M.A. MacDonald

The court fixed partial indemnity costs following successful summary judgment motions.

The defendant's motion was unsuccessful, while the plaintiff's was successful, with findings that the defendant's words were untrue, unwithdrawn, and demonstrated malice.

The plaintiff sought elevated costs, citing the defendant's unreasonable conduct and bad faith, and more favourable settlement offers.

The court found no unreasonableness or bad faith in the defendant's cross-motion or delay, and the plaintiff's settlement offers were not Rule 49 compliant.

However, considering the defendant's demonstrated malice and failure to apologize, the court awarded reasonably generous partial indemnity costs to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, a former municipal councillor, sought damages for defamation against the defendant, a current municipal councillor, regarding statements made in an email.

Both parties moved for summary judgment.

The court found the defendant's statements, which alleged the plaintiff disclosed confidential information from a closed council session and acted with a conflict of interest, were defamatory, false, and malicious.

The court rejected the defendant's defences of qualified privilege and fair comment, finding no reciprocity or duty to communicate the defamatory information and that the statements were assertions of fact, not opinion.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the defendant's cross-motion was dismissed.

General damages of $30,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash an order of a provincial court judge directing defence counsel to bring a motion to disqualify Crown counsel after the defence indicated it intended to call the prosecutor as a witness at a preliminary hearing.

The Superior Court held that the Ontario Court of Justice judge lacked jurisdiction when making the order because he was sitting in remand court and not acting as a preliminary hearing judge, trial judge, or case management judge.

The court further found that the order denied the accused procedural fairness and interfered with the right to make full answer and defence by preventing the accused from seeking a subpoena for opposing counsel.

The order was therefore beyond jurisdiction and contrary to principles of natural justice.