Brendan J. Hughes

The plaintiffs brought a motion arising from a dispute over the conduct of examinations for discovery, specifically whether the plaintiff could attend the defendant’s discovery and the order in which discoveries should occur.

The action alleged misrepresentation and fraud relating to investments connected to speaking engagement events and an alleged IPO opportunity.

The court considered the principles governing exclusion of a party from attending an opposing party’s examination for discovery, including the requirement of “proper cause” and the risk of tailoring evidence where credibility is central.

Given evidence suggesting credibility would be a critical issue and concerns regarding potential tailoring of testimony, the court concluded that the interests of justice justified limiting attendance until one party had completed examination.

The plaintiff’s request to strike the defence and related relief was rejected, and directions were provided for how the discoveries should proceed.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action against the respondent and declaring the individual appellant a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action, as the corporate appellant was in receivership and the individual appellant lacked authority to bring a claim on its behalf.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the vexatious litigant declaration, holding that under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, such an order can only be made on an application, not on a motion in an action.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's approval of a sale by a court-appointed receiver, alleging judicial bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the serious allegations of bias.

Furthermore, the court noted the appeal was moot as the properties had already been sold and the proceeds distributed to the major creditor.

The plaintiffs moved for leave to appeal and for a stay of an order refusing to grant an adjournment of the trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the decision to refuse an adjournment is discretionary and entitled to high deference, particularly on the Commercial List.

The plaintiffs failed to satisfy the test under Rule 62.02(4) for leave to appeal an interlocutory order, as the issue was not of broad public importance and there was no basis to doubt the correctness of the order.

The plaintiff, a shareholder and creditor of a closely held corporation, brought an oppression action alleging that another shareholder and director misappropriated corporate funds.

The defendant moved to dismiss the claims, arguing they were derivative in nature and required leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the claims were properly advanced under the oppression remedy in s. 248.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the overlap between derivative actions and oppression claims, particularly in closely held corporations where the risk of frivolous lawsuits is minimized.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding he defrauded the respondent in the sale of a business and awarding damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on liability and the valuation of the business.

The Court also upheld the award of $402,000 in consequential damages for wasted expenses incurred by the respondent in attempting to salvage the unviable business.

The appeal was dismissed, subject to a minor clarification in the formal order to prevent double counting of damages.