Cory A. Gilmore

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) applied for an order requiring Andrew Willis to pass accounts for his mother, Ruth Ilene Willis, from January 1, 2015, and to replace him as interim Guardian of Property.

Andrew Willis, acting under a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property since May 2, 2018, consented to the PGT becoming guardian after the sale of his mother's home, and sought to limit the accounting period to his appointment date.

The court found Andrew Willis acted in a fiduciary capacity since at least 2015 and ordered him to provide detailed explanations for financial transactions from January 1, 2015, and a formal passing of accounts from May 2, 2018, to July 31, 2020.

The court also ordered the PGT to be appointed temporary Guardian of Property for Mrs. Willis as of August 1, 2020, regardless of the home's sale, citing Andrew's conflict of interest and neglect of his mother's welfare.

The respondents brought a motion to vary a consent order registered on title to land, seeking to limit its application to only lots relevant to the dispute.

The applicants opposed, citing the respondents' breaches of obligations under the consent order and minutes of settlement, and concerns about related companies.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the respondents did not meet the high threshold to vary a consent order, as the "new facts" (PIN assignments) were foreseeable, and the respondents had demonstrated a disregard for their obligations, justifying the applicants' concerns about security.

The respondents brought a motion seeking a contempt order against the applicant for breaching a disclosure order, an order to set aside restraining orders against Wilfred Abraham, and an order to appoint an inspector for Scorpio Specialty Services Inc. The court dismissed the contempt claim, finding non-compliance but not intentional breach.

It terminated the restraining orders against Wilfred Abraham, concluding they were no longer necessary due to changed circumstances and the applicant's inconsistent positions regarding Abraham's status.

The court granted the request to appoint BDO as an inspector under s. 161(2) of the Ontario Business Corporations Act, finding a prima facie case that the business affairs may have unfairly disregarded security holder interests, with the respondents initially bearing the investigation costs subject to re-apportionment at trial.

The applicant sought an interim Mareva injunction against the respondents and several related entities, alleging breaches of a co-owners agreement, a distribution order, and misappropriation of funds in a real estate development project.

The respondents brought a cross-motion for the release of occupancy fees.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion for a Mareva injunction, finding that the applicant failed to establish a strong prima facie case, a real risk of asset dissipation, or irreparable harm, and that the undertaking as to damages was insufficient.

The court granted the respondents' motion for the release of occupancy fees.

The applicant, Panagiota Aggelakos, sought the appointment of The Canada Trust Company as Guardian of Property for her incapable parents, Nikolaos and Kostadina Aggelakos, due to the respondent, Ioannis Aggelakos's, persistent non-cooperation and failure to abide by a prior settlement agreement.

The respondent, co-attorney with the applicant, opposed the appointment, arguing it was against his parents' wishes and that he intended to cooperate.

The court found that the respondent's lack of cooperation, including failure to open a joint bank account for two years, resulting in significant lost interest income, and his submission of unsworn and late material, created an injustice for the incapable parents.

The court varied the prior settlement and ordered the appointment of The Canada Trust Company as Guardian of Property for both parents.

The respondent moved to dismiss the applicant's application and notice of objection as statute-barred.

The applicant argued her prior filings constituted a "proceeding" within the limitation period or that she was self-represented and unaware of the need to issue an application.

The court found the limitation period began at the date of death or notice of objection, and that neither a notice of objection nor a notice of appearance constituted a "proceeding" under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also rejected the argument that the claims were solely for declaratory relief to avoid the limitation period.

The respondent's motion was granted, and the application was dismissed.

No costs were awarded due to the applicant's impecuniosity and the difficult result.

The applicants sought a declaration of ownership over certain equipment and assets ("BuiltRite Assets") and an order compelling respondents to release them, asserting a first-ranking security interest.

The dispute centered on whether a Quitclaim effectively transferred ownership of "Trailered Assets" to Strongco Plastics Ltd. The respondents argued the Quitclaim lacked certainty and consideration, and that claims against the Hernandezes were stayed due to bankruptcy.

Marcelo Hernandez also cross-applied for compensation for work performed.

The court found the Quitclaim unenforceable due to lack of certainty and consideration, dismissing the applicants' claims regarding asset ownership.

The court also found ESC Enterprises Inc. unjustly enriched by Marcelo Hernandez's services and awarded him compensation.

Marian Carroll, a former TD employee, brought an application seeking an order to compel The Toronto-Dominion Bank and its subsidiaries (TD Waterhouse Private Investment Counsel Inc. and TD Asset Management Inc., as Trustees of the TD Mutual Funds Trust and TD Private Funds Trust) to pass their accounts, alleging misconduct and breaches of trust.

The Respondents moved to strike the application for lack of standing.

The court found that Carroll lacked private interest standing as she was not a beneficiary or unitholder and had no direct financial interest in the trusts.

The court also rejected public interest standing, concluding that the application was not a reasonable and effective means to bring the matter before the court, given other available avenues for beneficiaries and regulatory bodies.

The Respondents' motion to strike was granted, and Carroll's application was dismissed with costs.

This motion, initiated by the Receiver, determined competing priorities under s.78 of the Construction Act between construction lien claimants (represented by Maxion Management Services Inc.) and a third-ranking mortgage held by Donald Dal Bianco.

The court found that Dal Bianco's mortgage, registered after the first lien arose and securing funds advanced between 2012 and 2015, did not qualify for priority as a "subsequent mortgage" under s.78(6) because the advances were not made "in respect of that mortgage." Furthermore, it was not a "building mortgage" under s.78(2) as it did not involve an intention to secure future financing.

The court emphasized the general priority of lien claimants and the mortgagee's burden to prove exceptions.

Consequently, the lien claimants were granted priority over the third mortgage.

The plaintiffs sought interim relief by way of a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against five properties and an oppression remedy under the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA), specifically the appointment of an inspector to audit financial information.

The court dismissed the request for a CPL, finding that the plaintiffs had no direct interest in the properties, which were corporate assets, and that a CPL would cause disproportionate harm to the defendants.

However, the court granted the request for an inspector, finding that the plaintiffs had standing and established a prima facie case of oppression based on their termination, inconsistent treatment as an employee versus partner, and denial of financial information.

The court determined that an inspector was necessary to clarify commingled funds and determine the plaintiffs' interests, with costs to be borne by the plaintiffs initially.

The applicant and three respondents sought a declaration that the respondent 2180366 Ontario Limited (218) failed to properly exercise a Right of First Refusal (ROFR) contained in a Partnership Agreement, which would permit the sale of shares from Parmantid Inc. to the applicant. 218 contended its exercise of the ROFR was unequivocal despite reserving certain rights.

The court found 218's exercise of the ROFR valid, determining that the reservation of rights was not a renegotiation of the purchase price but merely notice of a potential future entitlement, such as claims for unjust enrichment or set-off related to undisclosed liabilities.

Consequently, the Share Purchase Agreement between the applicant and the vendors became null and void.

The application was dismissed, and costs were awarded to 218 against the applicant and the other respondents.

A bankruptcy trustee applied to commence an equalization claim under the Family Law Act on behalf of a bankrupt husband, where neither spouse had initiated such a claim post-separation.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the right to an equalization of net family property is inchoate and personal to the spouses until exercised.

It does not become "property" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and therefore does not vest in the trustee until a spouse has commenced the claim.

The court also found no basis for a federal paramountcy argument as there was no conflict between the statutes if the right remained unexercised.

The Applicant, Illumina Holdings Inc., sought immediate payment of $254,195 plus interest from the Respondents, BrandAlliance Inc. and A Brand Company Inc., based on a share purchase Letter Agreement.

The Respondents brought a counter-application seeking rectification of the Letter Agreement due to alleged valuation errors and a declaration that Arora, Illumina's owner and former CFO of BrandAlliance, breached his fiduciary duties.

Alternatively, the Respondents sought consolidation, trial, or arbitration.

The court found the Letter Agreement binding and enforceable, rejecting the Respondents' claims for rectification, breach of fiduciary duty, and arguments for a trial or arbitration.

The court also found that the Respondents' claims were largely statute-barred and that A Brand Company Inc. was liable due to a merger with BrandAlliance.

The MGMIC Receiver sought a declaration that a second mortgage on Dovercourt Road was valid and enforceable, allowing distribution of sale proceeds to MGMIC investors.

The non-party A13MG argued the mortgage was invalid due to lack of shareholder consent and alleged fraud by MGMIC's directors.

The court found the mortgage valid, citing evidence of consent through email exchanges and the "Indoor Management Rule" under the OBCA.

The court also held that even if invalid, an equitable mortgage would exist to prevent injustice to innocent investors.

A13MG's fraud action was deemed a nullity due to failure to obtain leave.

A commercial tenant, Baketree Inc., brought a motion for a prohibitory injunction to prevent its landlord, 315-345 Flint Road Inc., from evicting it from the leased premises.

Baketree's lease had expired, and the property had been sold to the new landlord, Flint.

Baketree sought a temporary extension to allow it sufficient time to find new premises, renovate, and relocate its extensive bakery operations, arguing that immediate eviction would lead to the collapse of its business and the loss of 100 jobs.

Flint opposed, citing an Estoppel Certificate and "Entire Agreement" clauses, and offered a short extension until February 2020.

The court granted the prohibitory injunction, finding that Baketree met the low threshold for such an injunction, demonstrated irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured a temporary stay.

The court ordered Baketree to vacate by October 31, 2020, and adjusted the rent payments for the interim period.

The applicant mother brought a motion to dispense with the respondent father's consent for international travel to New Zealand with their children for a funeral.

The respondent father brought a cross-motion seeking conditions for the travel and an order for their eldest child to continue at Mildenhall Montessori School, with tuition costs to be considered a section 7 expense.

The court granted the mother's motion to dispense with consent without conditions, dismissing the father's requested terms.

The court ordered the eldest child to continue at Mildenhall for the 2019/20 academic year, with the father solely responsible for the tuition, and adjourned the determination of whether tuition is a section 7 expense to trial.

The case was designated for case management by Justice Gilmore due to high conflict.

The applicant father brought motions to enforce a 2016 Offer to Settle for shared parenting and to strike certain paragraphs and exhibits from the respondent mother's affidavit, alleging breaches of confidentiality provisions under the Child and Family Services Act and a prior court order.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion to permit the use of those documents and sought a s.30 assessment or, alternatively, the appointment of private counsel for the children.

The court dismissed the father's motion to enforce the Offer to Settle, finding it unreasonable given the children's changed circumstances and the high parental conflict.

The father's motion to strike the confidential material from the mother's affidavit was granted for the purpose of the current motion, but access to the protection file for trial was preserved.

The mother's motion for a s.30 assessment was dismissed, but her request for the appointment of private counsel for the children was granted, with costs to be shared by the parties.

The applicant brought a motion for interim child support, seeking imputation of $200,000 income to the respondent, increased life insurance, disclosure orders, and costs.

The respondent, claiming unemployment and disability, opposed the imputation and other requests.

The court imputed an income of $74,977 to the respondent, ordered child support of $700 per month, and a 67/33 split for section 7 expenses.

The existing $100,000 life insurance policy was maintained, and the respondent was ordered to provide outstanding disclosure.

Costs for previous conferences were fixed at $10,000, to be apportioned by the trial judge, and the applicant was awarded $5,000 in costs for the motion.

The respondent father brought a motion for access to his 19-month-old daughter, EFN.

The applicant mother opposed, seeking supervised access at a supervised access centre and imposing several conditions, including a mental health assessment for the father.

The court granted the father's motion for supervised access, initially by a private agency and then by the paternal grandmother, to take place at the father's home.

Most of the mother's requested conditions were dismissed as unreasonable.

The court found the mother's approach unreasonable and her views on the father's culture racist, ordering her to pay costs to the father.

The appellant mother, A.T., brought a motion to extend the time for filing an appeal against protection orders issued by the trial judge concerning her two children, A.T-W. and N.T. The trial judge had found the children in need of protection due to the mother's unfounded allegations of sexual abuse, mental health issues, and breaches of a supervision order, placing them with their respective fathers.

The motion judge applied the four-factor test for extending time for appeal: reasonable explanation for delay, prejudice to the respondent, merits of the appeal, and the justice of the case, with the children's best interests being paramount.

While the mother provided a reasonable explanation for the delay as a self-represented litigant dealing with a two-part judgment, the court found the appeal lacked merit and that allowing it would cause prejudice to the respondents and be contrary to the children's best interests by prolonging litigation.

The motion to extend time was dismissed.