Bastarache

The respondent used $300,000 of equity in his law firm to purchase a house and then refinanced his law firm equity with borrowed money.

He deducted the interest on the borrowed money under s. 20(1)(c)(i) of the Income Tax Act.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed and denied the deduction, arguing the true economic purpose of the borrowing was to buy a house.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the legal relationships must be respected and the direct use of the borrowed funds was to refinance the respondent's capital account.

As this is an eligible use, the interest payments were deductible.

The appellant municipality sought to terminate what it alleged was an unlawful substitution of one legal non-conforming use for another after a bar formerly featuring country and western entertainment began presenting nude dancers.

The majority held that acquired rights in zoning matters protect the actual pre-existing use, but with some flexibility for reasonable evolution, subject to limits based on change in kind, remoteness from prior activities, and adverse neighbourhood effects.

On the evidence, the respondents’ pre-existing use was properly characterized as a nightclub offering food, drink, ambiance and lawful entertainment, and the change in entertainment format did not create a wholly different use.

The appeal was dismissed and the acquired right to operate the nightclub continued.

The respondent's fishing vessel was seized for fishing without a licence.

While the vessel was detained, the Federal Court ordered its sale in a separate civil action, and the proceeds were held by the Receiver General.

The respondent was subsequently convicted of Fisheries Act offences, and the sentencing judge ordered forfeiture of $50,000 of the proceeds of the sale.

The Court of Appeal overturned the forfeiture, holding that physical detention of the vessel was a precondition to forfeiture under the Fisheries Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that s. 72(1) of the Fisheries Act authorizes a provincial superior court to order forfeiture of the proceeds of a vessel's sale even when sold under the authority of the Federal Court.

The appellants sued the provincial Crown for environmental damage caused by waste asphalt buried on their farm during highway reconstruction in the 1960s.

The respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by the six-month limitation period in s. 7 of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the disposal of waste asphalt on private land was an operational decision of a predominantly private character, not an act done in pursuance of a public duty.

Therefore, the usual six-year limitation period applied, and the action was not statute-barred.

The accused was charged with first degree murder.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown presented circumstantial evidence, while the accused called witnesses providing arguably exculpatory evidence.

The preliminary inquiry judge committed the accused to trial for second degree murder, refusing to weigh the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that while a preliminary inquiry judge must engage in a limited weighing of the whole evidence when the Crown relies on circumstantial evidence, the judge in this case properly considered the evidence as a whole and did not err in committing the accused to trial.

The respondent's liquor licence was suspended by the Liquor Control and Licensing Branch.

The respondent appealed to the Liquor Appeal Board, which upheld the suspension.

The Court of Appeal set aside the Board's decision, finding that its members lacked sufficient independence because they were appointed 'at pleasure'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the degree of independence required of an administrative tribunal is determined by its enabling statute.

Since the legislature unequivocally provided for 'at pleasure' appointments, there was no room to import common law doctrines of independence.

The appellant was committed to stand trial for first degree murder after forcibly confining his former partner and subsequently stabbing her tenant to death.

The preliminary inquiry judge found that s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, which classifies murder as first degree if committed while committing an enumerated offence (here, forcible confinement), does not require the victim of the murder and the enumerated offence to be the same person.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while such an alleged error by a preliminary inquiry judge is jurisdictional and reviewable on certiorari, the judge did not err in his interpretation.

Section 231(5) only requires a close temporal and causal connection between the murder and the enumerated offence, not that the victims be identical.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants sought a declaration that their comprehensive general liability insurer owed a duty to defend them in an underlying action arising from a fire at a tar sands plant.

The insurer denied coverage based on a 'turnkey exclusion' and a 'professional services exclusion'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the pleadings rule governs the duty to defend, but courts may consider extrinsic evidence explicitly referred to in the pleadings to determine the true nature of the claims.

The Court concluded that the claims against both appellants fell squarely within the turnkey exclusion, relieving the insurer of its duty to defend.

The appellant underwent surgery to relieve facial neuralgia, which was unsuccessful and caused serious sequelae.

She sued the respondent physicians, alleging the surgery served no purpose and that she did not give informed consent because she was not told the specific surgeon who would perform the nerve sectioning, nor was she provided with a consulting neurologist's negative report.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the surgery was medically justified, the appellant was informed of the surgical team's roles, and she was sufficiently aware of the consulting neurologist's negative opinion before consenting to the risks.

The respondent brought an action against the appellants and during an examination on discovery, the appellants requested the production of numerous documents.

The respondent sought a confidentiality agreement to prevent the documents from being disclosed to third parties, which the appellants refused.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that there is an implied rule of confidentiality in Quebec civil procedure regarding information obtained at an examination on discovery.

The Court found that an examination on discovery is not a sitting of the court and that the implied rule of confidentiality protects privacy interests recognized in the Quebec Charter and the Civil Code of Québec.

Ivanhoe contracted out its janitorial services to Moderne, and the union's certification and collective agreement were transferred to Moderne.

When the contract expired, Ivanhoe engaged four new contractors, and Moderne dismissed its employees.

The union applied to transfer the certification to the new contractors, while Ivanhoe applied to cancel the certification.

The labour commissioner and Labour Court transferred the certification but not the collective agreement to the new contractors, and dismissed Ivanhoe's petition for cancellation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard of review is patent unreasonableness.

The Court found that the Labour Court's application of the organic definition of an undertaking and the theory of retrocession to find a legal relationship between successive employers was not patently unreasonable.

The refusal to transfer the collective agreement and the dismissal of the cancellation petition were also upheld.

The respondents, who were self-represented, hired a non-advocate to draft injunction proceedings.

The mis en cause moved to dismiss the proceedings because they were drafted by a non-advocate in contravention of the Act respecting the Barreau du Québec.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the contract for legal services with the non-advocate was absolutely null for violating public order, this nullity did not extend to the legal proceedings themselves.

The proceedings constituted a distinct juridical act by the self-represented litigants, and dismissing them would improperly penalize the litigants and restrict their right to self-representation.

The parties separated after a 36-year marriage.

The husband's pension was equalized as property, and he paid spousal support.

Upon retirement, the husband applied to reduce spousal support, arguing that paying support from his pension income constituted 'double dipping' since the pension had already been equalized.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that to avoid double recovery, it is generally unfair to allow the payee spouse to reap the benefit of the pension both as an asset and then again as a source of income.

The payee spouse has an obligation to use the assets received on equalization in an income-producing way.

The Court reinstated the motions judge's order reducing spousal support.

The appellant employee filed a complaint under the Employment Standards Act for unpaid commissions.

An employment standards officer rejected the claim without providing the employee an opportunity to respond to the employer's submissions.

The employee subsequently pursued a civil action for wrongful dismissal and the unpaid commissions.

The lower courts held the civil claim for commissions was barred by issue estoppel.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while the preconditions for issue estoppel were met, the doctrine should not be applied as a matter of discretion because the administrative decision was made in a manifestly unfair manner.

The Mount Sinai Hospital Center relocated to Montreal after receiving promises from successive Ministers of Health and Social Services that its operating permit would be modified to reflect its long-term and short-term care services.

After the move, the Minister refused to issue the modified permit, citing financial reasons.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Minister's appeal, holding that the Minister had already exercised his discretion under s. 138 of the Act respecting health services and social services when he promised the permit and encouraged the relocation.

The subsequent refusal was not a valid reversal of that discretion and was patently unreasonable.

The Minister was ordered to issue the modified permit.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing that the common law rule of jury secrecy and section 649 of the Criminal Code infringed their Charter rights by preventing them from adducing evidence of jury deliberations to impeach their verdicts.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the common law rule of jury secrecy, which prohibits the admission of evidence concerning the intrinsic deliberation process but allows evidence of extrinsic influences, is consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court also found that section 649 of the Criminal Code is constitutional and that the trial judge in the appellant Pan's case did not err in declaring a mistrial.

The appellant employee was dismissed and his union took his grievance to arbitration, where it was dismissed.

The union refused to seek judicial review of the arbitration award.

The employee then brought a direct action in nullity on his own to quash the award.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the employee lacked the requisite interest to bring the action.

The Court found that allowing an individual employee to challenge an arbitration award when the union has exclusive representation rights would undermine the stability of labour relations and the finality of the arbitration process.

The appellant employee, who suffered from hypertension, was summarily dismissed by his employer.

The employer alleged just cause for dismissal, claiming the employee had been dishonest about his medical condition and available treatments.

At trial, the jury found in favour of the employee, awarding damages including an extended notice period and aggravated damages.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding that any dishonesty by an employee constitutes just cause for dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, establishing that whether an employer is justified in dismissing an employee for dishonesty requires a contextual approach.

The test is whether the employee's dishonesty gave rise to a breakdown in the employment relationship.

The Court restored the jury's verdict on all issues except aggravated damages, finding insufficient evidence of a separate actionable wrong to support that award.

The appellant landscaping and lawn care companies challenged a Town of Hudson by-law that restricted the use of pesticides within its perimeter to specified locations and activities.

The appellants argued the by-law was ultra vires the municipality's authority and conflicted with federal and provincial pesticide legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the by-law was validly enacted under the general welfare provision of the provincial Cities and Towns Act, as it was genuinely aimed at furthering public health and safety.

The Court also found no operational conflict with federal or provincial legislation, as dual compliance was possible, establishing a tri-level regulatory regime for pesticides.

The appellant, a judge of the Court of Québec, had a criminal record from 1971 for assisting members of the FLQ, for which he received a pardon in 1987.

When applying for judicial office, he failed to disclose his criminal record and pardon to the selection committee.

After his appointment, the Minister of Justice learned of his past and lodged a complaint.

The Conseil de la magistrature recommended his removal, and the Court of Appeal subsequently issued a report recommending revocation of his commission.

The Supreme Court of Canada held it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, upheld the constitutionality of the removal process, found no breach of procedural fairness or equality rights, and affirmed that the pardon did not allow the appellant to deny his past.

The Court concluded that the appellant's lack of candour undermined public confidence, justifying his removal.