Family and Matrimonial Law

The respondent, Laura McCombe, brought a motion for disclosure, and the applicant, David McCombe, brought a cross-motion for disclosure and suspension of spousal support.

The motions arose from a previous disclosure order and an underlying motion to change spousal and child support.

The court addressed the ongoing disclosure disputes, emphasizing the need for "critically necessary" information to determine income, particularly for the self-employed applicant.

The court dismissed the applicant's request to suspend spousal support due to outstanding disclosure.

It ordered a structured process for the applicant to provide specific "critically necessary" financial documents and an explanation for an unconventional property purchase.

The respondent was ordered to provide a proper accounting of educational trust funds.

The applicant, who is seeking to adopt her half-sister, alleged that the respondent children's aid society failed to comply with three terms of a settlement agreement reached during mediation.

The terms related to the home study process, expediting the adoption application, and expanding access visits.

Following a teleconference hearing, the Child and Family Services Review Board found that the society had adequately explained the home study process, expedited the application by commencing a concurrent home study, and committed to increasing access visits.

The Board concluded that the society was in compliance with the settlement agreement.

The applicant, a custodial parent, filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the respondent Children's Aid Society failed to respond to her complaints, refused to proceed with them, and failed to hear her concerns or provide reasons for decisions made during a child protection investigation involving her daughter at the other parent's home.

The Board found that the Society failed to respond to the applicant's complaints in a timely manner and refused to proceed with them.

Furthermore, the Board concluded that the Society made no meaningful attempts to engage with the applicant or permit her to express her concerns, thereby failing to provide her with an opportunity to be heard or satisfactory reasons for its decisions.

The Board ordered the Society to invite the applicant to an Internal Complaint Review Panel and provide a letter acknowledging its failures.

The applicant filed a complaint with the Child and Family Services Review Board alleging that the respondent society failed to protect the child's health.

The applicant acknowledged that the concerns were currently before the court and awaiting a settlement conference.

The Board dismissed the application, finding that under section 120(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, it lacks jurisdiction to review a complaint if the subject matter is already before the court.

The applicant alleged that the respondent Society failed to comply with a settlement agreement requiring it to provide reasons for the apprehension of her children.

The Child and Family Services Review Board held a documentary review after the applicant refused to stop recording a teleconference hearing.

The Board found that the Society had provided detailed and meaningful reasons for its actions, noting that disagreement with the reasons does not constitute non-compliance.

The complaint of non-compliance was dismissed.

The applicant mother filed a complaint under s. 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, alleging that the Children's Aid Society failed to hear her concerns and provide reasons regarding alleged abuse of her child by the father during access visits.

The Child and Family Services Review Board found that the Society met its obligations in most respects, having conducted multiple investigations and communicated its focus on the custody dispute rather than child protection.

However, the Board found the Society failed to adequately hear the applicant or provide reasons regarding a specific bathing concern and the closing of the file.

As explanations were provided during the hearing, no further orders were made.

The applicant, previously declared a vexatious litigant by the Board, sought leave to file a new application against the respondent Children's Aid Society.

The Board found that the new application did not set out details of a service-related complaint but instead duplicated complaints made to other bodies and repeated previously identified vexatious behaviour.

The Board concluded the application was an abuse of process and denied leave to file the new application.

The applicant father filed a complaint against the children's aid society, alleging it failed to hear his concerns about an individual living in the same home as his children who had been charged with sexual assault, and failed to provide reasons for closing its investigation.

The Child and Family Services Review Board found that the society failed to make meaningful attempts to engage with the applicant and failed to provide reasons for its decision that the children were not at risk.

The Board ordered the society to provide written reasons to the applicant within 30 days.

The applicant foster parent applied to the Child and Family Services Review Board to rescind the Society's decision refusing her application to adopt a Crown ward.

The Society had decided to place the child for adoption with extended family members residing in Alberta, a plan supported by the child's First Nation Band.

The Board weighed the best interests of the child under s. 136(2) of the Child and Family Services Act, emphasizing the importance of the child's cultural background, blood relationships, and the Band's perspective.

The Board concluded that the kinship placement was in the child's best interests and confirmed the Society's decision.

The applicant, a former foster parent, sought a review of the actions of the respondent children's aid society under section 68.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The complaints related to decisions regarding a foster child and the applicant's biological son, who was the subject of sexual assault allegations and an ongoing civil lawsuit against the society.

The Child and Family Services Review Board dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the applicant did not meet the definition of a parent seeking services with respect to the foster child, and that the issues regarding the biological son were precluded from review because they were the subject of an active civil lawsuit before the courts.

Following extensive family litigation, the court determined issues arising from competing motions to change concerning child support, post‑secondary education expenses, and alleged rental income of the payor parent.

The court considered whether rental property income should be included in income for child support purposes and whether deductions were limited to mortgage interest, property taxes, and insurance.

Due to evidence suggesting income suppression through the transfer of rental properties to a spouse, the court drew an adverse inference and imputed income to the payor parent at $60,000.

The court addressed child support obligations for children involved in junior hockey arrangements and post‑secondary education, setting prospective table support and allocating education expenses between the parents.

Retroactive adjustments were largely declined and the court concluded no refund or underpayment was owed prior to the new order.

Following earlier family law reasons, the court addressed outstanding issues relating to child support and costs.

The moving party sought child support for an adult child, arguing the child remained a “child of the marriage” under the Divorce Act.

The court found the evidence did not establish that the adult child met the statutory definition and also found the responding party lacked the means to pay support.

On costs, success was divided: the responding party succeeded on spousal support but failed on the limitation issue relating to an equalization claim, while the moving party’s claim for child support failed.

In the circumstances, the court ordered that there be no order as to costs.

A children’s aid society appealed the dismissal of its summary judgment motion seeking Crown wardship without access in a child protection proceeding.

The motions judge had refused the order due to concerns about hearsay evidence and insufficient detail addressing statutory requirements under the Child and Family Services Act, including the plan of care and efforts to assist the parent.

The appeal court held that summary judgment is available in child protection cases where there is no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the affidavit evidence was sufficient in context, particularly given the absence of opposition and the parent’s consent.

The court also accepted fresh evidence regarding the child’s placement and adoptability.

The appeal was allowed and the court substituted an order finding the child in need of protection and granting Crown wardship without access.

Following a seven‑day trial concerning a Hague Convention application for the return of a child to a foreign jurisdiction, the court determined the issue of costs.

The applicant father had sought the return of the child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, while the respondent mother successfully relied on the Article 13(b) exception to resist return.

The successful party sought full recovery costs of over $83,000, arguing complete success and reliance on discretionary factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules.

The court rejected the argument that costs could only be awarded under Article 26 of the Hague Convention and held that the ordinary operation of Rule 24 applied.

While some reductions were warranted, the court found the bill of costs generally reasonable and awarded the successful party $64,000 in all‑inclusive costs.

The applicant brought a motion seeking temporary exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and temporary spousal support following separation.

The court implemented a temporary “week about nesting arrangement” to maximize the children’s contact with each parent pending development of a parenting plan.

Applying s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act, the court found the applicant had at least a non‑compensatory entitlement to spousal support, leaving any compensatory claim to trial due to conflicting evidence regarding caregiving roles during the marriage.

The court declined to impute income to the applicant, finding she had made reasonable efforts to obtain employment.

Temporary spousal support was ordered together with interim financial obligations and life insurance security.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, all parties agreed the children remained in need of protection due to parental incapacity and sought a permanent care plan under s. 57.1.

Competing plans proposed placement with maternal grandparents, with the paternal grandmother, or maintenance of split placements.

After reviewing extensive evidence on caregiving capacity, family conflict, cultural and religious issues, and the children’s best interests, the court ordered shared legal custody between the maternal grandparents and the paternal grandmother on an alternating weekly schedule.

The court also set terms for religious holidays, birthday exchanges, and transition arrangements.

The responding spouse sought to strike the applicant spouse’s family law application for failure to comply with a prior order requiring monthly undifferentiated payments and costs following a trial adjournment granted at the applicant’s request.

The applicant acknowledged the breach and proposed partial compliance through RRSP deregistration and payment from trust funds held by counsel, arguing financial hardship and business failure.

The court declined to reconsider the prior order or permit satisfaction of the payments from trust funds, noting insufficient evidence to justify revisiting the earlier ruling and ongoing credibility concerns.

Instead of immediately striking the application, the court adjourned the motion and ordered extensive financial disclosure, including business documentation, banking records, passport records, and updated financial statements.

The applicant was required in the interim to pay funds realized from the RRSP deregistration to the respondent’s counsel pending further determination.

Following a family law motion relating largely to support and financial disclosure, the applicant sought full indemnity costs of $14,774.19 and requested that a substantial portion be enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office.

The court found the applicant had been largely successful and that the respondent had failed to provide disclosure and comply with a prior consent order.

Although the respondent argued that no settlement offer had been made, that some disclosure had been provided voluntarily, and that the applicant was not entirely successful, the court held that the absence of an offer did not preclude full indemnity costs.

The court also questioned the necessity of two counsel and considered the tax implications of support-related costs under Rule 24.

Costs were fixed at $7,500 plus HST and disbursements.

The applicant brought a motion to change prior custody and access orders concerning three children, seeking sole custody and supervised access for the respondent.

Evidence showed ongoing high conflict, inappropriate communications by the respondent toward the applicant, and concerns regarding emotional regulation during parenting.

An investigation by the Office of the Children's Lawyer recommended sole custody to the applicant and therapeutic supervised access for the respondent.

The court found a material change in circumstances under the Children’s Law Reform Act and concluded that joint parenting was no longer workable.

Sole custody was granted to the applicant, with therapeutic supervised access for the respondent subject to review.

In an undefended divorce application, the court addressed whether it could rely on a clearance certificate issued by the Central Registry of Divorce Proceedings where the certificate listed an incorrect application filing date and a clearance date that preceded the commencement of the proceeding.

The court reviewed the requirements under ss. 3(2) and 3(3) of the Divorce Act and the Central Registry of Divorce Proceedings Regulations, as well as r. 36 of the Family Law Rules.

The court held that a clearance certificate must accurately state the date the divorce proceeding was commenced and must have a clearance date on or after that date in order for the court to confirm exclusive jurisdiction.

Because the certificate showed a clearance date earlier than the filing date and an incorrect application date, it could not be relied upon.

The court ordered the Central Registry to issue a new clearance certificate reflecting the correct filing date and a clearance date on or after that date.