Christopher D. Bredt

The Bot Group appealed a declaration that a late bid submitted by Coco Paving for a Ministry of Transportation (MTO) contract was compliant.

Coco's bid was received electronically 28 minutes after the tender closing time, allegedly due to a computer glitch.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge misinterpreted the tender documents.

The Court held that the MTO's tender process strictly precluded the consideration of bids received after the closing time, and no contractual duty of fairness was owed to a non-compliant bidder.

The parties sought resolution of three issues arising from the Court of Appeal's reasons regarding civil contempt sentencing.

The Court directed that the appellants be brought before the trial judge, and remitted the issues of credit for time served and passport retention to the trial judge for determination.

The appellant posted $5,000 as security for costs for an appeal.

Because the appeal was allowed in part, the Court of Appeal amended its previous order to direct that the $5,000 security for costs be released and returned to the appellant.

The appellants, Jay and Christina Chiang, appealed a trial judge's finding that they had not purged their civil contempt by fulfilling undertakings to disclose financial information, as well as the resulting sentences of one year and eight months' imprisonment.

They also appealed the trial judge's decision to quash a Parole Board order granting Jay Chiang parole and to issue a replacement warrant of committal.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of non-compliance and the decisions regarding parole jurisdiction and the replacement warrant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal against sentence, finding that the trial judge was bound by a 2003 consent order that limited the initial period of incarceration for non-compliance to seven days.

The sentences were reduced to seven days each.

The appellant, a Canadian pig producer, appealed an order dismissing its motion for an anti-suit injunction and granting a stay of its Ontario action against a Russian corporation.

The appellant sought to avoid an arbitration clause requiring arbitration in Moscow, alleging the respondent's CEO made death threats against its chief operating officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the injunction issues moot as the arbitration had already occurred.

The court upheld the stay of the Ontario action, concluding the arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass the appellant's related tort claims.

The appellant appealed an order made by the Superior Court of Justice relating to discipline proceedings.

The respondents conceded that they never sought an order relating to proceedings other than the discipline proceedings and related matters.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the order to include a notice requirement for proposed witnesses and striking out one paragraph, but otherwise upholding the order.

Costs of $4,000 were awarded to the appellant, to be set off against outstanding costs orders.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order of Justice Wilton-Siegel regarding an Anton Piller order.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which properly applied the test from Celanese Canada Inc. v. Murray Demolition.

The court also found that the appeal did not raise matters of general importance, as the issues were essentially factual and lacked jurisprudential value.

Costs of $7,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The Canadian Medical Protective Association and the Ontario Medical Association brought applications for judicial review of an Adjudicator's order requiring the disclosure of a 2004 Memorandum of Understanding under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The applicants argued the OMA was not a 'trade union' under the Act and that the agreement contained confidential third-party information exempt from disclosure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, upholding the Adjudicator's broad interpretation of 'trade union' and finding her conclusion that the information was not 'supplied in confidence' to be reasonable.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal upholding the revocation of his real estate license.

The appellant was an undischarged bankrupt who had previously pleaded guilty to misappropriating trust funds in connection with his real estate business.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review to the Tribunal's findings of fact and exercise of discretion.

The Court found no palpable and overriding error, concluding that the penalty of revocation was reasonable and necessary to protect the public.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent landlord leased commercial premises to a corporate tenant within the Brick enterprise.

The lease was subsequently assigned and sublet to other entities within the enterprise.

When the sub-tenant vacated the premises early and stopped paying rent, the landlord sued the parent corporation, arguing it was liable under a Consent and Acknowledgement agreement and the oppression remedy.

The trial judge found liability under the oppression remedy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parent corporation was directly liable to the landlord for the unpaid rent under the terms of the Consent and Acknowledgement agreement, making it unnecessary to rely on the oppression remedy.

The appellant, a lesbian woman, sought to conceive a child using semen from a known gay donor.

She challenged the definition of 'assisted conception' in the Processing and Distribution of Semen for Assisted Conception Regulations, which exempted women using semen from a spouse or sexual partner from rigorous screening requirements.

The appellant argued this violated her equality and liberty rights under ss. 15 and 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the exemption was based on health considerations rather than sexual orientation, as women using a spouse's semen are already exposed to any existing risks.

The court also upheld the exclusion criteria for donors over 40 and men who have had sex with men, concluding they were factually based on health risks and not discriminatory.

The parties appealed the trial judge's costs award in a shareholder oppression and valuation proceeding.

The trial judge had awarded the dissenting shareholders substantial indemnity costs up to the date of a settlement offer, and awarded the corporation partial indemnity costs thereafter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both costs appeals, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion under s. 241(3) of the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The Court also ordered no costs for the main appeals due to divided success.

The minority shareholders of Ford Canada dissented from a squeeze-out transaction and sought fair value for their shares, along with an oppression remedy against Ford Canada and Ford U.S. regarding a transfer pricing system that caused the Canadian subsidiary to lose money over a ten-year period.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the transfer pricing system was oppressive and that the business judgment rule did not protect the directors.

However, the Court reversed the dismissal of the oppression claim against Ford U.S., finding that the parent company's actions were oppressive.

The Court also held that minority shareholders were not entitled to compensation for historical oppression that occurred before they acquired their shares, and that fair value does not include a component for historical oppression.

The trial judge's order directing a reference to a Master to determine shareholdings was set aside.

The appellant, a lesbian, challenged the constitutionality of federal regulations governing semen donation for assisted conception, arguing they discriminated against women using known donors who were not spouses or sexual partners.

Before the application was heard, the appellant successfully self-inseminated and the government amended the regulations, leading the application judge to dismiss the case as moot.

The Court of Appeal upheld the mootness finding and declined to hear the Charter issues as a court of first instance.

However, the Court granted a motion to add another woman in the same situation as a party and remitted her application to the Superior Court for an expedited hearing on the constitutional issues.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that dismissed its application for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The Commissioner had ordered the disclosure of certain records requested by a former client of the Children's Lawyer.

On judicial review, the Commissioner defended her decision on a new ground, arguing the Children's Lawyer was not acting as Crown counsel.

The Children's Lawyer challenged the Commissioner's standing to raise this new argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court properly exercised its discretion under the Judicial Review Procedure Act to grant the Commissioner full standing to ensure a fully informed adjudication.

The moving parties brought a motion to strike or stay the responding party's application for judicial review of a real estate discipline committee decision.

The responding party, a real estate agent, had been penalized by the discipline committee but failed to appeal the decision through the internal appeals process before seeking judicial review.

The court granted the motion and struck the application, applying the general principle of administrative law that alternative remedies must be exhausted before resorting to judicial proceedings.

The applicant, a real estate broker, sought judicial review of a decision by the Discipline Committee of the Real Estate Council of Ontario (RECO) that found him guilty of professional misconduct for advertising properties without consent.

The applicant argued that RECO did not exercise a statutory power of decision and alleged bias in the disciplinary process.

The Divisional Court held that RECO's disciplinary bodies do exercise a statutory power of decision subject to judicial review.

However, the court dismissed the application on the merits, finding no evidence of bias or procedural unfairness, as the applicant was provided full disclosure and a fair opportunity to be heard.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario (CLO) acted as litigation guardian and legal representative for a minor.

When the minor reached the age of majority, she requested her file.

The CLO treated the request under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) and refused to disclose portions of the file, claiming exemptions under s. 19 (Crown counsel litigation privilege) and s. 13 (advice to government).

The Information and Privacy Commissioner ordered disclosure.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Commissioner had standing to participate.

The Court dismissed the application, finding that the CLO is not 'Crown counsel' when acting for a minor and that s. 13 does not apply to advice given for the benefit of a private client.

The CLO's fiduciary duties to the client precluded withholding the file.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Information and Privacy Commissioner's finding that a requested record did not contain 'personal information' under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The appellant argued the Divisional Court erred by requiring 'detailed and convincing evidence' to establish identifiability.

The Court of Appeal agreed that this evidentiary standard was too demanding, but dismissed the appeal, finding the Commissioner's decision was reasonable given the paucity of evidence presented by the Ministry.

The City of Toronto appealed a decision declaring parts of a municipal by-law unconstitutional.

The by-law prohibited anyone at a Collision Reporting Centre from recommending an auto repair shop to motor vehicle owners.

The application judge found this violated the insurers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the by-law's objectives of protecting vulnerable accident victims from business pressures and preserving the impartiality of the centres were pressing and substantial.

The Court found the limitation on commercial expression was minimally impairing and justified under s. 1.