33 total
Convictions for importing cocaine upheld for truck drivers; sentences reduced to 12 and 10 years.
The appellants, two commercial truck drivers, were convicted of importing $3.5 million of cocaine after the drugs were found hidden in their trailer at the border.
They appealed their convictions, arguing they were 'blind couriers' and the trial judge erred in his credibility assessments, particularly regarding their knowledge of English and a purported alibi.
The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence.
However, the court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the sentences from 16 and 14 years to 12 and 10 years, as the original sentences were outside the range for first-time couriers.
Inmate transfer upheld as fair and reasonable.
A federal inmate sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid challenging his reclassification and involuntary transfer from a minimum security institution to a medium security institution.
The court applied the habeas corpus framework and held that the correctional authorities provided an adequate gist of the confidential information relied upon, while properly withholding identifying details of informants.
The court found no breach of procedural fairness because the applicant received notice, disclosure sufficient to know the case to meet, and an opportunity to make submissions, which he waived.
The transfer decision was also reasonable given the applicant's extensive escape history, intelligence indicating current escape planning, and the statutory priority of public safety.
The application was dismissed and modest costs were awarded to the respondent.
Retrospective abolition of accelerated parole review breached s. 11(i).
Three federal inmates applied for a declaration that they remained eligible for accelerated parole review under the pre-repeal Corrections and Conditional Release Act because their offences were committed before the Abolition of Early Parole Act came into force.
The court held that retrospective elimination of accelerated parole review delayed liberty and formed part of the applicants' punishment for purposes of s. 11(i) of the Charter.
Relying on the reasoning in Whaling and agreeing with prior Ontario and British Columbia authorities favouring the inmates, the court concluded the applicants were entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment in force when their offences were committed.
The application was allowed and a declaration issued that they were eligible for accelerated parole review at one-sixth of their sentences.
Sentence appeal dismissed; four-year penitentiary term for child pornography and internet luring upheld as fit.
The appellant appealed his four-year penitentiary sentence for voyeurism, making child pornography, and internet luring involving two teenage victims.
He argued the sentencing judge erred by over-emphasizing consecutive sentences and unreasonably assessing aggravating factors.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the global sentence fit given the serious aggravating features, including breach of trust, careful planning, grooming, and exploitation of a victim's poverty.
Offender sentenced after repeal cannot claim accelerated parole review.
The applicant sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid, arguing that the transitional provisions of the Abolition of Early Parole Act violated Charter rights by depriving him of accelerated parole review.
The applicant had committed the offence before the repeal of the accelerated parole regime but was sentenced after the repeal came into force.
The court considered whether the repeal constituted a change in punishment contrary to s. 11(i) of the Charter and whether the applicant had a settled expectation of liberty based on the earlier regime.
The court held that an offender’s expectation of liberty crystallizes at sentencing, not at the time of the offence.
Because the applicant was sentenced after the repeal of accelerated parole review, the prospective application of the repeal did not constitute punishment or violate the Charter.
Sentence appeal dismissed; sentence fit given the offender's escalating record for violence.
The appellant appealed the sentence imposed following a guilty plea for a serious violent offence.
The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the sentencing judge gave appropriate weight to the guilty plea and that the sentence was fit given the appellant's escalating record for violence.
The appeal was dismissed.
Conviction and sentence appeals for domestic assault dismissed; credibility findings and 12-month consecutive sentence upheld.
The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of assault and his sentence of 12 months' imprisonment consecutive to a sentence he was already serving.
The appellant argued the trial judge erred in her credibility assessment and that the Crown's cross-examination was abusive.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility findings, which were supported by police observations of bite marks, and concluding the cross-examination was relevant.
The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the domestic context, the injuries, and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.
Appeal from dismissal of habeas corpus application regarding prison transfer dismissed.
The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for habeas corpus regarding a prison transfer.
He argued that the Warden's reasons for ordering the transfer were inadequate.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the reviewing judge that, although the reasons could have been better, the appellant knew he was being transferred due to security concerns triggered by an altercation with his cell mate.
Appeal from conviction dismissed; minor witness discrepancy did not render verdict unreasonable.
The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable because the trial judge failed to address a discrepancy in witness testimony regarding whether the robber had a Jamaican accent.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were comprehensive and adequately addressed most discrepancies in the identification evidence.
The court noted that defence counsel had not raised the accent issue at trial and the evidence on the point was not strong.
Sentence appeal dismissed; 33-month term upheld for sexual assault by fraudulent healer.
The appellant appealed a sentence of two years and nine months imprisonment for sexual assault.
The appellant argued the trial judge placed undue emphasis on his position of trust, claiming he was a fraudster rather than a genuine healer, and that the sentence was disproportionate due to immigration consequences.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant used his purported position as a religious consultant and healer to fraudulently obtain consent for sexual acts, and that the sentence was fit regardless of immigration consequences.
Sentence appeal allowed; trial judge erred by automatically treating s. 810.2 offender as worst offender.
The appellant, a career criminal with a lengthy record, appealed his concurrent 21-month sentences for two counts of breach of recognizance.
The trial judge had treated the appellant as being at the 'worst end of the continuum' simply because he was subject to a section 810.2 recognizance.
The Court of Appeal held this was an error in principle, as it would inevitably result in maximum sentences regardless of the gravity of the breach or rehabilitative steps.
The appeal was allowed and the sentences for the breach of recognizance counts were reduced to 12 months concurrent.
Crown sentence appeal allowed; sentence for historical child sexual abuse increased to nine years.
The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for historical sexual and physical abuse of his children.
The Court of Appeal found the original sentence manifestly inadequate and held that the trial judge erred in giving credit for delay in sentencing.
The appeal was allowed, and the total sentence was increased to nine years' imprisonment.
Appeal dismissed; appellant found incapable of consenting to treatment for schizophrenia due to lack of insight.
The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision confirming a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment for a mental disorder, including the use of neuroleptics.
The Court of Appeal found that the Board did not misapprehend the evidence, noting the appellant's denial of his schizophrenia diagnosis and lack of insight into the consequences of refusing treatment.
The Court held that the Board correctly applied the Health Care Consent Act and dismissed the appeal.