to add new causes of action following the discovery of a multi-million dollar fraud by a co-investor.

The defendants moved to strike the new claims and opposed the derivative action.

The court held that the motion for leave to commence a derivative action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, applying the Supreme Court's reasoning in CIBC v. Green regarding the unavailability of nunc pro tunc orders to circumvent expired limitation periods.

The court also struck the new claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence as statute-barred, but allowed the unjust enrichment and oppression claims to proceed.

Schonfeld Inc., acting as a court-appointed Monitor and Receiver, sought to dismiss an action commenced against it by the monitored parties for alleged failure to engage in tax planning.

The monitored parties commenced the action without obtaining leave of the court and subsequently brought a motion for leave nunc pro tunc.

The court held that leave was required under the terms of the Monitor and Receiver Orders.

The court refused to grant leave nunc pro tunc, finding that the proposed claim lacked foundation because the Receiver's mandate did not include tax planning, and the pleadings failed to establish gross negligence or wilful misconduct as required to overcome the Receiver's discharge and release.

The action and a related crossclaim were dismissed.

The defendant fuel oil distributor was sued after a fuel oil tank it sold leaked, causing property damage.

The defendant brought a third-party action against its insurers seeking a declaration of a duty to defend.

One insurer argued the claim was barred by a one-year contractual limitation period incorporated from statutory fire conditions.

The court held that the fire statutory conditions could not be applied to third-party liability coverage without anomalous consequences, meaning the general two-year statutory limitation period applied and the claim was not barred.

The court found the first insurer had a duty to defend as there was a mere possibility the damage occurred during its policy period.

However, the court dismissed the claims against the other insurers, finding that pollution exclusions and specific policy definitions precluded coverage.

Following a successful application to rectify a will, the court determined the appropriate costs allocation among the parties.

The estate trustee sought costs against two respondents, while one respondent sought costs against the estate or the drafting solicitor.

Applying Rule 58.06 and Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered the successful party principle, settlement offers, the conduct of the parties, and proportionality.

The court concluded that the litigation arose from the testator’s own actions and therefore reasonable costs should be borne by the estate.

Costs were awarded to the estate trustee and one respondent from the estate, while another unsuccessful respondent was denied costs.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a claim arising from a land purchase agreement involving residential development lands in Oshawa.

The plaintiff alleged that the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and related Omnibus Agreement required a post-closing readjustment of the purchase price where the net developable area of the lands was later reduced.

The court held that the contracts did not provide for post-closing adjustments to the purchase price, and that the closing adjustments based on the consultant’s calculation of net developable area were final.

The plaintiff’s later attempt to rely on a recalculation based on modified development constraints was not conducted using the contractual definition of net developable area and was based on the purchaser’s subsequent development choices.

Interpreting the agreements to allow indefinite post-closing adjustments would create commercial uncertainty and absurdity.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim.

The applicant estate trustee sought to rectify the deceased's secondary will, which dealt solely with her house.

Due to a drafting error by the solicitor, the secondary will omitted a residue clause and duplicated bequests made in the primary will, which would have resulted in a partial intestacy benefiting estranged children.

The estranged children opposed the application, arguing the will should be interpreted as written.

The court found that the drafting solicitor made a clerical error that did not reflect the testator's intentions, and ordered the will rectified to include the residue clause and remove the duplicated bequests.