David Finley

The appellant, who suffered from schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations, was arrested on outstanding warrants and subsequently confessed to a murder and several robberies.

He waived his right to counsel multiple times, despite advice from a lawyer to remain silent, claiming voices in his head compelled him to confess.

The trial judge excluded the statements, finding the appellant lacked the capacity to appreciate the consequences of waiving his rights, leading to an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'operating mind' test applies to the confession rule and the waiver of Charter rights, requiring only that the accused have sufficient cognitive capacity to understand what they are saying and that it can be used against them, which the appellant possessed.

The accused was charged with touching a child for a sexual purpose.

At trial, the Crown successfully requested that the 12-year-old complainant testify behind a screen pursuant to s. 486(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated his right to a fair trial under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 486(2.1) does not infringe the Charter, as the use of a screen to protect young complainants facilitates the truth-seeking process without depriving the accused of the ability to cross-examine or the presumption of innocence.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal which set aside his acquittals and substituted convictions for possession of pay television decoders intended to access a telecommunication facility without payment, contrary to s. 327(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal's interpretation of the provision and upholding the substituted convictions.

The appellant, while intoxicated, forced two police officers from his mother's home with a shotgun.

He was acquitted at trial of possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, as the trial judge found no appreciable gap between the possession and the confrontation.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, finding that while the trial judge erred in law regarding the elements of the offence, the Court of Appeal erred in entering a conviction instead of ordering a new trial, as the trial judge had not fully considered the appellant's intoxication defence.