Cheryl Hess

The Children's Aid Society of the County of Renfrew brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act.

The respondent mother had a lengthy history of involvement with child protection services in multiple provinces, with documented concerns regarding mental health issues, substance abuse, poor home conditions, and domestic violence.

The court found that the mother had failed to put forward sufficient evidence to dispute material facts and granted summary judgment in favor of the Society, finding both children in need of protection.

The court also addressed the procedural issue of bifurcating the protection finding from the dispositional hearing.

A motion by the Children's Aid Society of the County of Renfrew to transfer child protection proceedings involving two children from Renfrew County to Ottawa, where the children currently reside with their father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to establish a preponderance of convenience favouring transfer.

The court considered the statutory test under section 48(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, the best interests of the children, the location of witnesses, the children's connections to both jurisdictions, and the availability of court resources.

The court also addressed a related summary judgment motion regarding a third child, which resulted in a consent order placing the child with the mother subject to supervision.

The appellant mother appealed a child protection judgment making her three children Crown wards.

She sought to introduce fresh evidence and argued the trial judge erred by admitting and relying heavily on a court-ordered parenting assessment by Dr. Lynch, while disregarding competing medical reports.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the fresh evidence inadmissible as it was available at trial.

The court held the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in admitting Dr. Lynch's report under section 54 of the Child and Family Services Act, nor in preferring his evidence over the appellant's experts.

Claims of judicial bias and ineffective trial counsel were also dismissed.

The applicant mother brought a motion to establish that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice has jurisdiction to determine custody and access of the parties' three-year-old child.

The respondent father brought a motion to stay the application, arguing that a prior Québec order ratifying a 2009 custody agreement gave Québec exclusive jurisdiction.

The court found that the 2009 agreement and subsequent Québec order were null and void because the parties had reconciled for nearly two years after signing it.

The court held that the child was habitually resident in Ontario, or concurrently in Ontario and Québec, and that Ontario was the appropriate forum.

The mother's motion was granted and the father's motion to stay was dismissed.

Child protection disposition following an amended status review under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two young children with significant behavioural and developmental challenges.

The applicant society sought Crown wardship without access for the purpose of adoption and a restraining order against the father.

Both parents opposed the application and proposed separate plans of care, including supervision orders and kinship placement with maternal grandparents.

The court found the children continued to be in need of protection and that neither parent’s plan provided sufficient stability, parenting capacity, or ability to work cooperatively with required support services.

Crown wardship for the purpose of adoption was ordered and a restraining order was issued restricting the father’s contact with the society, foster parents, and future adoptive parents.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of sex and sexual harassment against an organizational respondent and three individual respondents.

The Tribunal addressed two preliminary requests: a request by respondents' counsel to be removed as solicitor of record for one individual respondent due to a breakdown in the solicitor/client relationship, and a request regarding whether another individual respondent should be removed as a party.

The Tribunal granted the request to remove the solicitor of record.

The Tribunal found it unnecessary to reinstate the individual respondent as he had never been formally removed, and declined to remove him on its own initiative.

The father unsuccessfully appealed a trial decision in a child protection proceeding.

The mother, who supported the children's aid society on the appeal, sought costs of $14,000 on a substantial indemnity scale against the father.

The court held that under subrule 24(2) of the Family Law Rules, the presumption of costs does not apply in child protection cases, even as between parents.

As the father's appeal raised genuine issues and he did not behave unreasonably, the court made no order as to costs.