Charles A. Painter

Following the dismissal of his appeal, the appellant opposed the respondent's request for costs, arguing the court made errors in its decision.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, noting the appellant's application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal had already been dismissed with costs.

The court fixed the respondent's costs of the appeal at $15,000.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision dismissing appeals from Superior Court orders affirming a decision of the Chief Building Official.

The respondent argued no appeal to the Court of Appeal was available.

The Court of Appeal clarified that leave to appeal remains available under s. 6(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act for decisions made under s. 26 of the Building Code Act, 1992.

However, the motion for leave was dismissed on the alternative ground applying the Sault Dock test.

The applicant municipality sought to have the self-represented respondent declared a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and to dismiss his action under Rule 2.1.01.

The respondent had sued the municipality and police for malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, and false arrest following criminal charges against him.

The court declined to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant but struck out his malicious prosecution claims because the underlying criminal charges had not resolved in his favour.

The court also struck numerous scandalous and irrelevant paragraphs from the statement of claim, while allowing the misfeasance and false arrest claims to proceed under strict case management.

Following the dismissal of the Town of Richmond Hill's motion for an interlocutory injunction regarding alleged zoning bylaw infractions, the successful respondents sought partial indemnity costs of $3,851.04.

The Town argued that costs should be reserved to the trial judge or made payable in the cause, and disputed the quantum.

The court rejected the Town's arguments, finding no compelling reason to depart from the ordinary rule that a successful party on a motion is entitled to costs payable forthwith.

The court fixed costs at the requested amount of $3,851.04.

The respondent was found guilty of civil contempt for violating an interim order prohibiting him from communicating with the Town of Aurora and its officials pending a vexatious litigant application.

The court rejected the respondent's proposals to purge his contempt, finding he lacked insight and remained committed to his cause.

The court ordered the respondent to pay a fine of $1,500 and costs of $10,000, emphasizing the need for general and specific deterrence.

The appellant appealed three orders dismissing his motions to set aside a previous order that upheld the revocation of his building permit, and a related costs order.

The appellant had attempted to rely on a purported zoning map to reinstate his permit, which the motion judge found was not genuine.

He also argued that his property had legal nonconforming use status, which the motion judge rejected as res judicata and an extraordinary intensification of use.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's factual findings, upholding the application of res judicata, and affirming the full indemnity costs award due to the appellant's use of a fraudulent document.

The applicant municipality brought a motion for an interim order prohibiting the respondents from using two semi-detached buildings as multi-unit apartments, contrary to the local zoning bylaw.

The municipality argued that the respondents had previously breached the bylaw and could easily do so again.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while a municipality need not show irreparable harm to obtain an injunction against ongoing bylaw breaches, it must demonstrate that the bylaw is currently being flouted.

The evidence indicated the respondents were making some attempt to comply with the bylaw, and the threat of statutory penalties remained an adequate sanction pending the final hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of Trustees of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Compensation Fund denying his claim for $23,000.

The appellant had paid a registered car dealer for a vehicle, but the dealer failed to deliver it, transferred it to a third party, and subsequently declared bankruptcy.

The appellant paid the third party $23,000 to recover the vehicle and sought compensation from the Fund.

The Tribunal found that the purchase was a consumer transaction and that the appellant's loss flowed directly from his payment to the bankrupt dealer.

The appeal was allowed, and the Board was directed to pay the appellant $23,000 from the Fund.

The self-represented plaintiffs in a malicious prosecution action brought a motion to dismiss or stay a related Provincial Offences Act property standards prosecution, alleging it was an abuse of process and a SLAPP proceeding.

They also sought permanent restraining orders against the municipal defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the request for a stay was res judicata as it had been previously dismissed by another judge.

The request for permanent restraining orders was also dismissed because such relief requires a full adjudication of rights and was not pleaded in the statement of claim.

The court issued an amended case management endorsement addressing procedural issues for a judicial review application sought by the appellant.

The endorsement struck the March 3, 2017 proceedings related to setting a date for the judicial review application and vacated the April 18, 2017 return date.

The parties were directed to contact the trial coordinator to set a new hearing date before another judge to consider the procedural issues.

The court emphasized the principle of finality and the remediation order from September 30, 2016, which was determinative of the underlying appeal.

The Appellant appealed the Chief Building Official's (CBO) decision to revoke a building permit for a two-family dwelling, arguing his property was zoned differently or that its legal non-conforming use status exempted him from seeking zoning variations.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the matter largely res judicata due to previous appeals upholding the CBO's decision.

On the merits, the court determined that the proposed construction constituted an extraordinary intensification of use, exceeding the scope of legal non-conforming protection.

Consequently, the Appellant was required to seek zoning variations from the Committee of Adjustments, as such relief falls outside the CBO's authority.

The Superior Court of Justice issued a costs endorsement following an appeal and subsequent motion to reopen.

The appellant had appealed a building permit revocation, which was upheld by both the Superior Court and Divisional Court.

The appellant then successfully moved to reopen the appeal to introduce new evidence (Exhibit H), but the court found Exhibit H to be fraudulent.

The court dismissed the appellant's new arguments as *res judicata* and on their merits.

Due to the appellant's conduct, including presenting a fraudulent document and making unproven allegations, the court awarded full indemnity costs of $50,976.96 plus interest to the respondents.

The Respondents (City of Brampton and CBO) brought a motion alleging the Appellant (Ahmed Elbasiouni) was in contempt of a prior court order regarding property remediation and zoning variances.

The court found the Appellant technically in breach of the order because his applications to the Committee of Adjustments (COA) and Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) did not seek the specific variances contemplated by the order.

However, due to confusion arising from discussions between the Appellant and the CBO without the City's counsel, and the lack of court leave to vary the original order, the court dismissed the contempt motion.

The court emphasized the need for finality in the three-year-old matter and directed the parties to engage in further discussions to determine the way forward for remediation, with strict adherence to a new timetable.

The self-represented appellant appeared before the court to set a date for a judicial review of an Ontario Municipal Board decision regarding a building permit revocation and zoning non-compliance.

The respondents sought to dismiss the application on the technicality that it was commenced under the wrong court file number.

The court denied the request for dismissal, ordered the court office to assign a new file number, directed the production of a video recording of a Committee of Adjustment meeting, and clarified the remediation timetable from a previous order.

The applicant sought to vary a previous endorsement that had upheld the revocation of a building permit and confirmed the property's zoning as R1B(3)-153, following an appeal to the Divisional Court.

The applicant attempted to introduce fresh evidence (Exhibit H) to prove a different zoning, which the court had previously found to be inauthentic.

The court refused to treat the request as a motion for final judgment but agreed to consider the applicant's list of alleged errors.

After review, the court made only one minor correction regarding a costs award amount, maintaining all other aspects of the October 2, 2015 endorsement, including the finding that Exhibit H was not authentic and the property's zoning remained R1B(3)-153.

The moving parties brought a motion alleging the responding party was in contempt of a court order establishing a remediation timetable for zoning variances.

Although the responding party technically breached the order by applying for different variances than those specified, the court found that post-order discussions between the responding party and the Chief Building Official caused confusion.

The court halted the contempt hearing, dismissed the motion, and directed the parties to discuss a way forward.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Chief Building Official revoking a building permit for the construction of a two-family dwelling.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding it was barred by res judicata as the revocation order had been previously upheld.

On the merits, the court held that while the property had legal non-conforming use status, the appellant's proposed construction constituted an extraordinary intensification of use that required a zoning variation from the Committee of Adjustments, which falls outside the authority of the Chief Building Official.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs following successful summary judgment motions.

The defendant's motion was unsuccessful, while the plaintiff's was successful, with findings that the defendant's words were untrue, unwithdrawn, and demonstrated malice.

The plaintiff sought elevated costs, citing the defendant's unreasonable conduct and bad faith, and more favourable settlement offers.

The court found no unreasonableness or bad faith in the defendant's cross-motion or delay, and the plaintiff's settlement offers were not Rule 49 compliant.

However, considering the defendant's demonstrated malice and failure to apologize, the court awarded reasonably generous partial indemnity costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, a former municipal councillor, sought damages for defamation against the defendant, a current municipal councillor, regarding statements made in an email.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The court found the defendant's statements, which alleged the plaintiff disclosed confidential information from a closed council session and acted with a conflict of interest, were defamatory, false, and malicious.

The court rejected the defendant's defences of qualified privilege and fair comment, finding no reciprocity or duty to communicate the defamatory information and that the statements were assertions of fact, not opinion.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the defendant's cross-motion was dismissed.

General damages of $30,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, Valrose Taylor, brought an action for injuries sustained after falling on a City of Brampton bus due to sudden braking.

The parties agreed on damages, leaving only the question of liability.

The court examined the bus driver's standard of care, considering the sudden braking event caused by pedestrians running in front of the bus.

The court found the driver met the standard of care of a reasonable bus driver in the circumstances, as he had to brake immediately to avoid serious injury or death to the pedestrians.

The action was dismissed.