Chris Donovan

The grievor was released from employment during his probationary period for failure to meet the requirements of the position.

The union grieved the release, alleging it was a disguised disciplinary dismissal and discriminatory.

The employer brought a preliminary motion to summarily dismiss the grievance, arguing the union's particulars failed to disclose a prima facie case.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the employer's motion, finding that while the union's particulars were insufficient, summary dismissal was an extraordinary remedy.

The Board held that the employer bears a limited onus to establish the release was valid, and ordered the employer to call its evidence first while directing the union to provide further particulars.

Former union members brought a civil action seeking damages for wrongful dismissal and declarations that their expulsion from union membership was invalid and contrary to the union’s constitution and principles of natural justice.

The international union moved under Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to bar portions of the claim on the basis that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust internal union appeal mechanisms and, alternatively, that a forum selection clause required the dispute to be litigated in the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.

The court held it was not plain and obvious that the plaintiffs were precluded from pursuing the claims without first exhausting internal remedies because the evidentiary record was insufficient to determine whether those remedies were unreasonable, impracticable, or illusory.

The court also held that a forum selection clause does not deprive Ontario courts of jurisdiction simpliciter and that jurisdiction and forum non conveniens issues had not been properly argued.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellant challenged an order dismissing his action as an abuse of process on the basis that it constituted a collateral attack on prior mortgage proceedings.

The Court of Appeal applied the deferential standard governing appellate review of discretionary process-control orders and held that no misdirection or clearly wrong result had been shown.

The court found the appellant's real complaint concerned alleged accounting and payment issues that could have been raised during the mortgage proceedings, and noted that a statutory assessment remedy under the Mortgages Act had been initiated but adjourned.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondents.

The employer sought production of the grievor's medical records in relation to an accommodation request and the alleged effect of the employer's actions on the grievor's mental health.

The Grievance Settlement Board ordered the union and the grievor to produce arguably relevant clinical notes and records from specified health practitioners.

The Board imposed conditions limiting the review and use of the documents to the current proceedings and authorized review by specific employer representatives and medical experts.

The Employer sought an order for the production of the grievor's clinical notes and medical records.

The Grievance Settlement Board ordered the Union and the grievor to produce the records of specified doctors and other health practitioners, limited to documents arguably relevant to the grievor's accommodation request and the effect of the Employer's actions on his mental health.

The Board also imposed conditions on who could review the documents and restricted their use solely to these proceedings.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision refusing leave to vacate a trial record after the action had been set down for trial.

The trial record had been filed to avoid dismissal following a status notice, but doing so prevented further discovery under rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Master held that leave could only be granted if there was a substantial or unexpected change in circumstances or if substantive rights were affected.

The court held that the Master fettered his discretion by applying the test too narrowly.

Even without a substantial change in circumstances, leave may be granted where the interests of justice require it, particularly where the plaintiff would otherwise suffer significant prejudice in preparing for trial.