Cronk

The respondent was found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault and other charges.

The Ontario Review Board granted him an absolute discharge, finding he no longer posed a significant risk to public safety.

The hospital appealed, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that the respondent had rapidly decompensated, resumed substance abuse, and become aggressive shortly after his discharge.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it could reasonably have affected the board's decision as it undermined the factual foundation of the absolute discharge.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the board for a rehearing.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, administering a noxious substance, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to her two-year-old son.

At trial, the Crown relied on expert evidence from the Motherisk Program regarding hair testing to prove the child had ingested cocaine over a 14-month period.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh expert evidence challenging the methodology and validity of the hair testing.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it credible and potentially decisive.

The convictions related to cocaine ingestion were quashed and a new trial was ordered, but the order was stayed because the appellant had already served her sentence.

The appeal from the fracture-related convictions was abandoned.

The respondent, a former equity partner of the appellant accounting firm, withdrew from the partnership to join a competitor.

The partnership agreement required a withdrawing partner to pay liquidated damages equal to two times their 'Permanent Capital'.

The appellants argued the permanent capital should be based on the partner's 'Anchor Capital' which included shareholder loans, while the respondent argued it was limited to the $10,000 fixed in his capital account following a capital conversion.

The trial judge agreed with the respondent, fixing liquidated damages at $20,000 and ordering the appellants to repay the respondent's shareholder loan and other entitlements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the partnership agreement, finding no palpable and overriding error, but allowed the appeal in part to set aside a small award for management fees that lacked evidentiary support.

The defendants in a personal injury action appealed a costs award of $578,742.28 following a jury trial where the plaintiffs were awarded $144,013.07 in damages.

The defendants had made an offer to settle for $145,000 plus prejudgment interest.

The Court of Appeal found that while the offer was timely, the defendants failed to prove it exceeded the judgment due to uncertainty regarding the prejudgment interest rate.

However, the Court held that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the offer under Rule 49.13 and by ignoring the vast disparity between the amount claimed ($1.9 million) and the amount recovered.

The costs award was wholly disproportionate and was reduced to $100,000.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of numerous firearms offences after police found loaded firearms in his bedroom.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to a 12-day delay in holding his bail hearing, which violated his s. 11(e) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the residual category of abuse of process and reasonably concluded that the community's interest in seeing the serious charges disposed of on their merits outweighed the need for a stay.

The Court also found that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant possessed the firearms was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellants guaranteed a loan made by the respondent to a retirement residence developer.

When the developer defaulted, the respondent sued the appellants on the guarantee and obtained summary judgment.

On appeal, the appellants argued they were released from liability because the loan terms were materially altered without their consent, specifically by converting the fixed-term loan to a demand loan and entering a forbearance agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge failed to consider the totality of the evidence regarding material alterations and applied the incorrect test for prejudice.

The summary judgment was set aside and the matter referred to trial on the defences of material alteration and laches.

The appellant appealed her conviction on Highway Traffic Act charges.

Due to a misunderstanding with her paralegal, neither attended her trial, which proceeded ex parte.

A subsequent appeal hearing also proceeded in her absence, resulting in a resolution she claimed she did not consent to.

The Court of Appeal found that the apparent unfairness at trial was not cured by the appeal hearing and ordered a new trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

The appellants were convicted of fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud in relation to a high yield investment scam.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert profiling evidence, giving confusing jury instructions on conspiracy, and admitting preliminary inquiry evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the expert evidence was properly admitted and the preliminary inquiry evidence met the statutory requirements.

However, the trial judge erred in his conspiracy instructions by presenting it as an 'all or nothing' proposition and failing to properly explain the Carter stages.

The conspiracy convictions were set aside.

The court also reduced one appellant's restitution order by two-thirds to reflect the shared responsibility of all three co-accused.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment awarding a 20-year employee 22 months' pay in lieu of notice.

The employer argued the motion judge was bound by stare decisis to follow a similar Superior Court decision that awarded 13 months.

The Court of Appeal rejected the stare decisis argument, noting Superior Court decisions are persuasive but not binding on other Superior Court judges.

However, the Court found the 22-month notice period excessive and reduced it to 18 months, less 11 weeks of working notice.

The motion judge's award of substantial indemnity costs was upheld due to the employer's unreasonable conduct on the motion.

The Attorney General appealed the dismissal of an application for civil forfeiture of a residential property under s. 8(1) of the Civil Remedies Act.

The property owner's son had used the property for a marijuana grow operation and drug trafficking.

The application judge dismissed the forfeiture, finding an unexplained six-year delay by the Attorney General.

The Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in his findings on delay and by ignoring the lack of a limitation period under s. 8(5).

However, conducting a fresh analysis, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that forfeiture would clearly not be in the interests of justice because the owner was not complicit, did not profit from the crimes, and had made significant efforts to help his son overcome his drug addiction.

The Attorney General of Ontario appealed the dismissal of its application for a civil forfeiture order regarding a property used for a marijuana grow operation.

The application judge found that the property was an instrument of unlawful activity, but declined to order forfeiture under the 'clearly not in the interests of justice' exception in s. 8(1) of the Civil Remedies Act.

The judge found that during the respondent's criminal proceedings, the federal Crown made representations that led the respondent to reasonably believe his home would not be forfeited if he pled guilty.

The Court of Appeal upheld this finding and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant property owner appealed a forfeiture order made under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001.

The property, a 12-unit apartment building, was the site of extensive drug-related criminal activity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the owner was not a 'responsible owner' because he knew of the criminal activity and failed to take meaningful steps to prevent it.

The Court also agreed that the appellant failed to establish that forfeiture was clearly not in the interests of justice, given that the unlawful activity permeated the entire building.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident in 2002 but did not commence an action until 2011.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred, finding that a reasonable person would have investigated the ongoing back pain and discovered the serious and permanent nature of the injury well before 2009.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's conclusion on discoverability and noting the appellant adduced no evidence of individual characteristics that would have prevented her from discovering the claim earlier.

The self-represented appellant failed to appear for his appeal, which had been adjourned multiple times and made peremptory to him.

He requested a further adjournment by email on the morning of the hearing, claiming he thought it was scheduled for the following day.

The Court of Appeal denied the adjournment, finding it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

After reviewing the filed materials, the Court dismissed the appeal on its merits and awarded $1,000 in costs to the respondents.

Following a major appellate decision regarding the tolling of limitation periods in securities class actions, the successful parties in two of the appeals sought their costs.

The opposing parties argued for reduced costs on the basis of public interest, over-lawyering, and the fact that the court had overruled its own prior jurisprudence.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding the claimed amounts to be fair and reasonable given the complexity and significance of the proceedings.

Costs of $151,250 and $100,000 were awarded to the respective successful parties on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellants attempted to appeal an interlocutory order of the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, noting that it lacked jurisdiction because there is no right of appeal from an interlocutory order of the Divisional Court to the Court of Appeal, with or without leave.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a full indemnity basis due to the contractual terms of the loan and the appellants having prior notice of the jurisdictional issue.

The appellant, a prolific child sex offender diagnosed as a psychopath, appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge conflated risk reduction with risk elimination and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence suggesting psychopaths can be effectively treated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly applied the long-term offender criteria and correctly concluded the appellant's risk could not be safely managed in the community.

The fresh evidence application was also dismissed as it merely offered a concurring opinion to evidence already rejected at trial and lacked sufficient probative value to affect the outcome.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for second degree murder and attempted murder.

The trial judge had ruled that the Crown could not call alibi evidence in reply to the defence's alternate suspect theory, forcing the Crown to call the evidence in-chief and prejudicing its case.

The trial judge also excluded the Crown's expert evidence regarding the type of instrument used to inflict the fatal wound, erroneously concluding it would not assist the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in both rulings, which had a material bearing on the acquittals, and ordered a new trial.

The appellants made a last-minute request to adjourn their appeal in order to retain new counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment with considerable reluctance, viewing it as a significant indulgence.

The appeal was rescheduled peremptorily, and the appellants were ordered to pay $1,000 in costs thrown away.

The court also noted that corporate appellants require leave to act in person under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for breach of contract and breach of warranty regarding a roof installation.

At trial under the simplified procedure, the appellant withdrew its non-suit motion and elected to call no evidence.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's evidence that the roof leaked persistently within the 10-year warranty period and that the appellant failed to correct the problem.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence, causation, limitation period, or damages.