David Winninger

In a child protection proceeding, the applicant society sought summary judgment under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules.

A preliminary issue arose regarding whether courts hearing such motions may exercise the expanded fact‑finding powers available under Rule 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court held that Rule 16 does not confer jurisdiction to weigh evidence, assess credibility, or draw inferences in the same manner as the civil rules because the legislature has not amended the family rules to provide those powers.

The Hryniak “cultural shift” applies only to the extent of interpreting existing jurisdiction broadly, but it does not create new fact‑finding powers absent legislative authorization.

Accordingly, summary judgment motions in family and child protection matters under Rule 16 are limited to determining whether a genuine issue requiring a trial exists based solely on the evidentiary record.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a young child due to severe concerns of medical child abuse (Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy) by the mother.

On a motion for temporary care and access, the parents sought the return of the child to their care and expanded access, while the Society sought directions on access and the distribution of a parenting capacity assessment.

The court found credible and trustworthy evidence of risk of harm and ordered the child to remain in the temporary care of the maternal grandmother.

The court granted a gradual expansion of access, allowing limited unsupervised access for the father, provided the mother is never left alone with the child.

The court also ordered the distribution of the assessment to specific medical and childcare providers.

In a custody and access proceeding, the father brought a motion to transfer the case from London to Brampton after relocating with the children.

The court considered whether the “preponderance of convenience” under s. 21.11(3) of the Courts of Justice Act favoured transferring the matter from the Family Court jurisdiction in London to a court without Family Court jurisdiction.

Although the children had been living with the father in the Toronto area, the court held the application was properly commenced in London due to the ongoing child protection context and the children’s conditional residence tied to the London court’s jurisdiction.

The moving party failed to demonstrate that convenience strongly favoured transfer.

Access to justice concerns, including the respondent’s financial limitations and Legal Aid representation, and the need for timely resolution in the children’s best interests weighed against transfer.

In a custody dispute following separation, both parents sought sole custody of two children, while the mother alternatively sought joint custody and equal time based on an Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) report recommending shared parenting.

The court assessed the best interests of the children under s. 16 of the Divorce Act and considered the significant caregiving role of the paternal grandmother, the parents’ inability to communicate effectively, and the reliability of the OCL report.

The court found the report carried limited weight due to methodological concerns, including joint interviews of the children and failure to interview key collateral contacts.

Given the long-standing status quo in which the children resided primarily with the father and paternal grandmother, and the instability that a major change would cause, the court concluded that sole custody with the father best served the children’s interests.

The mother was granted liberal and structured access and child support obligations were suspended due to her financial circumstances.

This is a child protection trial following the apprehension of two children from their parents' care.

The parties agreed to findings under the Child and Family Services Act based on substandard home conditions and parental conflict.

The central issue was disposition: which parent should have care and control of the children subject to supervision.

The court found that the father had successfully remediated his deficits through parenting programs and consistent implementation of learned strategies, while the mother continued to struggle with attention deficits, anxiety, stress, and decision-making capacity.

The court placed the children in the father's care and control subject to supervision, with specific terms addressing monitoring, computer use, relationship disclosure, and parental counselling.

The appellant husband appealed a trial decision ordering him to pay spousal support of $1,500 per month for five years and thereafter until the respondent wife obtained employment.

The parties had a short relationship of three-and-a-half years with no children.

The Divisional Court upheld the quantum of support, finding no palpable and overriding error, but found the indeterminate duration to be an error in principle given the short marriage.

The appeal was allowed in part to impose a firm termination date for spousal support.