Copeland

The accused, on trial for second-degree murder and attempted murder during the COVID-19 pandemic, brought a motion requesting that civilian witnesses testify without masks so their demeanour could be assessed.

The trial judge applied the framework from R. v. S. (N.) to balance the accused's fair trial rights against the public health interest in limiting virus transmission.

The court held that requiring witnesses to remain masked did not create a serious risk to trial fairness, as demeanour is not determinative of credibility.

The court further noted that testimony by videoconference was a reasonable alternative that accommodated both interests.

The motion was dismissed, and witnesses were directed to remain masked.

Following a successful application regarding the interpretation of a commercial contract for the development of a non-profit cemetery, the applicant sought costs of $45,891.90 on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondent argued that no costs should be awarded or, alternatively, that costs should be capped at $20,000.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments against awarding costs, noting the applicant was wholly successful.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the principle of proportionality, the court fixed the applicant's costs at $35,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant, a non-profit corporation, brought an application to interpret an agreement regarding the development and management of a cemetery for the Sunni Muslim community.

The court found that the agreement granted the applicant the right to set its own price list for its designated phase of the cemetery.

Furthermore, the court held that the Care and Maintenance Fund (CMF) contributions under the Funeral, Burial and Cremation Services Act must be calculated based on the applicant's lower price list, and that certificates of interment rights are to be issued as individual plots are transferred, rather than all at once.

The plaintiff brought an action under the Occupiers' Liability Act after falling on a rubber fingertip mat in the vestibule of the defendant's premises.

The defendant moved for summary judgment.

The court found that the defendant met the standard of care, as the mat was a standard commercial mat, in good repair, and subject to reasonable seasonal and daily inspection protocols.

Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiff's expert evidence and found the plaintiff failed to prove that the mat caused her fall, noting she was wearing high wedge-heeled shoes and the video evidence contradicted her account.

The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment regarding three loan agreements.

The defendant admitted receiving $74,000 but disputed the interest payable, arguing the third agreement consolidated the first two.

The court found the third agreement was a novation that consolidated the loans and provided more time to pay in exchange for additional interest.

Although the short-term interest rate exceeded the criminal interest rate under s. 347 of the Criminal Code, the court exercised its remedial discretion to allow the $19,000 interest to stand, applying standard pre-judgment interest thereafter to avoid a windfall for the defendant.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in an action for breach of contract regarding the assignment of an interest in a sports agency corporation.

The defendant conceded the breach and the amount owing but argued he was not personally liable, asserting he contracted on behalf of his corporation.

The court applied the principle that a party wishing to benefit from the corporate veil must make it clear they are contracting on behalf of a corporation.

Finding the contract unambiguous and signed by the defendant personally, the court held the defendant personally liable and granted judgment for the outstanding balance of USD $927,535.51.

The moving party municipality brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to restrain the responding party from dumping large volumes of fill on its property in contravention of a fill control by-law and a stop work order.

The responding party argued its activities fell under a 'landscaping' exception and that the by-law fees were ultra vires.

The court granted the injunction, finding a serious issue to be tried that the massive volume of fill did not constitute landscaping, presuming irreparable harm to the public interest, and concluding the balance of convenience favoured enforcing the democratically enacted by-law.